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Computer games are common activities in the nineties and have become a new cultural 
influence in children's lives. Games labeled 'educational software' are said to be 
beneficial to the development of children's thinking and learning because they provide 
opportunity to practise problem-solving skills. However, there is little evidence about 
what really happens in this respect when children play an educational computer game. 
Prior to this study, there have been no adequate means for assessing reasoning and 
problem-solving skills in the context of computer games. The study aims to develop 
ways to measure and analyze gains in children's cognitive skills acquired through 
computer game activities. To develop a method of assessing children's reasoning, the 
game chosen was an inferential problem-solving game called 'Find the Flamingo', one 
of the 'Safari Search' series (O'Brien, 1985). Different versions of the 'Find the 
Flamingo' game - computer, board and card games - were given with if-then sentences 
as rules of the game. 282 primary school children took part in this research. Four 
studies were carried out. Study 1 compared the effects of specific media on children's 
performance in the game. No difference was found between the use of computers and 
traditional game tools such as a board or playing cards. 	 Study 2 explored 
developmental trends and individual differences in problem solving with the game. 
Differences in the curves of performance groups were shown to be stable across games. 
The production and use of inferences in the process of playing the game were also 
examined. Children used the inferences with different levels of accuracy according to 
the conceptual difficulties in the information. Study 3 explored the impact of guided-
planning and timed pausing for reflection on inferential problem solving with a 
simplified version of the computer game. Children benefited from guided-planning in 
the training period. Study 4 examined the development of operative logic of 
inclusions and exclusions across three inferential tasks and the Flamingo game. The 6-
year-old children understood the inclusion rule of multiple possibilities, but they were 
not able to coordinate the knowledge of inclusion and exclusion to represent more 
complicated structures. The significant association between the performances of the 
tasks and of the game even after the control for age allowed the prediction of the 
Flamingo game performance. Applications of the findings could lead to the design of 
computer programs that concentrate on specific aspects of problem-solving skills such 
as planning, and the development of problem-related concepts and operations. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Computer games are common activities in the nineties and have become a new culture in 
children's lives. Children play computer games in and out of the school curriculum. It 
is a strong tendency in the education policies in many countries to encourage computer 
use with every age of children (Janssen Reiner & Plomp, 1997; Pelgrum & Plomp, 
1991) and home computers are used mainly for game playing (Giacquinta, Bauer & 
Levin, 1993). New games are often labeled 'educational software'. Although the 
games are said to be beneficial to the development of children's thinking and learning, 
there is little evidence about what really happens in this respect when children play an 
educational computer game. Thus, it is important to develop ways to measure and 
analyze gains in children's cognitive skills through the computer game activities of the 
present day. 
The aim of the thesis is to develop a framework for analyzing children's thinking in 
computer games. In particular, the focus is on the development of children's ability to 
make and use inferences in the context of computer games and how this development 
differs between individuals. Despite the recent upsurge of interest in computer games, 
relatively little is known about educational games, and even less about how to examine 
the development of thinking in an educational game context. To build a framework to 
investigate computer game activity, two points can be made from research on games in 
general and on problem solving. The first is that decisions have to be made in games 
(Colman, 1982; Davis, 1970); the second is that processes of decision making and 
problem solving often involve inference (Piaget & Garcia, 1991; Manktelow & Over, 
1990; Thornton, 1995). Ways of analyzing children's inferences in the context of 
computer games will be explored in this thesis. 
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The introduction consists of four sections. In the first section, the role of decision 
making in games, and the measurements and special features of computer games are 
defined and discussed. The second section describes how game playing develops into 
problem solving. The role of concepts in problem solving contexts is discussed. And 
there will be an introduction to the game chosen for this thesis: its criteria and purposes. 
The organization of the thesis will be described at the end. 
1. 1. Games 
Voluntary control has been emphasized in definitions of games (e.g., Demsey, 
Lucassen, Gilley & Rasmussen, 1993-4; Herron & Sutton-Smith, 1971; Pellegrini, 
1995). Players decide what their goals are, plan their moves and attempt to anticipate 
the other participants' intentions. Since the outcomes may depend upon the choices of 
the decision-makers involved in games for two or more persons, the players may try to 
assign probabilities to one another's moves. The player's moves may be aimed directly 
toward the goal or to obtain more information. In this thesis, games requiring the 
search for a goal according to certain rules will be studied. 
Scholars have classified games according to certain family resemblances. The most 
basic criterion of classification seems to concern the factors that affect the outcomes of 
the game: games of skill, games of chance, games of strategy and games of second-
guessing. Games of skill, strategy and chance may be classed as games for one person 
or more, while games of second-guessing must involve two or more decision-makers. 
The term 'second guessing' is defined as anticipating the moves of an opposing player. 
This classification is useful because the method of analyzing a specific game can be 
applied without modification of the fundamental ideas to other games which belong to 
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the same general class; only relatively few games need, therefore, to be studied in order 
to understand a much larger number. 
1.1.1. 	 What is the role of decision-making in games? 
Performances in games are rich sources for the analysis of attributes of decision 
making. Game players continuously ask themselves, "Which strategy/move should I 
use next?" Drawing on cognitive and information processing theories, scholars have 
asserted that 
"Human rational behaviour is shaped by a scissors whose two 
blades are the structure of task environments and the computational 
capabilities of the actor." (Simon, 1990). 
Consequently, the decision-making of a game player is bound to her or his 
understanding of the task, in other words, the rules of the game and the types of 
information encoded in the course of the game. From the perspective of mathematical 
game theory (see McKinsey, 1952), randomness and hidden information make the 
outcome of a game uncertain and this uncertainty is a major charicteristic which makes 
the game interesting and attractive (Malone, 1980). Can young children understand the 
rules of games and pay attention to information given in the course of a game? What 
kind of logical inferences do children make? How do individual differences affect game 
playing? Strategies or goal-directed search patterns are shown in games. A plan, a 
consciously adopted strategy, means using information to determine further moves 
towards the goal and to select appropriate moves to bring this about. Do children plan 
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moves in the game? Winning, losing, or reaching the goal depends on players' 
strategies and planning as well as on other factors, such as luck. 
	
1.1.2. 	 How have outcomes of games been studied? 
Outcome measurements in game activity can be quantitative or qualitative. One 
approach to measuring gains in skills from playing games is to look at the quantitative 
changes in performance with practice (Mazur & Hastie, 1978; Walker, 1996). The 
reduction in solution times with practice has been emphasized, by following individual 
learning over a large number of trials as the player becomes increasingly competent at 
executing a skill. As qualitative measurements, types of strategies and categories of 
judgements are often used. However, there must be caution about the validity of 
measuring types of strategies, since more- and less-advanced strategies may coexist in 
an individual and it is not the case that children always apply their most advanced 
strategy in a task (Siegler, 1989; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). 
	
1.1.3. 	 What are the special features of computer games? 
Firstly, repetitiveness is a distinguishing characteristic of computer game activities. 
Many children are highly motivated to play against the computer over and over again. 
Repetition gives players the opportunity to develop cognitive skills related to the game. 
In learning-from-doing, the players acquire more generalized strategies (Anderson, 
1982; Bruner, 1996; Greenfield, 1984). Next, fast feedback and the visual and audio 
18 
aspects which the traditional pencil and paper tasks can never offer are motivational 
factors of this new medium (Carter, 1984; Siegel & Misselt, 1984). In the tradition of 
Marshall Mcluhan's remark that the medium is the message, Kozma (1991) argues that, 
in a good instructional design, media and method are narrowly integrated and 
consequently the learner constructs knowledge in interaction with medium and method. 
Thirdly, proponents of computer games point to a form of preparation for, or initiation 
into, the more cognitively demanding world of computer technology (Hawkridge, 
1990); however, this is not the main concern of this study. Finally, due to the technical 
advance in computers, it is possible to have automatic recording which tracks each 
move players have made in computer games. 
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1. 2. Problem solving 
Educational games embody problem solving. Deciding in which boxes to put three 
crosses to make a straight line in the game of noughts and crosses, which letter will 
complete a word in "Hangman", or how to find the way to the exit in a Maze all demand 
problem solving. Solving a problem is a search that occurs when the means to an end 
do not occur simultaneously with the establishment of the goal (James, 1890). The 
journey of problem solving, in almost any instance, has different steps: recognizing that 
there is a problem and identifying a new goal; planning a strategy to solve the problem; 
noticing whether or not this strategy works and planning another one if it does not (see 
Marshall, 1995; Newell & Simon, 1972). Do children recognize problems in a game? 
Do they plan the use of information before starting a game or in the process of the 
game? Inferences are a key element in problem solving in games. At each step in 
problem solving, the child must make sense of the information available and use that 
information to generate a new understanding of the problem or a new strategy. This 
involves making inferences or deductions that take the child from what she or he 
originally knew to some new piece of information or new idea (Thornton, 1995). 
Some insight into the question of how children relate a new piece of information to 
what they already knew has come from neo-behaviourists. In concept formation tasks, 
a participant must in a first task learn to select one of two (or more) stimuli. She or he 
is then required in a second task to select one of the previously incorrect choices; i.e. 
she or he must reverse her or his response to a particular situation. If she or he is trying 
to infer what makes certain choices positive and certain ones negative, her or his task is 
to discover which of the discriminable attributes or which combination of discriminable 
attributes are present in the positive instances and absent in the negative ones. 
Discovering is, then, a matter of developing intentional hypotheses or descriptions of 
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concepts and classes identified in clustering, so that instances not previously 
encountered can be recognized and utilized (Langley, 1987; Mascolo & Fischer, 1999). 
Individual differences in performances of concept formation tasks have been reported 
(Kendler, 1995; Kendler & Kendler, 1959; Kendler, Kendler & Carrick, 1966; 
Kendler, Kendler & Wells, 1960). In Kendler & Kendler (1959), kindergarten 
children (5-6 years) were trained on a discrimination problem with two pairs of stimuli 
which differed both in size (e.g. large v. small) and brightness (e.g. black v. white). 
Only one stimulus within a specific dimension was correct (e.g. the large stimulus in 
the size dimension); the stimuli in the other dimension (e.g. both brightness stimuli) 
were irrelevant to the solution of the problem. After solving this problem, the children 
were required to solve a second discrimination problem in which they either had to 
reverse their previous choice (e.g. select small) or shift to the previously irrelevant 
dimension (e.g. select black rather than either large or small). The former is termed a 
reversal shift; the latter a nonreversal shift. With the kindergarten children neither shift 
was favoured. However, when the children were divided into fast and slow learners, 
based on their first task performance, it was found that the fast learners mastered the 
reversal shift better than the nonreversal shift while the opposite was true for the slow 
learners. How can these individual differences be explained? More direct observation 
of the learning process itself, rather than its results, has been suggested as a more 
productive way to analyze individual differences in ability to learn (Resnick & Neches, 
1984). The question of how children learn search strategies will be discussed regarding 
choice as inference in Chapter 2. 
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1. 3. The computer game chosen for the research 
Two criteria for the choice of a computer game for the research were, first, that it can be 
played by children within a broad age range and, second, the problem solving feature of 
the educational software. The former criterion is in order to explore what it is that 
makes younger children able to play with computer games successfully while older 
children still find them challenging; a question that instantly arises is whether there are 
developmental trends in understanding the game structure and inferring the target from 
information. The latter criterion is in order to examine whether children use logic in 
playing computer games and what they take into account when making decisions about 
the next moves. 
For the purpose of this research, the chosen game was an inferential problem-solving 
game called "Find the Flamingo", one of the 'Safari Search' series (O'Brien, 1985). It 
is advertised as educational software and one of the goals of this research is to explore 
the relation of such software to children's thinking. The goal of the game is to find the 
location of a Flamingo hidden among 25 cards. The instructions appear on the screen 
as follows: 
Turn over a card to find the Flamingo. 
If it's there, you win. 
If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT 
If it touches your box cornerwise, you are WARM 
If they don't touch at all, you are COLD. 
Figure 1.1. A picture of the 'Find the Flamingo game' with the rules 
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The game looks easy and friendly, since the Flamingo must be underneath one of 25 
cards, which make a scene on a safari. The Flamingo can be searched for using merely 
the strategy of random trial and error. However, if the players try to make an effective 
search, it is cognitively challenging in that information has to be selected in the course 
of the game, and spatial directions to the Flamingo should be inferred from the 
information. Interesting research questions raised in this game will be explored in the 
thesis. Did children understand the logical structure of the if-then sentences given as 
rules of the game and use their knowledge in the course of playing the game? How 
would children construct and use the new meanings of the words - Hot, Warm and 
Cold - in the Flamingo game? Hot, Warm and Cold in the game are not degrees of 
temperature or feelings as used in everyday life, but relations to the location of the goal. 
Faced with the spatial information of Hot, Warm, and Cold in the game, would the 
children construe the words as signals of exclusion of impossible locations of the goal 
or inclusion of possible locations? 
1. 4. 	 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 2 provides an account and evaluation of 
major approaches to explaining children's inference making. Two approaches will be 
discussed: neo-behavioural and cognitive constructivists' views. Issues concerning the 
process and components of strategic thinking are considered in more detail. Children's 
assumptions toward a game, the development of the concept of rule, and understanding 
inferential goal search will be examined. 
Chapters 3 — 6 contain accounts of four experiments, each including the specifics of 
design and analysis. 
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Chapter 7 presents a summary of the main findings in relation to the research questions, 
limitations of this project and suggestions for further research, and the educational 
implications. 
In brief, this thesis explores various aspects of children's making and use of inferences 
in the context of computer games, and examines ways to analyze their performance. It 
aims to use the computer game as a window into the everyday thinking of children. It 
is hoped that findings from studies such as this will be useful in designing educational 
programs using computer games for children. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
This literature review aims to develop a technique for analyzing children's thinking in a 
computer game context. I will explore various aspects of thinking in game playing: 
children's representation of the game, functions of their choice behaviour, the process 
by which judgements are made, individual differences and development, and the need 
for adult intervention. These six aspects have been also acknowledged as fundamental 
elements of a theory of thinking (Johnson-Laird, 1983; White, 1993). 
Regarding the above elements of thinking, a hypothetical model of decision-making 
processes is proposed in this study. The model of decision making involves the 
following process. First, a child is faced with the situation. The player perceives the 
situation. The product of this perception is an internal representation. In the Flamingo 
game, the player is presented with many squares making a beautiful safari scene on the 
first screen and the rules appear on the next. The rules of the Flamingo game say: 
Turn over a card to find the Flamingo. 
If It's there, you win. 
If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT. 
If it touches your box cornerwise, you are WARM. 
If they don't touch at all, you are COLD. 
Surely the player asks herself or himself what is this situation: is winning a chance 
event or a target which can be achieved logically? It is assumed that the representation 
of the situation would affect choice making, which is the next process in decision 
making. 
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Second, choices are made in a game situation. This situation is conceived as complex, 
containing a set of choices (at least two and possibly more), each of which involves a 
set of outcomes (gains or losses of various kinds and degrees). The choices, in turn, 
are embedded in a context or frame. Each square contains HOT, WARM, COLD or the 
Flamingo. Each word conveys a spatial relation to the goal, if the child makes a 
connection between the words and the game rules. Does the player infer from the rules 
when they make choices? Will all the rules be used for inference? If she or he is not 
good at using the rules, will use improve as the game goes on? 
The third part of the decision process is an attempt to solve the problem. The goal is 
hidden among 25 squares in the game. The task of finding the Flamingo becomes a 
problem to solve. How does the player represent the structure of the problem? Will 
she or he plan moves ahead? The decision is made internally, but the choice leads to 
actual behaviour that can be directly observed. Since the player's mind cannot be seen 
directly, her or his actual choice of behaviour in a given situation constitutes a clue, and 
sometimes the only clue, to what the person's decision processes might be. These three 
parts of the decision making process are not mutually exclusive. In particular, choices 
cannot be separated from the problem solving process if the player draws logical 
inferences from information given in the form of alternative choices. 
In my examination of the decision—making processes, I will review and discuss studies 
of social context, the development of the concept of a rule, contents of rules, choice as 
inference, inferential goal search, logical certainty and a specific additional issue: girls 
and computer games. The research questions for each of the experiments of the thesis 
will be introduced at the end of the chapter. 
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2.1. Social context: Games vs. Tasks 
The first part of the decision process concerns the player's perception of the situation. 
How does the child play a game if she or he defines it as a chance event? What if the 
player defines it as problem solving? There is a golden old research study on this issue. 
Goodnow (1955) carried out an experiment based on a two-choice task. The participant 
was to predict on each trial which of the two possible events occur when the series of 
trials has been randomized and so arranged that the probability of event A occurring is 
0.7, and of event B, 0.3. Two other cases used an equal probability, 0.5 of A and B 
event occurring and a probability A of 0.9 with B of 0.1. One group of subjects was 
instructed so as to induce a 'gambling' set, while another group was instructed so as to 
induce a 'problem-solving' set. The probability of winning was programmed as the 
same in the two sets. There was no difference in children's choices between gambling 
and problem-solving sets for cases 50:50 and 90:10. However, there were significant 
differences for case 70:30. The players came to predict A (the more frequent event) on 
all trials in the 'gambling' set, but not in the 'problem' set. In the 'problem' set, the 
players behaved as if there was some pattern to be found in the game and that 
regularities were applicable. The 'gambling' set was more conducive to the maximizing 
tendency (the predictions approximating 100%) than the problem set. Siegel and 
Golstein (1959) explained the results of Goodnow's study in terms of strategy while 
confirming the results of her study. They argued that circumstances in which risk or 
uncertainty occurs, like in the gambling set, were most likely to induce a "maximum 
gain" strategy: the maximization of the expected frequency of correct predictions. The 
player came to predict the more frequent event on all trials in the 'gambling' set. These 
studies showed how the perception of the event altered the behaviour. 
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Ceci (1990) compared a game context and a problem-solving context in computer 
activities. Children were instructed to predict by placing a cross on the screen at that 
location (by moving a joystick), where, on the computer screen, an object would 
terminate. The object was one of three shapes (square, circle, and triangle), two 
colours, and two sizes, yielding 12 combinations of features. Squares would go up, 
circles would go down, and triangles would stay horizontal. Similarly, dark-coloured 
objects would move to the right, and light-coloured objects would move to the left. 
Large objects would move on a lower-left to upper-right diagonal, while small objects 
would move along the opposite diagonal. There were no interactions in the algorithm. 
Children were given 15 sessions of 50 random trial each; however, their prediction 
accuracy was only 22%. Next, the same algorithm was used to drive a video game. 
The three geometric shapes were converted to a butterfly, a bumble bee, and a bird. 
The same colours and size were used. Instead of placing a cross on the area of the 
computer screen where they predicted that the object would terminate, children were 
told to place a "butterfly net" to capture the prey by moving a joystick. Children were 
awarded points for each correct capture, and sound effects were added to complete the 
video game context. The change of context resulted in drastically improved 
performance. After 750 feedback trials altogether, the children's accuracy was near 
ceiling. 
In an extension of this study, a more complex curvilinear algorithm was used to drive 
the objects. Again, there was a substantial enhancement of performance when the task 
was embedded in the presumably more motivating video game context, although the 
overall levels of performance were not as high as those found with the simple additive 
algorithm. 
Relatively few research studies have been conducted on the educational effectiveness of 
computer games and much of the work is anecdotal, descriptive, or judgmental, rather 
than investigative (Randel, Morris, Wetzel, & Whitehil, 1992; Walford, 1995). 
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Nevertheless, some issues have been raised in investigating the effect of educational 
software on children's learning. 
Firstly, research has shown that children get better in using various cognitive skills 
while they are engaged in the practice of games (Blaye, Light, Joiner, & Sheldon, 
1991; Littleton & Light, 1999; Sedighian & Klawe, 1996; Sedighian & Sedighian, 
1997; Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, 1994). Children in a game context learn skills that 
they cannot learn if the activity is defined as a task, for motivation is created by the 
situation. They behave differently, depending on their assumptions toward a game. If 
they represent the Flamingo game as a chance event, they make random choices and 
their behaviour will reflect reinforcement. If they represent it as a problem, their game 
behaviour becomes problem solving and making inferences from information. 
Secondly, observation has been widely made of marked gender differences in the ways 
in which boys and girls tend to approach computer-based games (Brosnan, 1998; 
Hughes, 1990). Section 2.7 will review this gender issue in more detail. 
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2.2. Development of the concept of a rule in games 
What if a child starts a game without relevant concepts about rules? Can we predict 
whether she or he will be a good player? The literature on children's concept of a rule 
and its relation to game play will be reviewed in this section. 
Piaget investigated the question of how children come to understand the rules of games 
(Piaget, 1932). In accordance with his "stage" theory of the development of children's 
intelligence, he explains a child's feelings and thoughts about rules in terms of 
assimilation and accommodation. In the first two stages (up to 6 years), the child 
assimilates rules unconsciously along with the commands to which he is subjected, 
taken as a whole. According to Piaget, the simple routine regularities of experience that 
precede the rules of games imposed by a group of players give rise to the consciousness 
of rules. In the case of babies, external regularity produces an awareness of "law", or 
at any rate favours the appearance of motor schemas of prevision. Sources of 
awareness of the regularity of the environment can be either certain physical events 
(alternation of day and night, sameness of scenery during walks, etc.) or parental 
discipline (meals, bed-time, cleanliness, etc.). For older children, however, certain 
forms of behaviour are ritualized by the child herself or himself (e.g. not to walk on the 
lines that separate the paving stones from each other on the curb of the pavement). 
While these motor rules never give rise to the feeling of obligation, certain rules - it 
does not matter whether they were previously invented by the child, imitated, or 
received from outside - are at a given moment sanctioned by the environment, i.e. 
approved of or enjoined. 
Piaget (1932) distinguishes three kinds of behaviours in play: motor behaviour, 
egocentric behaviour (with external constraint) and co-operation. Corresponding to 
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these three types of social behaviour there are three types of rules in playing games: the 
motor rules due to pre-verbal motor intelligence, coercive rules due to unilateral respect, 
and rational rules due to mutual respect. 
The child aged between 3 and 7 knows that there are rules, the "real rules", and that 
they must be obeyed because they are obligatory. But on the other hand, although the 
child vaguely takes note of the general scheme of these rules (making a square, aiming 
at the square, etc.), she or he is still hostile to any innovation of rules at this stage. 
On the average after the age of 10, i.e. from the second half of the co-operative stage 
and during the whole of the stage when the rules are codified, autonomy follows upon 
heteronomy. The rule of a game appears to the child no longer as an external law, 
sacred in so far as it has been laid down by adults, but as the outcome of a free decision 
and worthy of respect in the measure that it has enlisted mutual consent. 
Corresponding to the development of behaviour, Piaget (1951) classifies play by the 
structure that characterizes it. He makes three main categories: sensori-motor play 
(sometimes translated as "mastery play" or "motor practice games"), symbolic play, and 
games with rules. Piaget suggests two ways to study children's games which have 
rules: first, to observe the practice of rules, i.e. the way in which children of different 
ages effectively apply rules: second, to study the consciousness of rules, i.e. the idea 
which children of different ages form of the character of these game rules, whether it is 
something obligatory or something subject to their own choice, whether they experience 
heteronomy or autonomy. 
The importance of Piaget's theory of game play (1932, 1951) lies in the fact that he 
relates children's game play to the development of logic and conceptual thinking. 
Drawing on empirical evidence, he describes the children's development of the 
construction of rules. For the sake of the argument, Piaget does not mention the fact 
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that rules in many strategic games are not subject to the player's choices. The rules are 
already set up. Thus, the acceptance of the rules is obligatory. For example, in chess, 
players are not concerned about changing rules but strategic use of the rules. 
Of much interest in observing children's game behaviour is children's internalization - 
understanding - of the game rules and use of it. It is important to distinguish between 
pure regulation of game behaviour without awareness of following any rule and proper 
rule-guided behaviour. Not only clinical discourse but also quantitative methods will be 
applied to analyze children's thinking in this matter. 
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2.3. 	 Contents of rules: affirmative vs. negative 
This section of the literature review looks through the previous research on children's 
understanding of the logical structure of the if - then sentences which are given as the 
game rules, and the use of their knowledge in the course of playing the game. These 
rules are stated as affirmative and as negative in the Flamingo game. 
If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT. 
If it touches your box cornerwise, you are WARM. 
If they don't touch at all, you are COLD. 
It could be that when she or he makes choices, a player use syllogisms* with these 
rules. An example would be the player with HOT. The reasoning is as follows: "I am 
HOT. The rule says If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT. 
Therefore, the Flamingo touches my box sidewise." However, it is very unlikely for 
the player to be able to recall the exact sentences of the rules at each move (Bartlett, 
1932; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Markovits, Fleury, Quinne & Venet, 1998). 
The rules in use are more like: 
When the clue is HOT, the goal is either directly above or below, or right or left from it. 
When the clue is WARM, the goal is one of diagonals from it. 
When the clue is COLD, the goal is not a square touching it. 
* An if p then q statement serves as a major premise and the negated or affirmed version of the 
antecedent and consequent serves as a minor premise. 
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Research on reasoning has shown that there are differences in infoimation-processing 
between positive and negative statements. Wason (1959) investigated the mechanism 
behind the information processing of affirmative and negative propositional sentences 
with college students. Participants were given four kinds of statements, generated from 
two kinds of information - positive or negative - with two values: true or false. The 
four kinds of statements can indicate that something either is the case or is not. An 
affirmative statement that is known to be true and the complementary negative statement 
which is known to be false both imply that something is the case. An affirmative 
statement that is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is 
known to be true provide the same information, i.e., that something is not the case. 
The time taken to judge each statement was measured and compared between each kind 
of information and between values. He measured accuracy of judgements and time 
taken in completing the task of processing the information. It was found that dealing 
with negative statements led to more mistakes and took more time than dealing with 
affirmative statements. 	 Wason supposed that a "pre-existing" set for positive 
information explained why the false affirmative condition takes longer to process than 
the affirmative one. The role of a negated constituent, that is a denial of a 
presupposition, would require more cognitive processes than an affirmation. 
Many other explanations have been proposed for the phenomenon (see Evans, 1989). 
A negated constituent does not always deny a presupposition, but it often identifies a 
contrast class (Hampton, 1989). Toppino's experiment (1980) is one of the good 
examples showing that a negated constituent identifies a contrast class. Toppino 
investigated children's responses to positive and negative queries when two comparing 
values are both present or one is absent. Kindergarten children were shown two cards - 
a hypothesis card and a stimulus card - simultaneously. A hypothesis card contained 
values from two attributes (e.g., blue and circle) and a stimulus card contained only one 
of these values (e.g., blue). Half of the stimulus cards (proper-subset stimuli) 
contained only the single value (e.g., blue), which constitutes a proper subset of the 
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values on the hypothesis card. The other half of the stimulus cards (non proper-subset 
stimuli) contained two values, one of which was, and one of which was not, on the 
hypothesis card (e.g., blue and cross). Half of the children were asked to indicate 
which value on the hypothesis card was also on the stimulus card (positive queries) and 
the other half were asked to indicate which value on the hypothesis card was not on the 
stimulus card (negative queries). The kindergarten children did reasonably well on 
problems involving the proper-subset stimuli for both positive and negative queries, in 
that 80 to 90% of the children solved all such problems. However, the results were 
quite different for those problems involving the non proper-subset stimuli, which 
included irrelevant features on the stimulus card. Here only 50% of the children solved 
all problems with positive queries and only 25% solved all problems with negative 
queries. Corroborating results were obtained in two additional experiments. 
However, even though negative queries did pose difficulties for the children, research 
has shown that pre-training and feedback enhance younger children's handling of them 
(O'Brien & Overton,1982; Spiker, Cantor & Klouda, 1985). Spiker, et al, in one of 
their experiments (Experiment 3), explored factors in producing superior performance: 
feedback to the children on the correctness of their responses to queries, pre-training 
with its attendant feedback, or explicit use of labels. They presented 4- and 6-year-old 
children with sets of cards consisting of relevant and irrelevant information. The 
unitary stimuli consisted of colour-form compounds made from combinations of one of 
the colours, red, blue, or green, with one of the forms, square, circle, or triangle. The 
partitioned stimuli were produced by spatially separating the two components of each 
unitary compound. A positive query consisted of asking the child to indicate the value 
on the hypothesis card that was also on the stimulus card. A negative query asked the 
child to name the value on the hypothesis card that was not on the stimulus card. Each 
pair of hypothesis and stimulus cards together with either a positive or negative query 
constituted a single reasoning problem. Superior responses to the positive query than 
to the negative were shown. The level of correct performance of the first graders was 
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as high as above 90% for positive queries. This was much higher than for negative 
queries. In addition, this difference was found only for the three most difficult tasks. 
A combination of feedback information and preliminary experience with simple forms 
of the tasks produced the high performance levels, while the verbal labelling of stimulus 
components had no effect. 
The usage and the meaning of "If change with context (e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 
1972; Light, Blaye, Gilly & Girotto, 1989; Light, Girotto & Legrenzi, 1990). "If-then" 
can be used to express the propositional concept of conditional implication and "If and 
only if' can be used to express biconditional equivalence. 	 It was found that 
understanding the distinction between "if-then" and "if and only if' improves into 
adulthood, but tends to be still problematic even for adults (Byrnes & Overton, 1988; 
see Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; Smith, Langston & Nisbett, 1992 for reviews). 
In everyday life "if' is used for biconditional equivalence as well as conditional 
implication. Young children employ "If-then" statements to express meaningful 
relations such as temporal order, causality or rule-governed social interactions (French 
& Nelson, 1985; Scholick & Wing, 1992, 1995). 
Studies looking for competence in logical ability have demonstrated young children's 
sensitivity to semantics. Processing negative queries and statements seems to pose 
more difficulties than positive. The negated rule "If they don't touch at all, you are 
COLD" implies that the Flamingo cannot be next to the current location when your 
choice says COLD. Inference from COLD directs the player to exclude touching 
squares and to hold ones NOT touching for the goal. The negative constituent in the 
rule of COLD identifies an opposite class of WARM and HOT that direct the players to 
infer the inclusion of touching squares. It is predicted that correct inference from 
COLD will be poor due to the negative constituent in the rule. But feedback may 
enhance children's performance in inferring from the rule with a negative constituent, as 
studies have shown. 
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2.4. Choice as inference 
Following the first part of the decision-making process, that is, the representation of the 
situation, the second part is choice making, which raises a research question of whether 
choices are dictated by a conscious representation of the problem, or by a likelihood 
gained through the past experience of reinforcement. Investigations on the issue have 
been through discrimination (or concept formation) tasks in which two (or more) 
stimuli are constantly rewarded. For example, choice of a 'large' object is consistently 
rewarded regardless of its size in a training session. Then the job of the player in a test 
session is to choose correctly which one the reward will follow. The learning of 
'small' is easier than 'white' or 'black' if 'large' has been learned. Why is this the 
case? It cannot be explained in behaviouristic terms. Whenever 'large' is reinforced, 
'small' is not reinforced. A child is less likely to choose 'small' on the next round. 
Thus, a strict stimulus-response model cannot explain the case. 
How can children learn to choose a stimulus which they were not trained to choose? Of 
great importance in the discrimination tasks is the aspect that participants face 
successive choice problems and pick up the rules which lie behind the distribution of 
feedback. Kendler and co-workers (Kendler, Kendler, & Leonard, 1962; Kendler & 
Kendler, 1970; Kendler, 1995) proposed verbal links between the traditional S-R 
associations. A link might serve to unite the discrete stimuli "large" and "small" under 
the concept of 'size is relevant', whereas nonreversal shift or extradimensional shift, 
that is, choosing white or black in the above example, can be still explained by single 
unit S-R theory. Kendler and Kendler (1959) investigated the ontogeny of reversal 
learning. They hypothesized that 5-6 years was the transitional point at which verbal 
mediation appears; therefore, children who had not yet learned to mediate would be 
slow learners and would find it difficult to reverse. Conversely children who had 
38 
learned to mediate would be fast learners and would find it easy to reverse. 
Kindergarten children (5-6 years) were trained on a discrimination problem with two 
pairs of stimuli, which differed both in size (e.g. large v. small), and brightness (e.g. 
black v. white). Only one stimulus within a specific dimension was correct (e.g. the 
large stimulus in the size dimension); the stimuli in the other dimension (e.g. both 
brightness stimuli) were irrelevant to the solution of the problem. After solving this 
problem, the children were required to solve a second discrimination problem in which 
they either had to reverse their previous choice (e.g. select small) or shift to the 
previously irrelevant dimension (e.g. select black rather than either large or small). The 
former is termed a reversal shift; the latter a nonreversal shift. With the kindergarten 
children neither shift was favoured. However, when the children were divided into fast 
and slow learners, based on their first task performance, it was found that the fast 
learners mastered the reversal shift better than the nonreversal shift, while the opposite 
was true for the slow learners. However, Kendler & Kendler's assumption that fast 
learners were mediators while slow learners did not make a verbal link was not proved. 
Slow learners were not necessarily non-mediators. Furthermore there was no clear 
demonstration that mediation occurred. 
As a method of verifying these hypotheses, Kendler, Kendler and Wells (1960) tested 
pre-kindergarten age children, since at this age most children should be premediational 
and therefore show better nonreversal than reversal shifting. The training task involved 
only a single dimension (e.g. brightness) with no irrelevant dimension present. Half of 
the participants were assigned to the treatment group and instructed to tell the 
experimenter which stimulus was positive and which was negative. They were helped 
to express the correct word (e.g., black, white, big or little). Each child in the treatment 
group named both the correct and incorrect stimuli for 10 trials. No significant effect 
on reversal learning was found attributable to the instructions to verbalize. There was 
no significant difference in the number of reversal shifts made between the verbal 
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training group and the control. Overall, nonreversal shift was favoured more than 
reversal shift. 
However, in this study (Kendler, Kendler and Wells, 1960) in contrast to Kendler and 
Kendler's former study (1959), the training task involved only a single dimension (e.g. 
brightness) with no irrelevant dimension present. Therefore, the two studies may not 
be comparable. In the first (Kendler and Kendler, 1959), the children may have learned 
to avoid the irrelevant cue (e.g. avoid size when brightness was correct) and thus found 
nonreversal shifting difficult since they then had to select this previously negative 
dimension. In the second study (Kendler, et. al, 1960), however, nonreversal shifting 
may have been easy not because the children were younger but rather because they 
could have no bias against the dimension used in the training task. 
To clear up the difference between the two tasks, Kendler and Kendler (1962a) again 
presented children of 4 and 7 years of age with a pair of stimuli that varied 
simultaneously in size and brightness. While learning, the participants were required to 
verbalize aloud the stimuli to which they were responding. One-third of the participants 
was instructed to say "large" (or "small" as the case may be). The participants were 
helped to express the correct label by a series of questions. Another third was 
instructed to say "black" (or "white") in a corresponding way. The remaining third was 
not required to say anything. After learning the discrimination, all subjects were 
presented with a reversal shift. The shift was to a stimulus that was small, regardless 
of the treatment group. Thus, the group that initially described the correct stimulus as 
"large" had verbalized the relevant dimension. The verbal response of "black" was 
irrelevant to this reversal shift. It was reported that the younger children profited by 
making the kind of verbal response appropriate to a reversal shift, while learning 
inappropriate verbal responses hindered them. With no verbalization the 7-year-old 
children accomplished a reversal shift much more rapidly than the 4-year-olds. The 7-
year-old children did not profit from being trained to make the relevant responses. The 
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performance of the 7-year-olds in the irrelevant verbalization group was even poorer 
than that of the 4-year-olds. The experimenters interpreted these results as that the 
relevant labelling helped those who had not learned the concepts while those who 
already had ability to form the concepts were disturbed by irrelevant labelling. Children 
who are not able to represent the situation as, for instance, that big stimuli are 
reinforced regardless of their colour, can be helped by repeatedly labelling, "Big", 
"Big", "Big". This labelling may help children to infer that a small stimulus is the case 
when "Big" is not the case, under the concept of 'size is relevant in this task'. 
Later works by Kendler and co-workers focussed more on representational mediation. 
Kendler and Ward (1971) presented two sets of conceptually related pictures (e.g., 
animals versus vehicles) to two groups of kindergarten children. For one group, the 
reversal experimental procedure was used in that each picture was presented singly, and 
immediately following the correct choice the picture was removed from view. For the 
other group, the pictures were presented in a cumulative way. After being sorted 
correctly, the picture remained in view so that the participant could inspect it while 
responding to subsequent pictures. The experimenter reported faster reversal shifts in 
cumulative stimulus presentation than in single presentation. The result was articulated 
that as the number of previously sorted pictures available for inspection increases, the 
probability increases that the subject will use a common representation for the instances 
of each sorting category. 
An alternative explanation for performance on discrimination is the attention theory 
proposed by Trabasso and Bower (1968) and Zeaman and House (1963). They 
diagnosed young children's difficulty as being unable to ignore irrelevant and redundant 
information. Their poor performance on discrimination tasks is due to the fact that they 
are easily distracted by extraneous information. 
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Can the attention theory account for the effects of overtraining? Zeaman and House 
(1963) modeled an incremental attention to the relevant dimension and weakening 
attention to the irrelevant dimension over trials. In contrast, according to Trabasso and 
Bower's model (1968), the relative strengths of dimensions are set at the outset of a 
discrimination problem and do not change over trials. It is assumed that, on a trial, the 
participant only attends to a certain subset of the available dimensions, i.e. the focus of 
the sample. The stronger a dimension is, relative to the other dimensions, the more 
likely it is to enter the focus sample and to more of the spaces in the focus sample. 
When a child makes a correct choice, all the cues that are inconsistent with that choice 
drop out of the focus sample. On the next trial, there is a certain probability that the 
space will not be refilled, causing the focus sample to become reduced in size. Thus, 
extended overtraining should increase the probability that the focus sample will have 
closed down, so that only the relevant dimension remains. Therefore, according to this 
theory, as well as Zeaman and House's, overtraining should facilitate sustaining 
attention on the relevant dimension and reduce attention to incidental information. 
The effect of overtraining was compared to that of the one-dimension transfer of 
training in Casey's study (1976). It was assumed that narrowing down attention to the 
focus sample could be better achieved by training that involved only one dimension 
(e.g. colour) than by over-training that involved one relevant dimension (e.g. colour) 
with an irrelevant one (e.g. form). 4 and 7 year-olds were presented with intra-
discrimination tasks, in which one dimension had more than two attributes (e.g., red, 
yellow and green). The number of the participants who made no errors (i.e., two-cue 
learners) on the test trials was compared to the number who made one error (one-cue 
learners) in each condition. The pretraining group, in which the participant had in 
advance a session involving only a single dimension (e.g., colour) with no irrelevant 
dimension present, had a significantly greater number of two-cue learners than the 
overtraining group, in which 20 more trials were given in the initial training session. 
The training with a transfer problem was more effective than extended training for 
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focusing attention on the relevant dimension. No age group difference was found. The 
lack of an overtraining effect was difficult to explain in terms of an incremental learning 
model. Other investigations (Anderson, 1972; Lycsak & Tighe, 1975) also reported no 
significant effect of overtraining with young children. 
Studies with discrimination tasks have shown that even young children act as if the 
accumulated experience of the previous reinforcements has an effect on solving the 
current problem. Despite weakness in the design of discrimination tasks (see Blank, 
1968), invaluable implications can be drawn from the studies. 
First, the verbal mediation and attentional models differ in their views on the 
mechanism of picking up the rules behind the disposition of feedback. Verbal (or 
symbolic) mediation theory emphasizes the role of active agency in making a conscious 
representation of a problem. In the view of this theory, if the child does not construct 
the problem of the game by reading the game rules, for example, in the Flamingo game, 
she or he will gradually build up the representation by examining the disposition of 
feedback from the former choices. On the other hand, the attention theory gives credit 
to the neural system in the brain. Incremental attention is given to a stimulus followed 
by reinforcement, resulting in the brain becoming more sensitive to the dimension. The 
child makes choices in rule-like fashion as a result of the sensitization of the neural 
system. In the view of this theory, the child's performance would gradually improve as 
the practice of game accumulates. But, there is no need to suggest any subjective 
conscious representation. 
Second, the relationship between concepts and choice-making has not been proved. 
The question of how concepts related to the problem affect the processes of problem 
solving is of much interest in this study. Children's games depend not only on concrete 
attributes of concepts like shape, colour or size, but also on relational or abstract 
concepts. Experimenters in discrimination tasks referred to concepts required for the 
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ability to label different objects with a common name (e.g. pear and banana as 'fruit'), 
the ability to select out the relevant physical dimension in problem solving (e.g. size, 
form, colour) or the use of relational thinking (e.g. being able to compare objects as to 
size - bigger, smaller). In fact, these definitions of concepts are quite restricted. The 
understanding of abstract concepts like exclusion or inclusion, or defined concepts like 
'diagonal', cannot be readily studied by discrimination tasks. How do abstract 
concepts or higher-order concepts relate to the processes of problem solving? 
Third, the verbal mediation and attention theories shed light on the importance of 
encoding variables and use of strategies in problem solving. A considerable number of 
studies has shown the possibility of training young children to attend to and to 
remember variables in problem-solving. One of the first trainings of youngsters' verbal 
rehearsal on memory tasks was implemented by Keeney, Cannizzo, and Flavell (1967). 
From a large number of 6- and 7-year-olds, children who consistently rehearsed or who 
consistently failed to rehearse were identified. In order to identify these two groups, 
children were tested on the delayed recall test in which the experimenter recorded 
children's lip movements. Rehearsers were children for whom lip movements were 
detected on at least nine out of ten trials; nonrehearsers were those for whom lip 
movements were absent on a similar number of trials. Half of the first group of 
children and all of the latter group were trained to rehearse. Children were told to 
whisper the names of the stimuli over and over until the memory test was given. 
Several training trials followed in which children were prompted if they failed to 
rehearse correctly. Several test trials were then given in which children tried to 
remember from two to five pictures. Rehearsal training was shown to be highly 
effective. Children who had not rehearsed spontaneously at all did so on more than 75 
percent of the test trials. Furthermore, rehearsal had a clear facilitating effect on recall. 
Before training, children who did not rehearse recalled less accurately than either group 
of spontaneous rehearsers. After training, differences between groups were negligible. 
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This response pattern was backed by many later studies (i.e., Ferguson & Bray, 1976; 
Kingsley & Hagen, 1969). 
Fourth, adopting the neo-behavioural model, the methodology of recognizing patterns 
of children's responses to reinforcements is useful for examining children's strategies 
in successive decision making situations. Regularity in decision making - strategy - 
gives clues about the processes involved in learning or attaining a concept. For 
example, in discrimination tasks, two strategies are easily observed when a current 
choice is calculated from the feedback the participant has just received. They are lose-
shift and win-stay. "Win" designates a correct response on Trial 1; "lose" an incorrect 
response on Trial 1. There are two response alternatives on Trial 2; the participant may 
shift her or his response, or she or he may persevere ("stay"). Levinson and Reese 
(1967) reported that in young children win-stay and lose-shift strategies function 
separately and that lose-shift strategies are acquired earlier than win-stay strategies. 
They also reported that with increasing age the two strategies more likely occur in 
combination. Kendler and Kendler (1970) reported that all the participants - children of 
kindergarten, grade 2 & 6 and college students - were mostly operating on the basis of a 
lose-shift strategy, which above 90 per cent of all trials used in their experiment. The 
kindergarten children did not, on average, stay with the relevant stimulus after a lose-
shift response, since they continued to make errors on subsequent trials. The higher the 
developmental level, the fewer the perseverative errors in the test trials. At college age, 
the win-stay and lose-shift strategies merged so that there were few, if any, errors 
occurring after the first correct response. The developmental trend in these strategies 
supports the mediational role of concepts in problem solving. The next section will 
examine processes of inference-making in goal-search frameworks. 
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2.5. Inferential goal searching 
The previous section described how inferences are made from information. Concepts 
for inferences are formed through discrimination and generalization of stimuli. 
Research on the process of inference and its use in goal-search frameworks will be 
reviewed here. 
Earlier work on this matter was done by Maier (1936). Maier's criterion for inference 
was the combination of two separate experiences in order to solve a problem. In 
Experience 1, the child was allowed to explore the whole of the inside of a maze. In 
Experience 2, the child was led into one of the booths from the outside and was shown 
a toy which he was allowed to play with for a short while. In the test phase the child 
was led into one of the other booths, from the outside, and was required to find the toy. 
Each child was given a series of test trials in which different combinations of starting 
and goal booths were used. 
Inference, according to Maier, would be demonstrated if the incidence of direct routes 
to the goal booth was significantly above the chance level of 33%. Maier's subjects 
were 39 children whose ages ranged from 3 years 7 months to 7 years 11 months. He 
found that very few children below 6 years performed above chance level, and 
concluded that "the ability to reorganize past experience does not become marked until 
about 70 months of age." 
It is, however, extremely doubtful whether this experiment constitutes a valid test of 
inference making. The experimental situation was based on Maier's "three tables" 
experiments with rats (Maier, 1932). The children had to combine their knowledge of 
the maze with their understanding of where they were at that particular moment. 
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Children below the age of six failed this task quite consistently, though when older than 
this they were more successful. In the experiment, there was no check that young 
children who failed could remember the information that they had to put together. 
Thus, it was not sure whether the failure was due to children's inability to co-ordinate 
separate items of information or because they forgot what they had to combine. No 
conclusion, concerning the young child's capacity for inferential problem solving, may 
be drawn from Maier's work. 
Maier's study did, however, provide the starting point for a more thorough-going 
experimental investigation of inferential problem-solving in young children by the 
Kendlers (Kendler & Kendler, 1962b; Kendler, Kendler & Carrick, 1966), who 
employed a Hullian paradigm that clearly separates the learning of the behaviour 
segments that ultimately comprise the inferential solution to the problem. 
In Kendler and Kendler (1962b), children were thoroughly familiar with the items they 
later had to combine. Children were shown a box with three panels. The two side 
panels had a button and pressing this button produces an object which drops into a tray 
set in its own panel. In one panel this object was a marble, in the other a ball bearing. 
The central panel was different. Instead of a button it had a hole, and the child must 
learn that dropping the marble in the hole, but not the ball-bearing, has the effect of 
producing a small toy. These then are the two items of information, that one side panel 
produces a marble, the other a ball bearing, and that placing the marble in the central 
hole leads to a goal (the small toy). These correspond to three behaviour segments: A-
B, X-Y, and B-G. To make sure that children remembered the items they had to 
combine, subgoal training (A-B and X-Y) was given. Children learned to press a 
button located in each side panel in order to obtain the marble on one side and the ball-
bearing on the other. The correct solution, the A-B-G response sequence, was to press 
A that yielded B and then to insert B into the central aperture, thus obtaining G. The 
required inferential solution was obtained by 6%, 52% and 92% from kindergarten, 3rd 
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grader and college students, respectively. Kendler and Kendler, thus, argued that 
children younger than 7-8 years cannot solve novel problems through the inferential 
combination of separately acquired behaviour segments. 
The Kendlers' explanation of this improvement with age in inferential performance is in 
terms of their mediational theory of human concept development. According to the 
Kendlers, the difference between younger and older humans lies in the latter's tendency 
to make spontaneous, implicit linguistic representations. 
Kendler, Kendler and Carrick (1966) enquired whether young children's inference is 
helped by verbal labelling. In one of their experiments using the same apparatus (a box 
with three panels) as the previous study of Kendler and Kendler (1962b), they required 
their participants to produce overt verbal labels for the subgoals during learning of the 
initial segments. (In the control condition, the subgoals were never labeled.) The 
incidence of A-B-G solutions among 5 - 6-year-old children was raised to 30% in this 
labelling condition. Another experiment compared the effects of verbal labelling of each 
segment between using the same labels and using different labels. Predictions were 
made that the same-label group would make more inferential solutions than the 
different-label group at both age levels, but that the effect would be more pronounced 
among the kindergarten children who were supposed to be developing representational 
systems, than the 3rd grade group who already did not need representational aid. As 
predicted, the labelling effects, the greater effect of "same" labelling than of "different" 
labelling, were obtained from kindergarten children but not third graders. 
However, there is the possibility that labelling may have encouraged what may be 
described as "pseudo-inferential" solutions, i.e. solutions which followed the 
appropriate A-B-G pattern but which were not governed by an inference. In the 
Kendlers' experiment, the children were not told how they should go about solving the 
problem; they were asked to obtain the major goal. Possibly, they were supposed to 
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understand that the problem required an indirect solution. But whether they actually did 
so is open to question. 
In discussing the Kendler and Kendler study, Bryant (1977) pointed to the arbitrary 
nature of the problem. Pressing a button produces a marble for no visual reason. 
Putting a marble in a hole produces a toy, again for no visual reason. Since there is no 
obvious logic to these artificial association (button-marble, marble-toy), children cannot 
be logical about combining them. Bryant emphasized the importance of child's 
interpretation of the nature of particular problems. 
Hypothesising the argument developed by Bryant, Hewson (1978) replaced the 
apparatus of the Kendlers with more familiar and understandable material. He put the 
items in drawers so that the child simply had to learn which drawer to pull out in order 
to get a particular marble. This change of apparatus resulted in a big response change. 
He reported more than 60 per cent of the 5-year-old children succeeded in the task. 
Thus, it can be concluded that by the age of five children do have the ability to put 
together at least some kinds of information inferentially. 
While the Kendlers' tasks were conducted in a laboratory, Wellman and his colleagues 
devised naturalistic tasks, invloving staged sequences of real-life events, in order to 
examine young children's logical search. Wellman, Somerville, and Haake (1979) 
studied 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds searching eight marked locations on a familiar preschool 
playground for a missing object, under two different conditions. Each child initially 
searched the locations under a control condition in which there was no information 
specifying that the missing item (a calculator) should be at some location(s) rather than 
others. Next the child participated in a series of eight games at the locations, arranged 
so that events occurring at two of them defined a critical search area. These events set 
the stage for a second, logical task, in which the child searched the same eight locations 
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for a camera that had been used to take his or her picture at the third location and was 
subsequently discovered missing from the carrying bag at the seventh location. 
In the control condition, only 20% of the children went first to a location in what was to 
become the critical region for the logical task. By contrast, in the logical condition 76% 
of the children searched first in this region. The central four of the eight locations 
constituted the critical area; therefore if a child searched end to end, or in a haphazard 
manner, two of the first four searches would fall in this area by chance. In the control 
condition the mean number of the children's first four searches in the critical area was 
2.05. It rose to 2.84 in the logical condition. There were no differences between 3-, 4-
and 5-year-olds on these measures of logical search ability. 
However, the 3-year-olds differed from the older children in some respects. In the 
logical condition, the modal first search choice of every age group was the third location 
(where the picture was taken). When just those children whose first search was at this 
location were considered, it was found that the second searches of 3-year-olds were 
less likely to be in the critical area than those of 4- and 5-year-olds. After these 
inaccurate second searches, 3-year-olds tended to return to the critical area, but they 
also showed a greater tendency than older children to repeat a search of a location, in 
particular of the third location. These findings raised the possibility that the younger 
children's searches at this location were determined primarily by a strong association of 
the camera with that place, rather than by the knowledge that that place was the last 
point in the sequence of events where the camera was present. 
To distinguish between the two possibilities, the simple association of the camera with 
the place and the knowledge that the place was the last place the camera was seen, 
Haake, Somerville, and Wellman (1980) conducted a second study, on a different 
playground, incorporating two logical search conditions. One condition was identical 
to that of the previous study, and the new condition differed only in that the child's 
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picture was taken at each of the first, second, and third locations. This new condition 
was designed to establish associations of the camera with locations outside the critical 
area. If young children's searches were guided primarily by associations, they would 
be expected to do worse in the new condition than in the original one. The searches of 
3- to 9-year-olds were not different under these two conditions and were comparable to 
the logical search scores in Wellman et al.'s (1979) study. There was also no 
difference between the performance of younger and older children. Haake, et al. 
concluded that the children's searches were not guided by associations, and that they 
were making logical inferences about the location of the missing camera, on the basis of 
events occurring in the spatio-temporal sequence. This conclusion was supported by 
the results of a similar study by Anooshian, Hartman, and Scharf (1982). 
Previous studies have shown that young children are capable of drawing logical 
relations between two or more separate items or events. The next question is why the 
young children in the first study (Wellman, et al, 1979) were significantly less correct 
than the older children in their second search. Although the naturalistic tasks were 
presumably easy for young children to comprehend, the search problems were actually 
introduced incidentally to the child. The young children may have been less able to 
understand that there was more than one location that might contain the object. This 
hypothesis will be examined in the next section 2.6. 
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2.6. Possibility, Impossibility & Certainty 
How do children become certain about the position of the Flamingo? An adequate 
representation of the situation of the Flamingo game requires understanding of not 
probability, but impossibility and possibility. How do children deal with options of 
impossibility and possibility? What if one choice turns out to be wrong? 
The gain-maximizing strategy and the probability-matching hypothesis explain 
differently how the player responded to happenings in a game situation. The gain-
maximizing strategy portrays the player as an agent who represents the problem and 
calculates outcomes of moves. The basic assumption is that one can determine the 
strategies which would best maximize goals in every type of strategic situation 
(Rapoport, 1990). 
The probability-matching hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that a game player 
generates and holds multiple expectancies that reflect the probability of a particular 
happening at a particular situation (Kingstone & Klein, 1991). The hypothesis portrays 
rather a passive picture of the player. The assumption of probability matching is that 
children learn consciously or not to match their response ratio (the relative frequencies 
which they predict for each of the events) to the actual probabilities of occurrence of the 
events. In this view, strategies are not necessarily consciously formulated or the 
product of a conscious or rational choice, even in mathematical calculation (Siegler & 
Jenkins, 1989). 
Inhelder (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) argued that the understanding of possibility is 
indispensable for hypothetico-deductive or formal thinking. When the child reaches the 
stage of concrete operations (7-8 years), the decentering process has gone far enough 
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for the child to be able to structure relationships between classes, relations, and 
numbers objectively. Operational classifications are constructed at around this age, 
with the understanding of inclusions and their qualifications. A new series of 
operational possibilities - disjunctions, implications, exclusions, etc. - arises only after 
the stage of concrete thought. 
However, there are protocols cited by Piaget and Inhelder (1951) showing that the 
intuition of chance emerges at the pre-operational level. For example, 
Roulette experiment: "Mon. (4.11). Can we tell where it will stop?' 
No, because if we say it will stop at blue, and then it goes past blue, we won't know."(p. 74.) 
Researchers have pointed out (Gellatly, 1987; Murray, 1987; Siegler, 1991) that young 
children do not view conclusions as being true by reason of logical necessity. Such a 
failure to distinguish between logically-necessary and empirically-likely outcomes 
would explain young children's eagerness to verify by empirical means relations that 
older children and adults view as purely logical matters. It also would explain the 
seemingly opposite tendency of young children to reach conclusions when the evidence 
does not logically allow them to do so. 
To assess children's sensitivity to logical certainty, Pieraut-LeBonniec (1980) 
investigated children's discrimination of certain and uncertain (but possible) situations. 
The experimenter employed a box that had holes of two sizes in its lid. The larger hole 
allowed marbles of a certain diameter and thin sticks of a smaller diameter to fall into a 
drawer inside the box. The smaller hole permitted only the thin sticks to fall into the 
drawer. After children were made familiar with the box, it was placed behind a screen. 
Children were presented with the following problem: "I am putting something into the 
large hole. Can you be certain what it is without looking inside the box?" The correct 
answer was to say that one could not be certain, and that the box had to be inspected 
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because either the marble or the stick could be placed in the large hole. The 
experimenter reported that children began to recognise uncertainty in this context at 
about 9 to 10 years of age, where 45% of all children provided correct responses after 
feedback. However, most younger children were correct on trials where certain 
conclusions could be drawn (e.g., when questions were asked about the small hole 
where only the sticks can go through). The finding that the comprehension of 
conclusions about certainty emerges earlier than the understanding of uncertain 
conclusions was confirmed in other studies (Acredolo & Holobin, 1987; Byrnes & 
Overton, 1986; Holobin & Acredolo, 1989). 
Fabricius, Sophian and Wellman (1986) investigated children's inferential reasoning in 
possible, impossible and certain situations. The task was to find a picture to match a 
description. There were three kinds of descriptions which led to a conclusion that the 
case was as described (certainty) or that the case could not be so (impossibility) or that 
one could not reach a conclusion (possibility under uncertainty). 	 Descriptions 
contained quantifiers like "all cats in it" or "a duck in it". Significant differences were 
found in children's ability to distinguish between certain, impossible and possible 
situations. While 5-year-olds distinguished the impossible situations from the possible 
but uncertain situations, 3-year-old children only distinguished the certain from the 
impossible or the possible situations. The younger children failed to determine that 
negative information (absence of an object) could sometimes support an inference. 
Even the older children were likely to rely on positive information (presence of object) 
instead of negative more than half the time in the impossible situation. The study 
showed two characteristics of inferential problem solving. Firstly, children were more 
likely to rely on positive information than on negative. Secondly, the comprehension of 
conclusions of certainty emerged earlier than the understanding of impossibility in a 
concrete context. 
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Byrnes and Overton's study (1986) expanded Pieraut-LeBonniec's experiment (1980) 
to explore content effects on discrimination between certain and uncertain situations. 
Three tasks were presented: the box task used by Pieraut-LeBonniec (concrete context), 
an envelope task (causal context: "I am putting a picture into an envelope and the picture 
I'm putting in the envelope shows what makes the boy cry. Do you know for sure 
which picture it is or do you have to look inside the envelope to see which picture it 
is?"), and a formal syllogism task (propositional context: e.g., "If it has rained, then the 
grass is wet.") Comparisons were made of children's performances between the three 
tasks. In the concrete context, the Pieraut-LeBonniec box task, the percentage of 
children at each grade who made no errors on uncertainty trials increased as the age of 
the children increased, with 13%;, 71%; and 83% from 1st, 3rd, and 5th graders being 
correct, respectively. These correct performance rates were somewhat higher than 
those reported in Pieraut-LeBonniec. In the causal context, the envelope task, the 
percentage of children at each grade who made no errors on uncertainty trials were 
13%; 71%; and 100% from 1st, 3rd, and 5th graders, respectively. In the propositional 
context, the syllogism tasks, there was no developmental change for Modus Ponens 
(e.g., "It has rained, is the grass wet?") and children at each grade performed quite 
well. Performance on Modus Tollens (e.g., "The grass is dry, hasn't it rained?") 
dropped significantly between the first and third grades, and between the third and fifth 
grades. For Affirmed Consequence (e.g., "The grass is wet, has it rained?") and 
Denied Antecedents (e.g., "It has not rained, is the grass dry?"), the realization that 
there are other possible causes of grass being wet only enabled children to judge the 
arguments as uncertain. Although significant improvements occurred for both Affirmed 
Consequence (e.g., "The grass is wet, has it rained?") and Denied Antecedents (e.g., 
"It has not rained, is the grass dry?") at each grade, performance on these uncertainty 
arguments was above chance at only the fifth grade. 	 The understanding of 
discrimination between certain and uncertain conclusions was mastered in a concrete or 
causal context (i.e., the box and the envelope task) by the fifth grade, but with respect 
to a propositional context (i.e., conditional syllogisms), this understanding seemed to 
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emerge in the fifth grade. These studies demonstrate younger children's appreciation of 
concrete and causal uncertainty and apparent age differences in performance between 
concrete and propositional tasks. 
While Byrnes and Overton argued that the children's failures were due to the lack of 
formal operations, Braine and Rumain (1983) suggested that a response bias prevented 
children aged 6 to 10 years from correct performance on tasks assessing the ability to 
identify undecidable situations. According to Braine and Rumain, young children have 
a strong expectation that all problems have unequivocal solutions and this leads them to 
endorse only one possible solution, although they might actually have been aware of 
two or more equally viable alternatives. 
Hypothesising the argument developed by Briane and Rumain, Acredolo and Horobin 
(1987) investigated developmental changes in children's avoidance of premature close, 
which is the tendency to offer only a single solution to any problem that, because of 
insufficient or ambiguous information, logically permits more than one solution. 
Children of 1st, 3rd, 5th & 6th grades were presented with a simple computer game in 
which they had to deduce the possible sizes of one item relative to two others on the 
basis of visual comparison of the sizes of the two items and a written clue concerning 
the location(s) of the biggest or smallest of the three items. Some problems had single 
solutions, whereas others had multiple solutions. On the single solution problems, 
reasoning errors were less frequent than would be expected by chance even among the 
first-grade children. On the other hand, no observation was made until 6th grade of 
voluntary detection of the possibility of more than one correct solution when there were 
multiple solutions. Acredolo and Horobin pointed out that children almost always 
commit themselves to a single alternative in choice paradigms, despite an awareness of 
the viability of other alternatives. The finding of a strong tendency to close on single 
alternatives among 7- to 9-year-old children was backed up (Horobin & Acredolo, 
1989). The experimenters also reported that corrective feedback improved the 
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frequency with which first- through fifth-grade children detected multiple solutions on 
reassessment. 
Bryant and Roazzi (1992) investigated developmental changes in children's avoidance 
of premature close in number. 6-, 7-, and 8-year-old children were asked for a number 
which is bigger than X but smaller than Y. The children were asked to choose a 
number in one case where there was only one possible correct number and in another 
case where there were several correct answers. In the task which had one correct 
answer, even the younger children were quite good at inferring a "critical area", 
particularly in their first choices. In the other task, the proportion of correct first 
choices that were immediately followed by a correct second choice was quite high in the 
seven and eight year olds but a great deal smaller in the six year olds. It seemed that the 
six year olds had difficulties in holding the "critical area" in their mind and eliminating 
alternatives one by one. The findings of Bryant and Roazzi's study show that 
systematic use of inference in numbers develops up to 7 years of age. 
However, the results can be thought of as processes derived from children's familiarity 
of number sequence rather than an abstract understanding of the multiple possibilities. 
Hypothesizing that without necessarily being able to understand logical relations 
sufficiently to distinguish consistently between connected premises, young children are 
able to provide correct responses to some forms of syllogism, Markovits, Schleifer, 
and Fortier (1989) presented children with logical or illogical syllogisms. 	 The 
participants were asked to answer "yes", "no" or "don't know" to the syllogisms and to 
provide justifications for their responses. All the children were reported to produce a 
very high level of correct responses to the logical problems. However, the 6-year olds 
and to a certain degree, the 8-year-olds produced similar patterns of responses to the 
logical and the illogical problems. For the 6-year-old children, 90% of logical problems 
for which subjects referred to premises in their justification were correctly resolved. In 
the case of illogical problems, 78% of those with referral to premises received an 
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equivalent response. For the 8-year-olds, there were significantly more non-equivalent 
responses when the illogical problems were presented first, whereas there was no 
significant difference for the logical-first and random presentations. The 11-year-olds 
did not provide conclusions for the illogical problems, while resolving the logical 
problems. 
The results were also consistent with the notion that much of the correct responding 
observed may be due to the use of a strategy that relies on the "atmosphere effect", in 
which the response was chosen as a function of the positive or negative mood of the 
premises (or some similar strategy that did not involve understanding the relations of 
necessity between premises and conclusions). The 6-year-olds showed some signs of 
differentiating logically consistent and logically inconsistent premises, primarily in 
terms of their responses to the latter although not in terms of their justifications. The 
experimenters noted the invention of an imaginary link between premises. This form of 
justification appeared almost exclusively with respect to illogical premises, and only in 
8- and 11-year-olds. The invention of a link between premises that did not go together 
with each other could be an indication of the beginnings of an explicit understanding of 
the distinction between logical and illogical forms of argument. The 6-year-old children 
retained the overall tendency to respond similarly to illogical and logical problems, 
whereas the 8-year-olds showed a definite ability to differentiate the two when 
presented with the illogical problems first. The 11-year-olds differentiated the two 
regardless of order of presentation. These results showed the ability to differentiate 
reliably between premises that are logically related and that are not developed with age. 
These results are consistent with a variety of others that indicate that there are important 
developmental steps in the understanding of elementary inferential principles (Byrnes & 
Overton, 1983; Fabricius, et al., 1986; Pieraut-LeBonniec, 1980) 
If children understand elementary inferential principles, the next question is how these 
elementary principles enable the child to anticipate outcome of her or his choices in a 
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more complicated logical structure. 	 Piaget and Garcia (1991) investigated the 
development of operative logic of inclusions and exclusions, using a network of 
tunnels. Children were asked to choose a path in the tunnels. One tunnel divided into 
two primary branches, each of which turned into two paths. From each of these four 
paths two further paths separated. Each of the final paths ended up in one of eight 
garages. There were windows on each path. A car started at the entrance of the main 
tunnel and was placed in one garage. The car was tied to a long thin ribbon, which lay 
between the start and the garage. The task was to determine which garage a car was in 
by opening as few windows as possible. 
Piaget and Garcia proposed 3 stages of development of inclusions and exclusions. 
Stage IA is characterised by a lack of inclusions in the direction of the paths' 
construction. When asked to trace a car hidden in one of eight garages by opening a 
few windows along the paths, young children aged 4-5 year-old randomly opened the 
windows nearest to the garages. They said that it was better with those windows 
because they were closer to the garage. 
Children at stage 1B also conducted a semi-empirical and semi-deductive procedure. 
They started with windows in the middle or prime branches and went up and down 
across levels, sometimes skipping one or two. Inferences were still invalid. 
Children at stage 2, aged around 7 to 8 years, considered the network in its entirety and 
began to constitute an operative grouping. However, they still could not exclude 
impossible branches and garages systematically. 
Only children aged 10 -12 at stage 3, determined the goal place by opening windows 
which did not show the ribbon. This negative necessity is the most difficult aspect for 
the participant to accept. Piaget and Garcia took these findings to reveal the inability of 
young children to infer the part-whole relation, to group items according to their 
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classes, and to operate inclusions and exclusions that are prerequisite for a systematic 
search. 
In the Flamingo game, children have to infer the goal place from abstract and rule-
defined information. COLD conveys information of the impossibility of a certain area 
for achieving the goal, whereas HOT or WARM indicate possibility. Inclusions and 
exclusions would render appropriate representations of a zone of impossible places of 
the goal and/or a zone of possible ones. To anticipate the results of inferential actions, 
Piaget and Garcia argued that coordination of inclusions and exclusions has to develop 
up to a certain level. It is expected that older children would coordinate exclusions of 
impossible locations of the goal and inclusions of possible locations, whereas young 
children would have trouble in representing the problem of the Flamingo game. 
In conclusion, we can draw two very different pictures of game play. The first picture 
takes the viewpoint of the gain-maximizing strategy. The player in the 'Find the 
Flamingo' game, for example, generates a representation of possibility and 
impossibility, and maximizes the chance of reaching the goal through choices, 
becoming a player who achieves successes by representing the game structure. Faced 
with HOT and WARM, the player will map a zone of possible goal places related to the 
current place. Faced with COLD, she or he will map the zone of impossible ones. The 
choices will be guided by these inferences. Systematic use of representation requires 
the exclusion of impossible goal places and inclusion of possible places. The player 
has to see the logical certainty of predicting a certain goal place through coordinating the 
areas of possibility and impossibility. 
The second picture comes from the viewpoint of the probability-matching hypothesis. 
The player's choices follow the likelihoods that have developed through accumulated 
reinforcements. As the attention theory proposes, the child tends to attend to something 
that is more likely to happen than to any alternative, because of the past reinforcements. 
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The player does not generate specific and personal representations. She or he makes 
choices nearer to HOT or WARM and further away from COLD, because experience 
guides her or him that the target is found in that way. Research on inferential action in 
the Flamingo game would surely broaden knowledge about the nature of children's 
thinking in the context of game. 
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2.7. Gender issues in computer games 
One of the main issues relating to computer game play is that males, on average, 
perform better in visual and spatial skills (Halpern, 1986; Kerns & Berenbaum, 1991; 
Linn & Petersen, 1985; Okagaki & Frensch, 1994; Pertersen & Crockett, 1985) and 
these differential spatial abilities might be reinforced by male dominance in computer 
game play (Hoyles, 1988; Hughes, Blackenridge & MacLeod, 1987). According to 
Halpern (1986), there is "still some confusion about the youngest age at which gender 
differences in spatial abilities are found" (p.51). In a large study of over 1,800 public 
school students, Johnson and Meade (1987) used a battery of seven spatial tests tailored 
to the developmental levels of the children and concluded that a reliable male advantage 
in spatial performance appeared by age 10. How do these differences in spatial abilities 
affect each gender's computer game practice? 
Questioning the gender difference in favour of males on spatial cognition reported in 
some studies as possibly the result of exposure to the environment of these games, 
McClurg and Chaille (1987) investigated the effects of computer games on spatial 
cognition. It was hypothesized that boys and girls would perform spatial cognitive 
tasks with similar proficiency after the same amount of practice. Children of grades 5, 
7, and 9 played two computer games: 'Factory' and 'Stella 7'. 'Factory' required 
mental manipulation of three dimensional "products". To replicate a "challenge 
product" the user must visualize the movement of the product through an assembly line 
of Punch, Stripe, and Rotate machines. To be successful, the user was required to 
develop strategies for optimum sequencing. The task analysis involved visualizing a 
number of transformations in a series, this requires the use of visual memory and 
constant updating of the visual image. 'Stella 7' required recognition of three- 
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dimensional objects appearing at different distances, moving at varying speeds and 
changing orientations, and viewed from different positions. 
The Mental Rotations Test (Sheppard & Metzler, 1971) was administered as a pre-test 
the week before the treatment began and as a post-test the week after treatment ended. 
The "Factory" group and the "Stella 7" group met for forty-five minutes twice a week 
for six weeks. During the last two sessions in the sixth week, students were asked to 
predict the resulting product before the computer "manufactured", and display it in the 
"Factory" group. Each week about ten minutes were devoted to students sharing 
techniques and strategies that they found useful. All children in the "Stella" group and 
the "Factory" group improved more than children in the control group. It is interesting 
to note that in this study there was an initial gender difference in spatial skill, with boys 
performing better than girls; it is not clear from the report whether this difference 
continued to be present at the end of the study. Miller and Kapel (1985) found a 
positive effect of similar computer games on two-dimensional mental rotation in seventh 
and eight graders. 
Subrahmanyam and Greenfield (1994) investigated the effect of computer games on 
spatial ability. A group of fifth grade children played an action game, "Marble 
Madness" (Harvey, 1986), which involves the use of the spatial skills of guiding 
objects, judging speeds and distances of moving objects, and intercepting objects. 
Another group of the same aged children played a computer word game, "Conjecture" 
(1986), which does not involve any spatial skills. Children played the games for a total 
of 2 hr and 15 min. with three sessions of 45 min each on different days. Spatial 
abilities were measured before and after the experiment. Boys were significantly better 
than girls during pre-test assessment. However, no gender difference was found in the 
post-test assessment. The action game was significantly more effective than the word 
game in improving spatial performance on the post-test assessment; there was no 
significant interaction of gender with experimental treatment. However, the action 
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game practice was more effective for children who started out with relatively poor 
spatial skills. The action game play equalized individual differences in spatial skill 
performance, including those associated with gender. 
It has been found that boys are especially likely to play games requiring aggressive 
competition (Cunningham, 1995; Linn & Lepper, 1987), whereas girls are turned off 
by violent themes (Malone, 1981). This tendency might be well associated with the 
frequency of boys' greater success with electronic games (Griffiths, 1996). 
Questioning how the nature of a game affects girls' and boys' playing, Littleton, Light, 
et al., (1992) manipulated the same game format with different characters to meet each 
gender group's supposed taste. They presented honeybears in one version and pirates 
in the other. The task was couched in terms of a quest involving 3 male characters who 
must go on a journey to collect a missing crown ('Pirates'), or a logically equivalent 
task involving 3 teddy bears who must go on a journey to collect a missing pot of 
honey ('Honey bear'). They reported that the girls' performance was highly dependent 
on the represented task domain - their performance was far superior when using the 
relatively more 'gender-neutral' software involving teddy bears, while the boys were 
seen to perform equally well irrespective of whether they were confronted with any 
version of the characters. On a re-gendered version of the 'Pirates' game with the 
characters of 'Princesses', it was reported that the girls' performance was rather poor 
when using the 'Pirates' software and somewhat enhanced when using the 'Princesses' 
software, and that the performance of the boys was consistently high across both 
software types (Littleton, 1996). The girls' lower average scores in some types of 
"adventure" games could be considered to discourage them and make them more 
reluctant to play computer games. 
In Hay and Lockwood (1989), use of strategies on a computer-generated hunting task 
was examined in boys and girls. 6- to 10-year-old children were introduced to a 
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computer game that simulated a hunting problem for an animal forager. Girls and boys 
were equally successful at this stereotypically masculine spatial task, and both girls and 
boys foraged optimally in terms of the predictions of the ecological theory of optimal 
foraging. Only one sex difference appeared: girls tended to use more careful strategies 
than did boys. The excessive caution of girls in spatial tasks was well documented in 
Linn and Petersen (1985). 
In conclusion, research has shown that the nature of the game affects the level of 
engagement with it differently for boys and girls (Linn & Lepper, 1987; Malone, 1980; 
Littleton, et al., 1992). It is important for researchers using computer games as a 
window on children's thinking to be cautious in choosing a gender neutral game as a 
research tool. More research is needed on how girls and boys differ in their interaction 
with computer games and how we could help both genders be interested and enhance 
their cognitive skills while playing computer games. 
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2.8. Methods for investigating children's game activity 
Both behavioural and cognitive approaches have been adopted for examining game 
behaviour, as the two approaches are complementary to each other. Behaviourists 
assume that human choice is nothing but the result of respondent conditioning. These 
scholars focus on links - connections or associations - between observable stimuli and 
observable responses. 	 The terms "association" and "connection" refer to the 
phenomenon that links a particular stimulus with a particular behavioural response 
which an organism makes as a result of exposure to that stimulus (Isaacson, Hutt & 
Blum, 1965). Skinner (1938) views choice in terms of the competition between 
individual operants. In a choice situation, Skinner sees each alternative and its outcome 
as a separate contingency, strengthening or weakening an animal tendency to make each 
response. For Skinner, choice among alternatives is not an object of study in itself; it is 
merely the outcome of combining two individual responses to two stimuli. 
If we follow behavioural tradition, the objective of analyzing these game behaviours is 
to look for a link between cue and choice behaviour. "Cue" is here defined as a 
stimulus that points toward a goal without requiring any necessary conscious 
knowledge of its significance. One common measure of choice is the behaviour ratio 
(BR) introduced by Tolman (1938). The numerator of the behaviour ratio is the 
number of times an animal chooses one alternative and the denominator sums the total 
choices of all alternatives. The behaviour ratio is like a probability in that it varies from 
unity (when alternative 1 is chosen exclusively) to zero (when alternative 1 is never 
chosen). Another common measure of choice is the fraction of two choices, the relative 
choice (RC). 
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How does behavioural theory in a game situation explain the cause of the action? It is 
only the last action that is reinforced in terms of the goal. The analyst does not know 
what the player's viewpoint is. In game theory, a cognitive analysis is a very important 
aspect of the game, because it tells the subject what contributes to winning. Some 
children might not have any idea of what makes for winning. They just do anything. 
Other children might have an idea that is not as elaborate as adults have. They go close 
to a HOT and away from a COLD, so they have more chances of winning. Another 
group of children might operate more systematically. Faced with a HOT, they realize 
that there are a maximum of four possibilities. The game player needs to distinguish 
probable, possible and impossible solutions. These are the reasons why game theory 
adopts a cognitive approach, which studies the subject's thinking about the strategies 
that she or he develops. 
In games, the player finds herself or himself faced with the necessity for making 
choices at each point. She or he keeps tracking, searching, making judgements based 
on the information already obtained. Seeing games as goal-directed transforms playing 
games into problem solving. In the behaviourist view, each attempt to solve a problem 
consists only of a chain of responses. Problem solving, then, is defined as combining 
separate items of information in order to come up with a solution that is a completely 
new one. From the Piagetian and information processing point of view, however, 
problem solving is searching for an operation which bridges the gap between the state 
of affairs which is to be found now, and a more desirable goal state. Developmental 
changes in problem solving are known to occur along a wide variety of dimensions: 
planning, encoding of the problem, strategies for solving the problem, and the ability to 
learn from experience with it. 
The cognitive effort required to make a decision can be measured in terms of the total 
number of elementary information processes needed to solve a particular problem 
(Payne, Betterman & Johnson, 1993). Thus, one way to look at the player's making of 
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inferences is to understand the amount and types of information (see Payne, 1976; 
Thorngate, 1980). At one extreme are simple information board procedures. The 
Flamingo game is a good example of these information boards, which consist of three 
kinds of spatial information; adjacent above, below or on the right or left, diagonally 
adjacent and non-adjacent regarding the goal. 
It may be assumed that there are two kinds of game players: those who think that 
getting a goal happens purely by chance, and those who try to work out a string of rules 
governing reaching a goal. For those who are concerned about the rules, the rules will 
dictate their choice behaviour. They can develop strategies for playing games. They 
know what their choices mean. On the other hand, children may still play the game 
without understanding the rules. If they do not understand the rules of the game, the 
choice will be random. Some choices will be perhaps reinforced. Winning in a game is 
generally regarded as reinforcement, since it makes the child more likely to play the 
game. However, applying the concept of reinforcement to play is not as easy as it 
looks. When the child plays the Flamingo game and she or he wins, what is 
reinforced? These questions could be answered by looking at the choice behaviour and 
listening to what the player says. Inferences about how the child is reasoning are made 
on the bases of what they do and how they talk, whether autonomously in the game 
process or prompted by the experimenter - what Piaget called clinical discourse. Is 
there a relationship between what they say is their strategy and what they actually do in 
the game? In this research, for studying children's judgements about the possible goal, 
paper tests were organized. The scores on the paper tests were compared to the 
performance on the game. 
A correct judgement would result in a move that is in accord with the directional cue 
information provided. For example, a correct move given a COLD cue would be to 
move to a space far from the present game position. A correct move given a HOT cue 
would be to a space in contact with the present game position (either to the top, bottom 
68 
or sides of the current space). A correct move given a WARM cue would be to a space 
diagonally touching the space of the current game position. 
Each move made in the process of the game was examined to see whether the next 
move was based on a valid inference from one or two successive bits of the previous 
information. Two methods of analysis systems were introduced. The first method is 
called 'single information inference', in which information from the immediately 
preceding move is counted as the base of inference. The other method is called 'double 
information inference', in which information from the two preceding moves is counted. 
These procedures of data analysis allow us to look at the way children integrate the 
information about spatial relation, and to identify which combinations of relations 
children find to be most demanding. 
Intervention in the game process is based on the assumption that the player's becoming 
more aware of the structure of the problem would enhance the learning process. The 
awareness comes from the learners reflecting about their own representation of the 
problem. To be reflective is to stop and think before committing any action. The 
guided planning helps to plan before doing. The more knowledgeable person acts as an 
active helper to stop the learner and encourage them to think beforehand about inferring 
the goal from the current position. Pausing is another compelling way to improve 
performance. The relative effects of guided planning and pause were investigated. 
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2.9. 	 Drawing the threads 
	 together: 	 the study 	 o f 
children's thinking in the context of computer games 
The thesis reports on four experiments analyzing children's inferential game play in a 
computer context. The main themes of the research questions in each experiment are as 
follows: the computer game as a window into children's thinking, developmental and 
individual differences and learning, the effects of intervention for planning, and 
prediction of the Flamingo game performance. 
2.9.1. The computer game as a window into children's 
thinking 
The first experiment was an exploratory study. Three sets of research questions were 
raised. The first set of questions concerns the perception of the game and the use of 
rules. Do children represent the game as a random event or a problem-solving task? 
Do children make inferences from the game rules for choices in the game? 
The second question concerns the measurement of inferential problem solving. Direct 
observation of the game performance and questioning on making inference from the 
game rules were employed. The number of moves until the completion of game was 
counted in the observation. The questioning was carried out with each of the three 
kinds of spatial information (HOT, WARM, and COLD) printed on the test papers. 
70 
The child was asked where the target could be and could not be. Would the number of 
moves and scores on the tests be correlated? 
The third question is whether the computer on which children play the game affects 
problem solving in the game. Do the computer game effects come from the computer 
itself or from the game activity? The 'Find the Flamingo' game was presented either on 
the computer, a board, or cards. 
2.9.2. Individual differences and learning 
The second experiment was a replication and extension of the first one. It was intended 
to answer three research questions. The first set of questions concerns individual 
difference, which are defined in this study as the child's age, gender and inferential 
ability. Are there developmental differences in the making and use of inferences in the 
game process? Are young children able to link the game rules and the information 
during the game process? Do some children consistently perform better than others? 
Another research question concerns whether children become more proficient in using a 
particular form of logical reasoning when it is embedded in a game that they can play 
repeatedly. The question here is whether children understand a particular type of logical 
structure and whether they can use the inferences more and more in the course of 
playing a game. 
The third question is whether there are differences in the making and use of inferences 
from each types of information. Do children make inferences similarly concerning all 
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kinds of information, or does different information pose different levels of difficulty in 
making and using inferences? 
2.9.3. Training in planning 
The third experiment was a training study. The research question was whether 
children's inferential problem solving can be enhanced by adult intervention in 
planning. Do children make links between the game rules and the clues? Do children 
plan to use the inferences in their current position? Are there differences in these 
between inclusion and exclusion inferences? For these research questions, a simplified 
game with two clues — inclusion and exclusion without directional cues — was used. A 
brief training session was held in two conditions: guided planning and pauses. Guided 
planning actively poses to the player questions about the possibilities and impossibilities 
of the goal place before making each choice. In the pausing condition, pauses would 
provide the player with a definite time to plan before making a choice. Inclusion and 
exclusion inferences were studied in each condition. 
2.9.4. Prediction for inferential game play 
The last experiment concerns prediction for the inferential game play. Do children 
understand the inclusion of multiple possibilities? Do children coordinate inclusions 
and exclusions to find the target with efficiency? For these research questions, the 
study compared children's performances across the Flamingo game and two inferential 
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tasks: the Number tasks (Bryant & Roazzi, 1992) and the Tunnel task (Piaget & Garcia, 
1991). The Number task was used to investigate the inclusion of a 'critical zone' of 
multiple possibilities while excluding impossibilities. The Tunnel task was used to 
investigate the child's anticipatory actions in a structure that necessitates coordination of 
inclusions and exclusions. Through the examination of the child's responses to the 
tasks, it was intended to identify the level of the child's operative logic of inclusions 
and exclusions. The child's level of the operative logic would inform about the way 
she or he uses inferences from the game rules and allow to predict her or his 
performance in the game. 
An overview of the studies summarizes the aims, rationale, and measurement for each 
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Chapter 3. Study 1 
	
3.1. 	 Aims 
The present study aims to explore four aspects of children's inferential problem-solving 
in a computer game context: the representation of the game, the ability to make 
inferences from the game rules, the measurement of inferential problem-solving in the 
game, and the effect of the computer on the game play. 
	
3.2. 	 Introduction 
In the review of the literature, various aspects of children's game play in the context of 
computers have been discussed in relation to the framework for analyzing problem-
solving in playing computer games: the effects of game and task contexts, development 
of the concept of a rule in games, the effects of rule content, inferential goal searching, 
understanding of possibility, impossibility and uncertainty. As exploratory in the series 
of experiments for the thesis, this study had four purposes. The first three purposes 
were to explore children's inferential game play in respect of the representation of the 
game, inferential problem-solving and its measurement. Research questions follow: Do 
children perceive the game as a chance event or a task? Do children make inferences 
using the game rules? How can children's inference making be measured? The fourth 
purpose of this study was to examine whether the computer that the series of 
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experiments of this thesis used as the main research tool affected children's game 
behaviour differently from other traditional game tools. Computers give immediate 
audio and visual feedback that a board or card games cannot offer. Does the immediate 
feedback aspect of the computer affect the way children play the game? 
A problem-solving type game, 'Find The Flamingo', was chosen for the study since 
many educational computer games belong to the problem solving type of activities. The 
game is structured by the following rules. 
If the Flamingo is there, you win. 
If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT. 
If cornerwise, you are WARM. 
If they don't touch at all, you are COLD. 
The game demands various steps in problem-solving: making spatial links between the 
clues and the goal from the rules stated in an if-then form, affirmative or negative, 
mapping the links in the current situation at each move, and trying one of the possible 
places while holding in mind possible and impossible positions of the goal. The 
inferential problem-solving of the game is defined as a compound of two elements: 
first, the child makes links between the clues and the Flamingo place based on the game 
rules. Second, the child maps the relations on the current information and position. 
The clue HOT specifies the position of the goal with respect to the current location that 
has intrinsic axes, such as top and bottom, and left and right; for example, 'The 
Flamingo is at the top, bottom, left or right of this square'. The clue WARM specifies 
the position of the Flamingo with respect to the current location according to 45 degree 
axes; for example, 'The Flamingo is at one of the corner squares'. The clue COLD 
specifies the negative relation between the Flamingo and the current location; for 
example, 'The Flamingo is not at the adjacent squares'. Inferring from COLD requires 
the concepts of the impossibility of a certain area for the Flamingo and of the possibility 
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of the rest, whereas HOT or WARM require the concept of the possibility of certain 
places for the Flamingo. 
What decides whether children will make inferences from the rules when they make 
choices? This is initially a question about the player's understanding of the game, as a 
chance event or as a task that can be tackled with logic. For those who understand the 
game as a problem-solving task and use each clue to work towards the goal, their 
performance would be enhanced by the ability to make inference from the game rules. 
For those who cannot make inferences from the game rules and play the game without 
realizing its problem solving nature, or those who are capable of inference-making but 
do not use this ability in the game, their performance would be bad. 
Inferential problem solving of the game can be measured in two ways. Firstly, the 
number of moves the player makes until the completion of the game can be measured. 
The weakness of relying on such measurement of the problem-solving performance is 
the element of luck in the game. Children may hit the goal without any consideration of 
the rules. The first clue can give any of these items of information: the Flamingo, 
HOT, WARM or COLD. In most games, an initial clue of COLD needs more moves 
than a HOT or WARM clue if the player infers from the game rules. There are two 
ways to enhance the measurement. One is that each player plays the game more than 
once. Many games allow a more equal distribution of the element of luck to each 
player. The mean number of moves of all the games would represent the player's 
ability more fairly than the number of moves in a single game. A comparison of mean 
numbers of even and odd sets of games would work as a reliability test. Secondly, the 
inferential problem-solving can be measured by examining the child's making of 
possible and impossible inferences from the clues. For this, direct tests can be carried, 
outside the context of the game. Test scores can also be used as a validity test for the 




3.3.1. 	 Design 
The study had a mixed between-subjects and within-subjects design. It aimed to 
answer the research questions in these ways: 
1. by examining the relation between the game and word clue test performances, and 
2. by comparing the performances of the computer, board and card media groups. 
Using the first method, the relation between the children's game performance and the 
task performance could be examined. Significant positive relation in the game and test 
would suggest the reliability of the measurement of the inferential problem solving in 
the game situation. 
The second method was used to see whether using the computer affected the problem 
solving performance. 
	
3.3.2. 	 Participants 
The 50 children, aged 8 years (mean age = 99.88 months, ranging from 7 years 9 
months to 8 years 10 months, S.D. = 4.1 months) were all the children of year 2 in two 
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primary schools in a middle class area of Inner London. They were allocated into the 
three media groups in the order they entered the experiment room. 
Table 3.1. Number of participants across the three media and gender 
Gender \ Medium Computer Board Cards Total 
Girls 9 12 10 31 
Boys 7 6 6 19 
Total 16 18 16 50 
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3.3.3. 	 Apparatus 
The computer, the board and the cards as media all presented children with the same 
game structure. Each game apparatus had a 5x5 grid to allow 25 word clues. There 
were two distinguishing features among the three media. First, there was a review key 
that provided a view of all the moves made in the computer game. Second, the 
computer game and the board game had a cover picture of a safari, whereas the cards 
were plain green in front. What the player faced in the beginning of the game was the 
safari picture for the computer and board groups, and 25 green cards in a wooden frame 
for the cards group. 
a) Computer game 
An Apple Macintosh LC with 13 inch high resolution colour monitor was used for the 
computer group. There was a review key in the left hand corner of the screen to let the 
child see all the places already tried during the game (see Figure 3.1). The player was 
encouraged to use the review key after every move. Because the programme is not sold 
in the UK., this was a new game to the children. 
b) The board game 
This game has the same structure as "Find the Flamingo" but it was presented in a 
different format. A transparent plastic double-deck board was designed for the game 
(see Figure 3.2). It was covered with 5x5 pieces which formed a picture of a safari on 
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the top deck (a similar display as in the computer game). Each piece had a knob that 
allowed the child to lift it away. On the lower deck, the game rule-governed word clue 
sheets were already introduced before the game and withdrawn after the game. As the 
player lifted a cover piece away, she or he saw a clue word or the Flamingo through the 
transparent plastic board. 
c) The card game 
Two wooden boards were used for the convenience of the procedure. Each board 
(52.5 cm x 43 cm) was made up of 5 rows and 5 columns clearly marked with intercept 
sticks for laying 25 cards. The cards had a green cover, unlike the computer game and 
the board game (picture above). Each card showed a word: HOT, WARM or COT I)  
(see Figure 3.3). 
Find the Flamingo 




Go to the klend 
I New Game 
I Same Game 
Cold Cold Cold Cold Cold 
Cold Cold Cold Cold Cold 
Warm Hot! Warm Cold Cold 
Hot! Hot! Cold Cold 
Warr_. Hot! Warm Cold Cold Clues 25 
Figure 3.1. Pictures of the computer game 
Cold Cold Cold 
Cold Cold Cold 





Figure 3.2. Pictures of the board game 
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Figure 3.3. Pictures of the card game 
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3.3.4. 	 Procedure 
Children were taken individually to a quiet room in their school and shown the game. 
Each child was given an explanation: that she or he was going to play a game in which 
she or he had to find a Flamingo. The experimenter said: 
"If you follow the rules, the job will be much easier. Could you read the rules to me?" 
The screen that had rules was clicked for the computer group. A sheet on which the 
following rules was written was introduced to each child in the board and card group. 
Turn over a card to find the Flamingo. 
If it's there, you win. 
If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT. 
If comerwi se, you are WARM. 
If they don't touch at all, you are COLD. 
If the child was not a fluent reader, the experimenter helped by reading the instructions. 
After reading the rules, the child was asked to explain them to the experimenter. If the 
child understood the rules properly, she or he started to play the game. If not, the 
experimenter explained the rules. Each child played the game four times. Each time, 
the Flamingo was hidden in any of 25 places. The other two media groups had the 
same procedure. In the board game, the piece that had been lifted were not put back. 
In the card game, the cards that had been uncovered were not put back, either. 
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After the fourth game, each child was asked three questions on each of five test sheets. 
The five test sheets were shown in a random sequence (Appendix 1). Each of three 
sheets contained a single clue while each of two sheets contained double clues. The 
single clues were COLD, HOT, and WARM. The double clues were HOT- WARM, 
and WARM-COLD. The single clue tests were to test whether the goal place was 
inferred based on each of the word clues (the game rules). The double clue tests were 
to test whether two clues (rules) were applied at the same time. An assumption was set 
that there were differences in making inferences between the game rules, because of 
differential cognitive demands. The game rules that define the position of the goal in 
relation to HOT and WARM were stated as positive sentences and specified possible 
places of the goal. The game rule about COLD was stated as a negative sentence and 
informs only about impossible places of the goal. On the other hand, tests on multiple 
clues required the child to apply two or more game rules at the same time. To meet the 
requirement, the child had to hold the areas of possible or impossible goal places and to 
find the common ground between the areas. Besides a clue(s), the test sheets also 
contained a picture of a safari that at the beginning of game on the computer and the 
board. The card group was given test sheets on which there was a 5x5 matrix, without 
the picture. 
The rationale behind the questions enabled the child to judge the possible and 
impossible goal places. The first question was to test whether the child made an 
inference of the goal place from the information. The second question was to test 
whether the child made multiple inferences. The third question was to test whether the 
child made an impossible inference. The experimenter asked: 
"Where can the Flamingo be?" 
"Can it be anywhere else?" 
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Figure 3.7. Correct inferences from double clues HOT-WARM 
El Zone of correct inference from double information 
WARM & COLD 
Figure 3.8. Correct inferences from double clues WARM-COLD 
Correct answers to these three questions scored 1 point each. The range of scores for 
each sheet was between 0 and 3. 
If the child was right, she or he was given positive feedback. If not, the next question 
was asked without feedback. 
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3.3.5. 	 Measures 
Two quantitative measurements were used. First, the number of moves needed to 
complete the game was counted. It represents the child's inferential problem-solving 
performance in the game. Second, scores for the paper tests were counted. They 
represent the child's ability in the test situation to infer from each word clue defined in 
the game rules. 
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3.4. 	 Results 
The results are explained in four sections. The first section describes the game 
performances. The criterion for success at chance level of performance is presented. 
Media and gender differences are analyzed. The second section describes performances 
in the word clue tests. Inferences from each clue - HOT, WARM and COLD - and of 
deduction of two clues are presented. In the third section, the reliability of the 
measurements is presented. The fourth section summarizes the findings of the study. 
3.4.1. The game performances 
The questions to be answered in this section were whether the children understood the 
game rules and used them in their choices. In order to answer the questions, the 
criterion for success at chance level was needed. 
3.4.1.1. 	 The criterion for success at chance level 
In order to know whether the player made inferences from the game rules or just chose 
the places without any consideration of the game rules, perhaps at random, the mean 
number of moves of 4 games was observed. If the player made inferences from the 
game rules, it would not take as many moves as to find the target as if she or he found it 
by chance. How many moves would it take to find the Flamingo, if the player made 
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random moves? Three mathematical assumptions were made. Firstly, every place in 
the array has the same probability to be picked. Secondly, the number of places chosen 
until success follows a discrete uniform distribution over the integers from 1 to 25. 
Then the calculation for these follows. The mean of this distribution is (25+1)/2. The 
variance is calculated through deviance between the square of the mean and the 
summation of 12, 22, 32 - - - and 252 divided by the number of places. Thirdly, it 
happens that with 4 games, the mean is satisfactorily normally distributed. i.e. it 
follows the normal distribution with mean 13 and variance 52/4=13. In order to set the 
criterion of chance number, one-tail test was carried out with the mean, SD and the 
number of games. This leads to the criterion of the chance number of 7.07 moves, with 
95% confidence. If the mean number of moves over 4 games is 7.07 or fewer, I can 
reject the hypothesis that the player makes moves randomly. There must have been 
some bias, which is the child's use of the game rules. 36 children's mean number of 
moves was the same as or below the criterion, out of the total of 50, whereas the other 
14 children made more than 7.07 moves. It can be said that the majority of the children 
did not make moves at random. They used inferences from the game rules in order to 
make subsequent moves. 
3.4.1.2. Media and gender differences in the game 
performances 
First, in order to find out the computer medium effect, performances in the computer 
game were compared with those on the board and card versions of the game. The mean 
number of moves of each media group was calculated. Second, in order to see whether 
there were gender differences, the mean numbers of moves for the girls and boys were 
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calculated. Table 3.2 presents mean numbers of moves across game media and gender 
groups. 
The distribution of all the participants' mean numbers of moves is shown in Appendix 
2. It was normal. In order to verify whether there were significant differences between 
the computer, the board and cards and between genders, I carried out a two-way 
between group (medium x gender) ANOVA test (see Table 3.3). There was no 
statistically significant difference between gender groups nor among the three game 
media groups, using the computer, the board and the cards. Gender and media effects 
will be explored again in the word clue tests. 
Table 3.2. Mean numbers of moves across the three media and for each gender 
Gender Medium Computer Board Cards Total 
Girls 7.83 6.50 5.58 6.59 
Boys 5.96 6.58 6.71 6.40 
Total 7.02 6.53 6.0 6.52 
Table 3.3. Two-way ANOVA (medium x gender) for mean numbers of moves 
Source of Variation 	 DF 	 SS 	 MS 	 F 	 Sig. of F 
Medium 2 4.406 2.203 0.285 0.7534 
Sex 1 0.552 0.552 0.071 0.7905 
Medium X Sex 2 17.94 8.97 1.16 0.3228 
Error 44 340.195 7.732 
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3.4.2. Performances on the word clue tests 
Two levels of analysis were carried out: total scores and scores for each of the tests. 
Firstly, each child's total score on the word clue tests was counted for the ability to 
make inference from the game rules. Analyses were carried out to see whether there 
were differences between those who played the game at random and those who used the 
rules, between the game media groups and between gender groups. Secondly, analyses 
of each of the tests were made. Analyses of the single word test scores were to assess 
the accuracy of inference making from each of the clues. Analyses on the double word 
test scores were to assess the systematic use of multiple possibilities or impossibilities. 
3.4.2.1. Group differences in total scores 
Total scores on the word clue tests were not normally distributed (see Appendix 3). 
The distribution skewed a little negatively. The possible maximum score was 15. The 
mean of total scores was 7.1 (S.D. 3.4). In order to know whether there was a 
difference in the inferential ability measured through the tests between those who made 
moves around chance level and those who made significantly fewer moves, total scores 
for the word clue tests were calculated for the two groups. The mean of the total scores 
was 7.94 (S.D. 3.41) for those whose mean number of moves was below the criterion; 
4.93 (S.D. 4.93) for those who made moves within the criterion. In order to validate 
the difference between the two groups, a Mann-Whitney U test was carried out because 
data were not normally distributed. There was a statistically significant difference in 
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total scores between the children whose game performances were within the criterion of 
chance and those who were less than the criterion (z = -2.895, p< 0.01). Thus, there 
was an association between the criterion of chance and the total score for the tests. 
In order to see whether there were game media and gender differences in the inferential 
ability, group means of the total scores for the word clue tests across media and gender 
were calculated. Table 3.4 presents the means of the total test scores across the three 
media and gender groups. 
Table 3.4. Mean total scores for the word clue tests across the three media and 
gender groups 
Gender \ Medium Computer Board Cards Total 
Girls 7.11 8.42 6.30 7.36 
Boys 7.57 5.33 7.00 6.68 
Total 7.31 7.39 6.56 7.10 
To verify whether there were differences between the three game media groups, a 
Kruskall-Wallis test was carried out because data were not normally distributed. There 
was no statistically significant difference between the computer, board and cards groups 
(H = .791, p > 0.05). To verify whether there was a difference between gender 
groups, a Mann-Whitney U test was carried out because data were not normally 
distributed. There was no statistically significant difference between the boys and the 
girls (z = -.48, p = 0.63). 
3.4.2.2. Differences between tests 
To investigate how accurately the goal place was inferred from each of the word clues, 
the mean scores for each of the tests was calculated. The maximum possible score for 
each word clue was 3. To get a score of 3 at each test, the child was able to judge the 
possible and impossible goal places in relation to each clue. The mean scores for the 
single clues HOT, WARM and COLD were 1.98 (SD 0.89), 0.98 (SD 1.02) and 2.1 
(SD 1.02), respectively. The mean scores for the double clue tests were 1.18 (SD 
0.83) for HOT-WARM and 0.86 (SD 0.88) for WARM-COLD, with maximum 
possible score 3. 
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Figure 3.9. Mean scores across word clue item 
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To verify whether there were differences between test items, Wilcoxon tests were 
applied. There was no difference between the single clues COLD and HOT (z = -.889, 
p > 0.05) while there were significant differences between COLD and WARM (z = -
4.733, p < 0.01) and between HOT and WARM (z = -4.638, p < 0.01). The scores 
for COLD and HOT were significantly higher than for WARM. 
There was no significant difference in scores between the single clue WARM and the 
double clue HOT-WARM (z = -.146, p > .05) nor between the single word clue 
WARM and the double word clue WARM-COLD (z = -.973, p > .05). However, there 
was a significant difference between two double clues HOT-WARM and WARM-
COLD (z = -2.341, p < 0.05). The scores for HOT-WARM were significantly higher 
that those for WARM-COLD. 
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3.4.3. 	 Reliability and validity of measurements 
In order to verify the reliability of the measurement of the number of moves for 
assessing children's inferential problem-solving performance, a comparison was made 
between the mean numbers of moves in the odd and even sets of games. The 
correlation between the two means was statistically significant (r = .524, p < 0.01). 
In order to verify the validity of the measurement of the number of moves for assessing 
children's inferential problem-solving performance, a correlation was made between the 
number of moves and the scores on the word clue tests. The correlation between the 
mean number of moves and the total scores for the word clue tests was statistically 
significant (r = -.542, p < 0.001). Those who made a small number of moves in the 
game had high scores on the word clue tests, whereas those who made a large number 
of moves in the game had low scores. 
In order to verify the validity of the criterion for chance level success as a test of rule 
use, a comparison was made in the word clue tests between those whose mean number 
of moves was below the criterion and those who made moves within the criterion. 
There was a significant difference between the two groups (z = -2.895, p < 0.01). 
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3.4.4. 	 Summary of results 
1. The majority of children made fewer moves than the criterion of chance level. 
2. There was no significant difference in the mean number of moves between the 
computer, board and cards groups. 
3. There was no significant difference in the mean number of moves between genders. 
4. There was a significant difference in total scores for the word clue tests between 
those whose mean number of moves was below the criterion of chance level and those 
who made moves within the criterion. 
5. There was no significant difference in the total scores for the word clue tests 
between the computer, board and card groups. 
6. There was no significant difference in the total scores for the word clue tests 
between genders. 
7. There were significant differences in scores between the tests. Scores for COLD 
and HOT were significantly higher than for WARM, while there was no difference 
between COLD and HOT. Scores for HOT-WARM were significantly higher than for 
WARM-COLD. In the comparison of the single and double clues, there was no 
significant difference between WARM and HOT-WARM nor between WARM and 
WARM-COLD. 
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8. The correlation between the number of moves and the total scores on the word tests 
was highly significant. The correlation between the mean numbers of even and odd 
sets of games was also significant. 
3.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Study 1 explored four aspects of children's inferential problem-solving in a computer 
game context: the representation of the game, the ability to make inferences from the 
game rules, the measurement of inferential problem-solving in the game, and the effect 
of the computer on the game play. Further research questions were drawn from the 
findings of the study. 
Study 1 has shown that 8-year-old children on average can enact the game as a 
problem-solving task when the game is structured by the rules, stated as affirmative and 
negative if -then sentences. The majority of the children found the Flamingo with a 
smaller number of moves than the criterion of the chance number expected with random 
choices. These children inferred the goal place from the game rules when they made 
moves. It was evident that they represented the game as a problem-solving task. 
Counting the number of moves until the completion of the game is a reliable 
measurement of the child's inferential problem solving in the game process. There was 
a high correlation in the mean numbers of moves between the even and odd sets of 
games. The mean numbers of moves for all four games also significantly correlated 
with the total score for the word clue tests measuring the ability to infer from the HOT, 
WARM and COLD clues that appeared in the game and the game rules. The results of 
each of the word clue tests give hints on how the player might have dealt with each clue 
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in the actual game process. Scores for the clue WARM were significantly lower than 
those for HOT and COLD. Scores for the clue of COLD were as high as those for 
HOT in the word clue tests. These results contrasted with previous findings of the 
effects of negative constituents of statements on information processing (Fabricius, et 
al., 1987; Toppino, 1980; Wason, 1959). The negative statement "If they don't touch 
at all, you are COLD" was inferred from as accurately as the affirmative statement that 
"If the Flamingo touches your box sidewise, you are HOT". The negative statement 
was also inferred from significantly more correctly than the affirmative statement that 
"If the Flamingo touches your box cornerwise, you are WARM". There are two 
possible explanations for this contrast. First, COLD was inferred from as accurately as 
HOT, because the children in this study were old enough to handle the cognitive 
demand of a negative constituent as a sign of exclusion of the adjacent places. Second, 
it might be that the nature of the information has a crucial effect on inference making, 
stronger than the form of the statements in which information was given. If this is the 
case, the question is how the nature of WARM differs from that of HOT or COLD. It 
will be interesting to see whether the findings of the tests are also the cases of the game 
process. Would COLD be used correctly as often as HOT? Would WARM be less 
used than HOT or COLD? The way that children make moves in relation to the clues in 
the game process will be investigated in the next study. The investigation on use of the 
clues in the game process will inform further about the strategies that the children use. 
For example, making moves beyond the chance criterion requires a strategy to 
maximize the elimination of the impossible places for the goal. Do children exclude all 
the impossible places indicated by COLD in the game process? 
No difference was found between gender groups in the game performance. This result 
may come from the age of the participants. Earlier research (Halpern, 1986; Kerns & 
Berenbaum, 1991) showed that gender differences in spatial abilities may appear 
around 10 years of age in favour of boys. The 8-year-old children in this study might 
still be too young to have developed differences in spatial abilities. 
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A further interesting finding was that the media on which children played the game had 
no significant effects on children's problem solving. The game performances of the 
computer group did not differ from those of the board and cards groups. In spite of the 
presence of the vivid visual display and audible feedback, computers did not differ from 
the traditional game tools in the children's problem solving. 
Another research suggestion deriving from this study is to investigate the effect of the 
media and gender differences with children of a broad age range. It is difficult to 
generalize how far the computer and gender do not affect children's problem solving in 
search games. I need evidence about whether these findings are the same for younger 
and older children as well. 
A further research question concerns individual difference and learning. A significant 
difference was shown in the results of the word clue tests between those who made 
moves below the chance criterion and those who were within the criterion. Did children 
start the game with understanding of the problem of the game? Would they learn it in 
the course of the game? Even though literature on problem-solving has its tradition in 
the study of individual difference (e.g., Bruner, 1966, 1971), this is an area largely 
ignored in computer related research. For research on individual difference and 
learning, more games were allowed to each player in further studies. 
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Chapter 4. Study 2 
	
4.1. 	 Aims 
The aim of Study 2 was primarily to investigate development, individual differences 
and learning in children's inferential game play. Secondarily, it aimed to replicate some 
of the findings of Study 1. Gender and game media differences were investigated 
extensively, using two more age groups of children. 
	
4.2. 	 Introduction 
This study aimed to replicate and extend some of the findings of Study 1, and to 
indicate some suggestions for further studies. Replication was needed to check that the 
findings on game media and gender indifferences held across two more age groups of 
children, whose data would eventually allow analysis of developmental changes. As 
discussed in Study 1, two research questions are considered: whether learning occurs 
while playing the game, and how inferential game behaviour differs from individual to 
individual. 
I shall assume, within inferential game behaviour, two aspects of cognition which 
depend on developmental changes. The first is the development of the representation of 
the problem (presumably structured by the game rules). For example, the structure of 
103 
the Flamingo game, and consequently the word clues in the game, are related to higher-
order concepts such as possibility or impossibility. A COLD clue conveys information 
of the impossibility of a certain area for the goal and of the possibility of the rest, 
whereas a HOT or WARM clue indicates the possibility of certain places. Operations of 
inclusion and exclusion render the appropriate representations of the zone of impossible 
places for the goal and the zone of possible ones. From the Piagetian perspective, 
operation of inclusion and exclusion must develop after a certain age (Piaget & Garcia, 
1991). Only children aged 10 years upwards are expected to be able to construe the 
words as signals for an exclusion of the impossible places of the goal and an inclusion 
of the possible. Then, they would know which choices are appropriate. 
Secondly, as children's development progresses to the systematic use of multiple (more 
than one) possibility, there will be a change in inferential game behaviour. If the 
players define a zone of possibility and use the possible places within the zone 
systematically, their performance will be enhanced. Bryant and Roazzi (1992) studied 
6-, 7-, and 8-year-old children in number inference tasks which asked for a number 
which is bigger than X but smaller than Y. The children were asked to choose a 
number in one case where there was only one possible correct number and in another 
case where there were several correct answers. In the task which had one correct 
answer, even the younger children were quite good at inferring a "critical area", 
particularly in their first choices. In the other task, the proportion of correct first 
choices that were immediately followed by a correct second choice was quite high in the 
seven and eight year olds but a great deal smaller in the six year olds. It seemed that the 
six year olds had difficulties in holding the "critical area" in their mind and eliminating 
alternatives one by one. The findings of Bryant and Roazzi's study show that 
systematic use of inference in numbers develops up to 7 years of age. The Flamingo 
game requires systematic use of inferences in space. It is uncertain at this point whether 
inference in space develops after that for numbers. 
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While the assumption of developmental change in relation to the Flamingo game takes 
the constructivists' view that the structure of the game is consciously represented and 
develops with age, the probability-matching hypothesis envisages that the choices of the 
player are guided by the likelihood gained through accumulated reinforcements. No 
developmental change is expected in this model. Children would not tackle the task of 
getting the target logically. They would tend to attend to a HOT or WARM because 
these words were more likely to be found next to the goal than COLD in the previous 
games. 
To understand what lies underneath choice-making, we need to concentrate on the uses 
of information. If the players make inference from the game rules, their choices would 
be coherent with inferences from the information they have. Faced with HOT, their 
choice will be one of the adjacent places that are above, or below, or to the left or right. 
Faced with WARM, they will move to one of the diagonally adjacent places. Faced 
with COLD, the next move will be to one of the non-adjacent places. On the other 
hand, if the players do not have any concept of the game rules, their choices would not 
correspond to what the game rules define as the relations between the goal and the 
information. Thus, the focus of analyses of the game behaviour should be on choices 
(moves) in relation to information. The study adopted the methodology of recognizing 
choice (response) patterns in relation to reinforcement of concept formation tasks 
(Levinson & Reese, 1967; Kendler & Kendler, 1970) for the examination of children's 
use of inference from information. Each move can be seen as a result of either a correct 
or an incorrect inference from the previous information. To assess whether a move 
follows from a correct inference, two analysis methods were applied. The first method 
will be called 'single information inference', in which the immediately preceding 
information counts as the base of the inference. The other method will be called 
`double information inference', in which the two preceding items of information count 
as the base for inference. These procedures of data analysis allow us to look at the way 
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in which children integrate spatial relationship information, and to identify which 
concepts and operations they find demanding. 
The next question is whether children become more proficient in using a particular form 
of logical reasoning when it is embedded in a game that they can play over and over 
again. In this study, unlike some other tasks, children became engaged in a cultural 
practice, a game, which assumes either the use of inference from the rules or the 
accumulation of reinforcements. The study investigates whether children continue to 
perform at the same level of proficiency after many games, or whether they come to use 
inferences more and more. Learning curves reveal how performances change over 
games. Studying subgroups' learning curves over games and their choice-patterns 
were two methods for the examination of individual differences used in this second 
study. Two kinds of players were envisaged. The first group was those who played 
the game with an assumption that the game is a chance event. Their performances were 
expected to be at chance level. Choices of this group would not correspond to the game 
rule. The second group was those who made inferences from the game rules. They 
were expected to perform well. Their choices would be coherent with the game rules. 
The secondary goal of the study was to replicate some findings from Study 1, which 
showed no difference between genders nor between the game media groups. This 
study tackles the questions again, with younger and older children than the participants 
of Study 1. For generalization of the findings of Study 1, it was necessary to test 
whether or not the computer as a game tool affected the game behaviour of children of 
various ages. The study also aimed to assess the ability to make inferences from word 
clues, again through word clue tests. 
To sum up, the study primarily explored three aspects of the game play. 
• developmental change between 7-year-old children and 10-year-old children; 
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• individual differences: whether some children are consistently better than others in 
inferential game play; 
• learning: whether changes occur over games. 
• Furthermore, the study aimed to replicate other findings of Study 1, concerning: 
• game medium difference between use of a computer and a board; 
• gender difference; 
• reliability of measurements: correlation between the mean number of moves of the 
odd and even sets of the games; 
• validity of using the number of moves for measuring the ability to make inferences, 
comparing this with the total word clue tests score; 
• validity of using the criterion of chance number for the test compared to the total 
word clue test score for the use of the game rules. 
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4.3. 	 Method 
4.3.1. 
	 Design 
The study had a mixed between subjects and within subjects design. It aimed to answer 
the research questions in these four ways: 
1. by comparing performance between the two age groups, gender groups, and the 
computer and board groups, 
2. by examining the relationships between the game performance and the word clue 
test performance, 
3. by tracing the performance of the 'good' and 'poor' groups from the first to the last 
games, and 
4. by comparing moves after HOT, WARM, and COLD. 
The first method was used to see whether there were developmental changes, gender 
differences and medium effects in inferential problem solving. Significant differences 
between the age groups in favour of the older group would suggest that inferential 
ability develops with age. 
The second method was used to replicate the findings of Study 1, that there was a 
significant relationship between the children's game performance and the test 
performance. A significant positive relation between the game and the test would 
suggest the validity of the measurement of inferential problem solving in the game 
situation. 
The third method was used to see whether the children came to the game with already 
developed logical skills, or whether they developed their strategies while playing. 
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Using the fourth method, the children's use of inference from HOT, WARM, and 
COLD in the game process would be examined. It was predicted that COLD would be 
used more than HOT and HOT used more than WARM, as the word clue tests in Study 
1 had shown. 
4.3.2. 	 Participants 
The study involved 87 children whose ages ranged from 6 years 10 months to 10 years 
10 months. Two age groups were represented: 32 children aged from 6 years 6 months 
to 8 years 1 month (mean age = 88.3 months; SD 4.01) and 55 children aged 9 years 10 
months to 10 years 10 months (mean age = 124 months; SD 3.45). The children were 
all those in years 2 and 5 in two schools in a middle class area in central London. 
Table 4.1. Number of participants across age, gender and medium 
7 years 	 10 years 	 Total 
Computer 	 Board 	 Computer 	 Board 
Girls 	 9 	 7 	 11 	 18 	 41 
Boys 	 7 	 9 	 14 	 12 	 46 
Total 	 32 	 55 	 87 
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4.3.3. 	 Apparatus 
The computer and the board game media presented children with the same game 
structure. Each game apparatus had a 5x5 grid to allow 25 items of information to be 
shown. There is a distinguishing feature between the two media. The computer had a 
review key that allowed a view of all the moves made in the game. As the player 
clicked a place on the 5x5 grid, a word appeared in the place for a couple of seconds 
and returned to the original picture. With the board, the player made a choice on the 
5x5 grid, lifted the top piece in the place and uncovered it until the completion of the 
game. 
4.3.4. Procedure 
The computer and board groups had the same procedure as described in Study 1, except 
that each child had 8 trials of the game, and that there were 6 word clue tests. There 
were three tests with a single clue and another three tests with a multiple clue. The three 
tests with a single clue, HOT, WARM and COLD, measured the ability to infer the goal 
from each of the clues. The three tests with a multiple clue measured the ability to infer 
from two or more clues at the same time. 
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4.3.4. Outcome measures 
Five quantitative measurements were used: 
(a) Number of moves until the completion of the game; this was to measure children's 
inferential problem-solving ability in the game. 
(b) Single information inference: this was to identify whether the move was an adequate 
result of inference from the previous information (see examples in Figure 4.1 to 
4.3). 
(c) Double information inference: this was to identify whether the move was the result 
of inferences from two successive moves (see examples in Figure 4.4 to 4.9). 
(d) Time taken until the completion of the game; this was to measure children's 
proficiency in information handling. 
(e) Scores for the word clue test; this was to measure children's ability to infer from 
word clues, and a test of the validity of (a). 
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Figure 4.2. Correct inferences form WARM 
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HOT & HOT 
Figure 4.4. Correct inferences from two HOTs 
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Figure 4.5. Correct inferences from a HOT and a WARM 
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Figure 4.7. Correct inferences from two WARMs 
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4.4. 	 Results 
The results are given in six sections. The first three sections describe the replication of 
Study 1: analyses of the number of moves and of word clue test scores, and reliability 
and validity of the measurements. The next two sections address individual differences 
and learning over games. The last section describes choice-patterns. 
4.4.1. 	 Analysis of number of moves 
The questions to be answered in this section were whether the children understood the 
game rules and used them in their choices. In order to answer the questions, the 
criterion for success at chance level was needed. 
4.4.1.1. 	 The criterion of chance level 
In order to know whether the player made inferences from the game rules or just chose 
the places randomly, the criterion for success by chance was set. It was assumed that, 
if the player made inferences from the game rules, it would not take as many moves 
when they were made by chance to find the target. With 8 games, the mean was 13 and 
variance was 52/8=6.5 (its calculation was already described in Study 1). A one-tail 
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test was carried out with the mean, the variance and the number of games. This led to 
the chance level of 7.07 moves with 99% confidence, or 8.80 moves with 95% 
confidence. I take 7.07 with 99% of confidence over 8 games, for this number gives 
the same value as the criterion used in Study 1 over 4 games. 
Only when the child's mean number of moves in 8 games was the same as or lower 
than the criterion, the hypothesis that the child made moves at random was rejected. 
Each player's mean number of moves in 8 games was counted. 61 children out of 88 
children made, on average, fewer moves than the chance criterion. Therefore, the 
majority of the participants inferred the game rules to find the goal. In order to compare 
rule use between the age groups, the number of participants who made fewer moves 
than the criterion of 7.07 was counted for each age group. For 13 out of 32 7-year-old 
children, the mean number of moves in 8 games was smaller than the chance criterion; 
while 48 10-year-old children out of 55 made fewer moves than the criterion. There 
was a significant difference between the age groups in the number of children whose 
mean number of moves was less than the chance criterion (Chi-squire = 4.07, d.f. = 1, 
p < 0.05). In the next section, I will describe differences between genders and between 
media groups, using the mean number of moves, which were also used to examine 
differences between these groups in Study 1. 
4.4.1.2. Media and gender differences in number of 
moves 
In order to see whether there were no differences between the media groups and 
between the gender groups, the mean of number of moves was calculated across each 
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group. Table 4.2 shows the mean number of moves across the age, media and gender 
groups. 
The distribution of the mean number of moves of all the participants was skewed 
positively (see Appendix 3). In order to verify whether there were differences between 
the game medium groups or between gender groups, Mann-Whitney tests were applied 
separately with gender variables or with the media variables because data were not 
normally distributed. There was no significant difference between the computer and 
board groups (z = -.77, p > 0.05) nor between gender groups (z = -1.27, p > 0.05). 
The finding of no significant difference between the media groups or the gender groups 
replicates the finding of Study 1. 
Table 4.2. Mean number of moves (SD) across age, media, and gender groups 
7 years 
Computer 	 Board 
10 years 
Computer 	 Board 
Total 
n=16 n=16 n=25 n=30 n=87 
Girls 10.55 (4.70) 10.92 (4.70) 6.21 (2.91) 6.00 (3.45) 8.08 (4.35) 
Boys 8.29 (4.52) 9.86 (4.40) 5.59 (2.16) 5.03 (2.24) 6.44 (3.52) 
Total 9.87 (4.49) 5.58 (2.58) 7.16 (3.97) 
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4.4.2. 	 Analysis of word clue test scores 
Analysis of scores for the word clue tests was carried out at two levels. Firstly, the 
child's total scores for the word clue tests were counted for the ability to make inference 
from the word clues. Analysis was carried out to see whether there were differences 
between the two criterion groups, between the game media groups, and between gender 
groups. Secondly, analysis of each of the tests was made. Analysis of the single word 
test scores was to assess the accuracy of inference making from each of the clues. 
Analyses of the double word test scores were to assess the systematic use of multiple 
possibility or impossibility. 
4.4.2.1. Group differences in total scores 
Each child's total score for the word clue tests represents the ability to infer from the 
rules. The distribution of the total scores was skewed positively (see Appendix 4). 
The mean score for all the participants was 11.36 (SD 5.04) with the maximum 
possible score of 18. The mean score was 13.65 (SD 4.01) for those who made fewer 
moves than the chance criterion; and 6.26 (SD 2.88) for those who made moves above 
the criterion. In order to verify whether there were significant differences between the 
two groups, Mann-Whitney U tests were carried, because data were not normally 
distributed. There was a significant difference between the criterion groups (z = -6.50, 
p < 0.01). 
118 
In order to see whether there were differences between the age, media and gender 
groups, the mean scores for each of the groups were calculated. Table 4.3 shows the 
mean scores across the age, media and gender groups. In order to verify whether there 
were significant differences between the age, gender or media groups, Mann-Whitney 
tests were carried with each variable one at a time, because data were not normally 
distributed. There were significant differences between the age groups (z = -5.603, p < 
0.001). No difference was found between genders (z = -1.647, p > 0.05) nor between 
media (z = -.582, p > 0.05). This study thus replicated the findings of Study 1, that 
there was no difference in total scores for word clue tests between genders (z = -.48, p 
= 0.63) nor between media groups (H=.791, p > 0.05). 






Computer 	 Board 
Total 
n=16 n=16 n=25 n=30 n=87 
Girls 7.00 (1.41) 7.89 (3.37) 11.79 (4.73) 13.63 (6.12) 10.37(4.94) 
Boys 8.33 (4.39) 6.43 (3.15) 14.82 (3.68) 14.14 (4.02) 12.12 (5.03) 
Total 7.5 (3.28) 13.6 (4.5) 11.36 (5.04) 
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4.4.2.2. Differences between the tests 
In order to know how each clue was used to infer the goal place and whether there was 
systematic use of multiple possibility or impossibility, the mean scores for each of the 
tests were counted. The maximum possible score for each word clue was 3. To get the 
maximum score of 3 in each of the tests, the child should have been able to judge the 
possible and impossible goal places, inferring from the game rules. Mean scores for 
the single words HOT, WARM and COLD were 2.16 (SD 0.91), 1.60 (SD 1.20) and 
2.56 (SD 0.94), respectively. Mean scores for double words were 1.69 (SD 0.99) for 
the item HOT-WARM and 1.47 (SD 1.15) for the item WARM-COLD, with maximum 
possible score 3. The mean score for the triple words was 1.86 (SD 0.94) with 
maximum possible score 3. Figure 4.10 shows scores for each of the tests. 
To verify whether there were differences between the tests, Wilcoxon tests were 
applied, because data were not normally distributed. There were significant differences 
between the single word COLD and HOT (z = -3.971, p < 0.01), between COLD and 
WARM (z = -5.636, p < 0.01) and between HOT and WARM (z = -5.093, p < 0.01). 
Scores for COLD were significantly higher than for HOT, and scores for HOT were 
significantly higher than for WARM. 
There was a significant difference between the two double clues HOT-WARM and 
WARM-COLD (z = -2.80, p < 0.05). The scores of HOT-WARM were significantly 
higher that those for WARM-COLD. There were significant differences between the 
triple clue and the double clues. Significant differences were found between HOT-
WARM-COLD and HOT-WARM (z = -2.056, p < 0.05), and between HOT-WARM-
COLD and WARM-COLD (z = -3.483, p < 0.001). 
/- /- r--  
WARM COLD H&W W&C H,W&C 
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Figure 4.10. Scores for each of the word clue tests 
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To validate the findings of the word clue tests in Study 1, a comparison was made 
between Study 1 and 2. In Study 1, COLD was scored the highest. COLD and HOT 
were scored significantly higher than WARM, while there was no significant difference 
between COLD and HOT. In this second study, COLD was scored significantly higher 
than HOT, and HOT was scored significantly higher than WARM. The order of the 
mean scores for each single word test was identical in both studies. The results of the 
word clue tests in this study confirmed the levels of difficulties of the single word clues 
detected in the previous study. The children judged the possible and impossible goal 
places with differential levels of accuracy across the clues. COLD (the clue of exclusion 
of impossible places) was used more easily to make inferences than HOT and WARM, 
which specified a maximum of four possible goal places. These results give more 
doubt because the cognitive demand of inference making from COLD seems heavier 
than from HOT or WARM. 
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4.4.2.3. Age Differences in the word tests 
To find out which word clue results had age differences, the mean score for each test 
was calculated for both age groups. Data were classified only into age groups, because 
there was no difference in scores on word clue tests between gender or between media 
groups. Figure 4.11 shows mean scores for word clue tests across age groups. 
In order to verify whether there were differences in the scores for each test item 
between age groups, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out with scores for each item, 
one at a time because data were not normally distributed. Significant differences were 
found between age groups for each of the tests: HOT (z = -4.621, p < 0.01), WARM (z 
= -5.18, p < 0.01), COLD (z = -3.085, p < 0.01), HOT-WARM (z = -3.895, p < 
0.01), WARM-COLD (z = -4.344, p < 0.01) and HOT-WARM-COLD (z = -3.547, p 
< 0.01). The 10-year-old children scored significantly higher than the 7-year-old 
children in practically every word test. The older group made more accurate 









q 10 yrs 
cc 
WORD CLUE 
Figure 4.11. Scores for word clue tests across age groups 
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4.4.3. 	 Reliability of measurements 
In order to replicate the findings of Study 1, tests for the reliability and validity of the 
measurements were applied. To assess the reliability of measurement by counting 
moves for assessing the child's problem-solving performance, the correlation was 
calculated between the mean numbers of moves in odd and even sets of games. The 
correlation between the two means was statistically significant (r = .634, p < 0.001). 
The correlation between the mean number of moves over 8 games and the total score for 
the word clue tests was calculated, as a way to test the validity of measurement by 
counting moves for assessing the child's problem-solving performance. 
	 The 
correlation between the mean number of moves and the score on the word clue tests 
was statistically significant (r = -.723, p < 0.001). Those who had a small number of 
moves in the game had high scores for the word clue tests, while those who had a large 
number of moves in the game had low scores. 
To validate the criterion for chance level success as a test for the child's use of the game 
rules, the total scores for the word clue tests were compared between the two criterion 
groups. There was a significant difference in the test scores between the groups (z = - 
6.50, p < 0.01). 
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4.4.4. Individual differences 
In order to see whether some children were consistently better than others, and whether 
the difference existed from the beginning of the game, the study used the method of 
backward learning curves. The method takes final responses for the selection of groups 
and traces responses from the first to the last games (Zeaman & House, 1963). The 
children were divided into 2 groups - good and poor - based on the mean number of 
moves in the last 4 games. Children whose mean number of moves in the last 4 games 
was smaller than 7.07, the criterion of chance level success over 4 games, were defined 
as the good performance group. Those who had a mean number of moves around the 
criterion were placed in the poor performance group. The mean number of moves and 
the mean scores for the word clue tests of each of the groups were calculated for the 
comparison between the groups. Table 4.4 shows the number of participants, the mean 
number of moves and the mean test score of each performance group. 
The performances of each group were traced from the first trial to the last. Figure 4.12 
shows the learning curves of each of the performance groups. In both age groups, the 
poor game players who performed around the criterion of success by chance level in the 
later trials were those who started the game badly. On the other hand, the good 
performers did better from the start. The patterns of responses found in the final games 
already existed from the beginning. The 10-year-old 'good' performance group made 
fewer moves than the criterion of chance level from the beginning. The 7-year-old 
`good' performance group made fewer moves than the criterion after 4 games. The 
group needed the first four games to learn the use of the game rules in their choices. 
The 10-year-old 'poor' performance group was in overall worse than the 7-year-old 
`good' performance group. The fluctuation of the learning curve of the 10-year-old 
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`poor' performance group might have come from the small group size. The 7-year-old 
`poor' performance group did not show any improvement within the eight games. 
Table 4.4. Number of participants, mean number of moves and mean test scores 
for each performance group 
Age 	 Performance No. participants Mean No.(SD) MeanScore (SD) 
7 years Good 13 6.2 (2.48) 9.4 (3.2) 
Poor 19 12.4 (3.78) 6.2 (2.78) 
10 years Good 48 4.7 (0.96) 14.5 (3.74) 
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4.4.5. Learning measured by the completion time and 
number of moves 
In order to see whether the use of the game rules required less time for thinking as the 
games went on, the completion time for each game was measured. Figure 5.12 shows 
the mean completion time for the 10-year-old children. These children got much 
quicker as the game went on. The performance time of the last game was less than half 
that of the first one. As a turning point, differences from before and after the 5th game 
were very clear and particularly interesting. Before the 5th game, the decline curve of 
the performance time was rapid. Children were getting closer to their minimum time. 
In order to verify whether there were significant differences before and after the 5th 
game, games were divided into two blocks (1st — 4th and 5-8th). A Wilcox signed-
rank test was used, because the distributions of times were non-parametric (see 
Appendices 6 & 7). There was a significant difference in the time taken to complete the 
game between the two blocks of games (z = -2.51, p< 0.05). The phenomenon could 
be interpreted as that infolination processing was getting skilled. It has been shown in 
previous studies that problem solving becomes smooth as practice on the same problem 
continues (e.g., Case, 1986). 
In order to see whether there were significant differences in the numbers of moves 
before and after the 5t1 
 game, games were divided into two blocks (1st — 4th and 5-8th). 
A Wilcox signed-rank test was carried out because the distributions of the mean 
numbers of moves of the two blocks of games were non-parametric (see Appendices 8 
& 9). There was a significant difference in the mean numbers of moves between the 
two blocks of games (z = -2.32, p< 0.05). 
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There were many missing data for the performance time of the 7 year-old-children, due 
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Figure 4.12. Mean time across games of 10 year-old subjects 
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4.4.6. 	 Analyses of choice pattern 
To assess whether each move (choice) followed from a correct inference from 
information, 'single information inferences' and 'double information inferences' were 
counted. In single information inferences, each move was judged as correct or 
incorrect in relation to the immediately preceding information (see Figures 4.1 to 4.3). 
In double information inference, each move was judged as correct or incorrect in 
relation to the two preceding items of information (see Figures 4.4. to 4.9). 
For single information inferences, each move was categorized according to three areas 
that were identical to the three relations of the game rules; the horizontally and vertically 
adjacent area (H/V adjacent area), the diagonally adjacent area, and the non-adjacent 
area. The numbers of occurrences of each type of information (HOT, WARM and 
COLD) and the numbers of correct inferences from the information were calculated over 
8 games for each of the participants. Because the occurrences of the three types of 
information varied across each participant, the percentages of correct inferences for the 
three information types were calculated. The mean percentage of single information 
inference was 89.1 (SD 15.3) for HOT, 51.0 (SD 35.0) for WARM and 64.9 (SD 
26.8) for COLD. Table 4.5 presents the percent of moves into the three areas across 
the information. 
Faced with HOT, most of the moves were made to the horizontally or vertically adjacent 
places. The children were very good at using inferences from HOT in the process of 
the game. Faced with WARM, most of the moves were made either to the H/V adjacent 
places or to the diagonally adjacent places. But moves to non-adjacent places were rare 
with WARM. It seems that the children coded WARM as referring to adjacent places. 
Faced with COLD, the majority of moves was made to the non-adjacent places 
Table 4.5. Percentages of moves across three areas from single information 
H/V* 	 Diagonal 	 No-A-- 
HOT 89.1 5.9 5.1 
WARM 39.1 51.0 9.7 
COLD 25.9 9.2 64.9 
Percent of correct Inferences 
* H/V ; Horizontally or Vertically adjacent area 
No-A ; Non-adjacent area 
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The distributions of the percentages of correct single information inferences from HOT, 
WARM or COLD were not normal (see Appendices 10 to 12). In order to test whether 
there were significant differences in correct single information inferences between 
HOT, WARM and COLD, Wilcoxon matched-pair tests were carried out with pairs of 
HOT and COLD, and of COLD and WARM. There were significant differences 
between HOT and COLD (z = -6.34, p < 0.01) and between COLD and WARM (z = -
4.70, p < 0.01). HOT was used more correctly than COLD; COLD was used more 
correctly than WARM. The results did not agree with the findings of the word clue 
tests: in these, COLD was higher than HOT; HOT was higher than WARM. 
In order to find out whether there were differences between the age and gender groups 
in single information inference from HOT, WARM, or COLD, Mann-Whitney tests 
were carried separately with HOT, WARM and COLD. There were differences 
between the age groups in WARM (z = -4.86, p < 0.01) and COLD (z = -5.55, p < 
0.01) in favour of the older groups. No difference was found between the gender 
groups. 
To see how the younger and older groups differed in use of each type of information in 
the game process, the percentages of correct single information inferences and double 
information inferences were calculated for each age group. Figure 4.14 shows the 
percentages of correct single information inferences from the three kind of information 
for the two age group. 
The younger children made correct use of WARM and COLD on less than half of the 
occurrences. The older children were better at inferring from WARM and COLD than 
the younger children, although the correct use of these two items of information was 
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Figure 4.14. 	 Percentages of single information inferences for two age groups 
(7years and 10 years) 
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In order to see whether there were differences in inferring from two items of 
information between age groups, the percentage of correct inferences from two 
successive pieces of information was calculated for each possible pair of information 
items. For the 10-year-old children, the percentages of correct inferences from the 
double information WARM-COLD and those from COLD-WARM were below 60. 
These two double information inferences were also among the four double information 
inferences where the 7-year-old children had a percentage of correct inference below 
40. WARM and COLD clues still appeared to be more difficult for the younger age 
group to infer from. Figure 4.15 shows the percentages of correct double information 
inferences for the two age groups. 
Figure 4.15. Percent of correct double information inferences for two age groups 
(7 years and 10 years) 
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4.5. 	 Summary of results 
Results will be summarized first with reference to the replication of the previous study, 
including evidence of developmental change, and secondly with reference to individual 
differences, learning and choice-patterns. 
1. The majority of the 10-year-old children made moves below the criterion, while the 
majority of the 7-year-old children made moves around chance level. There were 
significant differences between the age groups in the scores for each of the word clue 
tests: HOT, WARM, COLD, HOT-WARM, WARM-COLD, and HOT-WARM-COLD. 
2. There was no significant difference in the mean number of moves between the 
computer and the board groups. No significant difference was found in scores for the 
word clue tests, either. 
3. There was no significant difference in the mean number of moves between gender 
groups. Scores for the word clue tests did not show significant differences, either. 
4. There were significant differences in scores between the word clue tests. Scores for 
COLD were significantly higher than for HOT; HOT was scored significantly higher 
than WARM. The order of scores of single word tests was identical in Studies 1 and 2. 
The results of the word clue tests in this study confirm the levels of difficulties of single 
word clues detected in the previous study. 
5. There was a significant correlation between the mean numbers of moves of odd and 
even sets of games. 
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6. There was a significant correlation between the mean number of moves and total 
scores for the word clue tests. 
7. There was a significant difference in the word clue test scores between the two 
criterion groups. 
8. Backward learning curves showed that the patterns of responses found in the final 
games already existed from the beginning of games. 
9. There was a significant difference in the mean numbers of moves between the first 
and last four games. A significant difference was also found in the time taken to 
complete the game between the two blocks of games for 10-year-old children. 
10. Faced with HOT, most of the moves were made to the horizontally or vertically 
adjacent places. Faced with WARM, the moves were made to the H/V adjacent places 
nearly as often as to the diagonally adjacent places. But moves to the non-adjacent 
places were rare with WARM. Faced with COLD, the majority of the moves was made 
to the non-adjacent places. 
136 
4.6. 	 Conclusions 
The study investigated individual differences and learning in the inferential game play. 
Analyses were made in two perspectives on the game play, focusing on the player and 
the information. One perspective focused on the child who made inferences from the 
game rules: whether she or he perceived the game as a problem-solving task or a chance 
event, or how accurately she or he inferred the goal place. The other focused on 
information in the game frame: how correctly each item of information was used to infer 
the goal places in the game process. These two perspectives depict the inferential game 
play more comprehensively than either alone. 
Developmental change in inferential problem solving was clearly shown. Most of the 
10-year-old children made fewer moves than the criterion for success by chance, 
whereas on average the 7-year-old children could not achieve this. It took as many 
moves as working at the chance level would need for the younger children to find the 
Flamingo. Developmental differences were shown not only in the game situation, but 
also in the word clue tests. The 7-year-old children usually made poor judgements 
about the possibility and impossibility of the goal place, whereas the 10-year-old 
children showed significantly better judgements, inferring from the game rules. 
Considering these results together with the results from Study 1 which suggested that 
the majority of 8-year-old children used the game rules, there seems to be a big 
developmental change in inferential game play between 7- and 8-year-old children. 
Analyses of the information correctly used during the game process showed that 
WARM and COLD led the age differences in the game performance. No difference in 
inferring from HOT was found between age groups. This may be due to the younger 
children being too good to leave room for significant improvement. Why was HOT but 
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not WARM used highly? HOT and WARM have the same meaning: inclusion of 
possible goal places. Analyses of incorrect inferences showed that the children did not 
code WARM specifically enough. They regarded WARM as the signal for a move to 
any adjacent place. Faced with WARM, moves to the horizontally or vertically adjacent 
places were made nearly as often as to the diagonal places. But moves to non-adjacent 
areas were quite rare. Was this because keeping two similar clues in mind was too 
complicated for the children? Or was moving diagonally difficult? There is evidence 
supporting the second claim that young children have difficulty in drawing diagonal 
relationship (Bryant, 1974). 
Individual differences have been shown to be quite constant over games. The good 
performance group in the later games included those who started the game with much 
efficiency, while the poor performance group in the later games included those who 
started the game without much efficiency. The grouping offered a means of exploring 
the diversity of inferential ability within children of the same age in a way that is not 
feasible with reliance on a single mean for the whole group. The 7-year-old good 
performance group was better than the 10-year-old poor performance group. These 
variances might stem from the strategies they applied in the games. Those who tended 
to think about the consequence of a choice, whether one could be better than others, 
may have performed better than those who merely guessed the goal place. 
No game media difference was found, for either the younger or older children. Nor 
were gender differences found. Because these results replicate the findings of Study 1, 
I can become more confident that computers do not affect children's inferential problem 
solving and that the nature of the game is gender neutral. The most impressive 
observation for the experimenter was that all the children were very eager to play the 
game on computers. Regardless of whether or not a child managed to solve the 
problem, with logic or using random choices, she or he reported high satisfaction and 
joy. Nonetheless, the study showed that the effects of computer activities on learning 
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did not come from the computer itself, but from the activity. The result points to the 
importance of the design and use of educational game software. Bearing this in mind, 
the situational variance should also be explored: how the child's game performance 
differs when playing alone, with peers or with adults' guidance. 
The study contributes to the measurement of inferential problem solving in games. 
Firstly, it can confidently be asserted that counting the number of moves is a reliable 
measurement of children's inferential problem solving in the process of game playing. 
The finding of a high correlation between the number of moves in the games and scores 
for the word clue tests in Study 1 was supported by Study 2. The correlation between 
the mean number of moves and scores for the word clue tests was again statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the correlation between the mean numbers of odd and even 
sets of games was significantly high in both studies. Secondly, this study advocates 
considering both single information inference and double information inference when 
measuring use of the rules in relation to information in games. These measurements are 
powerful for the task analyses: which information and concepts the task consists of and 
which element poses a challenge to the player. Despite the limitation in the detection of 
more advanced and sophisticated use of information, these measurements captured well 
the phenomena of the game play: how each age group used information. 
Two shortcomings of this study come from the design of the experiment. Firstly, it 
would be more desirable if there had been many games over an extensive period for 
research on learning with computer games. The study did not allow exploration of the 
effect of the characteristic repetitiveness of computer games. 	 The 10-year-old 
participants were already too successful to gain from more of the same games. Their 
performance of inferential problem solving reached a ceiling within 8 trials. Some 
studies (Ceci, 1990) have shown that mastery of cognitive skills develops over 
hundreds of experiences of practice with a game. Secondly, it is desirable to give 
children an opportunity to play the game after a break. Since some children came 
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voluntarily to play the game after the experiment and a few actually made improvements 
at this time, it would have been better to allow more games after an interval. Two 
reasons were detected for these improvements. One was the realization of the game 
structure. The other was the consideration of the 5x5 grid as a whole, and the 
beginning of strategic moves to find at least a HOT or a WARM clue. The most 
developed use of a 5x5 grid is the division of the grid into 4 square quarters. Choices 
of the middle place of each quarter are the most efficient way to get HOT or WARM 
clues. Concerning the concept of the whole-part relation, we will examine more closely 
the use of logic in inferential problem solving in Study 4. 
This study has shown that making and using inferences from the game rules were two 
different matters in the game. Replicating the findings of Study 1, the results of the 
word clue tests of Study 2 show that the judgement of COLD as a clue to exclude non-
adjacent areas was high, even among younger children. Children were significantly 
better at making inferences from COLD than from HOT and WARM. However, 
analysis of correct inferences from each type of information in the game process 
showed that HOT was used correctly significantly more often than WARM or COLD. 
The conflict between these findings can be explained in terms of the difference between 
knowledge and its use. Scores for the tests stand for the ability to make inferences 
form the game rules, that is to say knowing what inference is, whereas the game 
performances show the actual use of inferences. Thus, these contrasting findings 
between the results of the word clue tests and the analysis of information in the actual 
games may well relate to how children plan to use their knowledge. This assumption 
was explored in the next study, which investigated the effects of training on the 
planning of the use of inclusions and exclusions. 
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Chapter 5. Study 3 
	
5.1. 	 Aims 
The study aimed to investigate the effects of 'guided-planning' and 'pausing' in 
inferential problem-solving in a computer game context. Inclusion and exclusion 
inferences were explored in the game. 
	
5.2. 	 Introduction 
Studies 1 and 2 measured children's inferential problem-solving ability in a game in 
terms of the moves needed to complete the game, and of judgement scores which were 
based on possible and impossible places and ascertained through the experimenter's 
questioning with one or two pieces of information each time. The two measurements 
that correlated highly in both studies revealed that there were consistent individual 
differences throughout the practice of the game. Those who played well in the later 
games were the ones who started the game with a higher performance, and those who 
played the game around chance success level were the ones who started the game with 
poorer performances. Furthermore, it was shown that the COLD exclusion information 
was not used much in the game process, even though children's judgement of the 
possible and impossible goal places was relatively high with the COLD clue in the test 
situation where the clue was presented via the experimenter's question and pointing, 
141 
and with intervals between the clues. The assumption was that two factors might 
underlie individual differences, besides the ability to make inferences already shown in 
Studies 1 and 2. One factor is impulsiveness. The poor performance group might be 
the more impulsive children. They had a disadvantage because of the hasty nature of 
their play in the game. Even though it might be that they were capable of making links 
between the game rules and clues, and between the clues and the spatial relations to the 
goal, the children neither saw that they were supposed to use the inferences nor realized 
the advantage of using them. Consequently, they made random choices, which led to 
their poor performance. The other factor underlying individual differences might be 
planning. Poor performance could be due to the inability to plan how to use inferences 
arising from information. To use inferences arising from information, the child has, 
first of all, to make links between the information and the game rules. Then she or he 
must be able to anticipate where the goal might be, and then to choose the next move 
amongst one of the possible places. She or he would fail to use the inference if she or 
he does not plan the next moves in the way that the inference indicates. 
In an attempt to explore ways of enhancing poor performance, this study aimed to 
compare the effects of guided-planning and pausing in inferential game play. The idea 
of guided-planning comes from research on problem-solving, in which the more 
knowledgeable person acts as an active helper to stop the learners from moving too fast 
and guide them by questioning to think about the goal of the problem and the means-
end relationship. This joint plan for the more able and less able, a consciously adopted 
strategy, will guide the use of the clue as a way to determine further moves towards the 
goal and to select appropriate moves to bring this about (Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989; 
Radziszewska & Rogoff, 1988). Mediation tasks illustrate the effects of the more able 
persons' verbal mediation on the less able children's representation of the problem. For 
example, Kendler and Kendler (1962) showed that children who were not able to 
represent a situation, for instance, that big stimuli were reinforced regardless of their 
colour, were helped by repeating the label, "Big", "Big", "Big". This labelling then 
142 
also helped children to infer that under the concept of 'size is relevant in this task', even 
a small stimulus is correct when "Big" is not any longer. However, the relevant 
labelling helped only those who had not learned the concepts, whilst those who already 
had ability to form the concepts were disturbed by irrelevant labelling. In the Flamingo 
game, I assume that the good performance group finds the goal through the 
conceptualization of the clues HOT, WARM, and COLD, as showing spatial relations 
to the goal: the horizontally or vertically adjacent relation to the goal (HOT), the 
diagonally adjacent (WARM), and the non-adjacent (COLD). In the guided-planning 
condition, the experimenter directed the player's attention by asking questions about the 
possible or impossible goal places in relation to the clues, that is, about their spatial 
relations to the goal. Through guided-planning, not only is the player guided to 
conceptualize the variable as the game rules define, but she or he also becomes aware of 
the benefit of making choices in this way. The effects of the verbal mediation of the 
variables and individual differences in these effects were expected. 
In the 'pausing' condition, the amount of time the child spent between seeing the clue 
and making the next choice was controlled, because impulsiveness makes the child fail 
to stop and think before reacting to an unfamiliar situation or situations in such a way 
that causal relationships or consequences are fully considered. Behavioural psychology 
literature has often identified the effects of forced delay used as a way to 'calm down' 
or 'cool' while problem solving (see Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert & Phillips, 1964; 
Kagan, Pearson & Welsh, 1966). If children are capable of making inferences from the 
game rules, the next step is that they have to remember and retrieve the link between the 
clue and the spatial relation to the goal and use it to guide the next move. 'Pausing' - a 
delay before the action - gives the player a deliberate opportunity to think before the 
next move. The effects of 'pausing' seem to depend on individual differences in 
spontaneous rehearsal. The training of youngsters' rehearsal with forced delay has 
shown strong effects (Cox, Ornstein, Naus, Maxfield & Zimler, 1989; Keeney, et. al, 
1967; Naus, Ornstein & Aivano, 1977; Ornstein, Naus & Stone, 1977). If the children 
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really know what they are supposed to do in the game, to be forced to delay before 
making a choice would help them to plan the next move on the basis of the current 
information. There need be no explicit request for making links between information 
and the game rules. Pausing is an implicit aid to thinking beforehand, contrasting with 
guided-planning which explicitly provides questions about the goal places vis-a-vis the 
current information. 
Study 3 aimed to investigate whether guided-planning and pausing can help problem-
solving. For these research questions, a software game was developed. The game, 
called 'Find the Boat', is structured by two rules. Firstly, it consists of inclusion and 
exclusion information. Secondly, it involves a fair comparison of the two kinds of 
information. In the Flamingo game, spatial information confounds the two kinds of 
inclusion: the inclusion of horizontally or vertically adjacent places and that of 
diagonally adjacent places. In order to concentrate on the comparison between 
inclusion and exclusion, it is better to separate the inclusion information from the 
directional cues. Therefore, the Flamingo game was simplified into a game called the 
Boat game'. It has only one kind of inclusion information, without directional clues, 
and that is 'touching'. The 'touching' information is equivalent to HOT and WARM 
and the not-touching is to COLD. The probability of error has changed: there are a 
maximum of eight possible correct responses to the inclusion information in the new 
game, and four responses for HOT or WARM in the Flamingo game. The zone of 
possible correct responses is bigger in the Boat game. Even though the numbers of 
correct responses between inclusion and exclusion information are still unbalanced, it is 
fairer to make a comparison of inclusion and exclusion in the Boat game than in the 
Flamingo game. 
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5.3. 	 Method 
5.3.1. 	 Design 
The study had a mixed within-subjects and between-subjects design. It aimed to 
answer the research questions in these ways: 
(1) comparing performance on the pre-training, the training and the post-training 
games, 
(2) comparing performance change between three groups: the guided-planning, the 
pause and the control groups, and 
(3) comparing performance between the uses of information of inclusion and exclusion. 
The first method was used to examine whether the performances changed overall. This 
was in preparation for the second method, which was used to see whether there were 
differences between the treatment groups. Using the first and second methods, the 
difference between inclusive and exclusive inferences were examined. 
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5.3.2. 	 Participants 
33 children in year 1 (mean age = 6 years 5 months, S.D. = 3.7 months), 36 children in 
year 2 (mean age = 7 years 5 months, S.D. = 3.8 months), and 26 children in year 3 
(mean age = 8 years 5 months, S.D. = 3.5 months) participated. This was the total 
number of year 1, 2, and 3 children from an inner London school. In the order of their 
entry to the scene of the experiment, the children were randomly assigned to each of the 
following three groups: guided-planning, pausing or control groups. 
Table 5.1. Number of participants across age and treatment groups 
6 years 7 years 8 years Total 
GUIDE* 11 12 9 32 
PAUSE 11 12 8 31 
CONTROL 11 12 9 32 
Total 33 36 26 95 
GUIDE*: Guided-planning 
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5.3.3. 	 Procedure 
Features of the game 
The game was programmed on a BBC computer that was attached to a touch screen. 
There was a 5x5 matrix of cards on the screen. Among these 25 cards, only one was a 
goal that was programmed to change the position from one game to another game 
randomly. 
The game was administrated to each child individually. 
The instructions were the following: 
Turn over a card by touching the screen with your finger. 
Imagine it is a large blue sea. We need the boat desperately. Only one card has a boat. 
If you follow the rules of the game, you can find the boat more easily. 
If it's there, we are saved. 
If the boat touches you, you are X. 
If it does not touch you, you are 0. 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 X X XO 
0 x x 0 
0 X X X 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 5.1. An example of the Boat game 
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The child was asked to explain the rules to the experimenter. If the child understood the 
rules properly, she or he started to play the game. If not, the experimenter explained 
the rules. Each child played the game 12 times. Each time, the boat was hidden in any 
of 25 places. The two experimental groups of children played three blocks of the game. 
The children had 4 games as a pre-test, the next 4 games as intervention training, and 4 
more games as the post-test. In the first 4 games, the children had the opportunity to 
play the game and get to know the rules. Before the 5th game, the player was told the 
game rules again. 
In the 4 training games, the guided-planning group children were asked to stop before 
making a next move. They were asked questions by the experimenter. The questions 
were as follows: 
"Can the boat be here (pointing to one of the adjacent places)?" 
The same questions were repeated for any three adjacent places. 
"Can it be here (pointing to a far place)?" 
The same question was repeated for any three non-adjacent places. 
"Where do you think the boat is?" 
"Did the rules say so?" 
In the 4 training games, the 'pausing' group children were given a 10-second 'pause' 
before making each move until the completion of the game. After the intervention, the 
child played 4 games more. The control group had 12 games without any intervention 
except reminding the children about the rules before the 5th game. 
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5.3.4. Outcome measures 
1. Mean numbers of moves in the pre-training, training, and post-training games. 
2. Correct inferences from inclusion information (see examples in Figure 5.2) in the 
pre-training, training and post-training games. 
3. Correct inferences from exclusion information (see examples in Figure 5.3) in the 
pre-training, training and post-training games. 
• 
x 
Figure 5.2. Zone of correct inference from X information 
0 
Figure 5.3. Zone of correct inference from 0 information 
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5.4. 	 Results 
Analysis of the training effect involved two steps. Firstly, it was tested whether there 
were performance changes before and after the training. Age and gender group 
differences were tested at this stage. Secondly, it was tested whether there were 
differences between the results of the treatments (guided-planning, pause and control) 
during the training and post-training games. These two steps of analysis were based on 
three sets of outcomes: the number of moves, and inclusion and exclusion inferences. 
The first part of the results reports analyses of the number of moves. The second part 
reports analyses of inclusion inferences. The third part reports analyses of exclusion 
inferences. 
5.4.1. 	 Analyses of numbers of moves 
In order to see how the children performed, the mean numbers of moves in the pre-, 
during, and post-training games was calculated for each of the treatment and age 
groups. Table 5.2 shows the mean numbers of moves in the pre-, during, and post-
training games across the treatment and age groups. 
The mean numbers of moves were 10.85 (S.D. 4.67) for the pre-training games, 8.28 
(S.D. 3.84) for the training games, and 8.12 (S.D. 3.95) for the post-training games. 
Inspection of Table 5.2 shows that the mean numbers of moves of the pre-training 
games varied across the treatment and age groups. Thus, the study used two steps of 
analysis. The first step was a global pre-post performance comparison to see if there 
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was improvement. Then, the second step was a treatment group comparison, 
controlling the child's pre-training performance and age, as the pre-training 
performance suggested the children were not homogeneously distributed across these 
groups. 
In order to test whether there were differences between the pre- and post-training games 
or between the age and gender groups, a three-way mixed design ANOVA was 
conducted, using the block of games (the pre- and post-training games) as within-
subjects factor and age and gender as between-subjects factors. Table 5.3 shows the 
results of the Analysis of Variance. 
There were significant differences between the pre-and post-training games (F = 28.51 
with 1 d.f., p < 0.01). The mean number of moves in the pre-training games was 
significantly higher than that in the post-training. There was no gender difference. 
Interactions were found between the blocks of games (the pre-, during and post-training 
games) and the age groups (F= 3.30 with 2 d.f., p < .05). The decrease in the number 
of moves from the pre-training games to the post-training games was 3.3 fewer moves 
for the 6-year-old children; 1.0 fewer move for the 7-year-old children; and 4.4 fewer 
moves for the 8-year-old children. Figure 5.3 shows interactions between the age 
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Table 5.3. Three-Way Analyses of Variance on performance over the practice of 
games (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Between group 
S S DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age (A) 134.03 2 67.02 2.85 .063 
Gender (G) .44 1 .44 .02 .892 
Interactions 
A X G 4.96 2 2.48 .11 .900 
S Within-group error 2094.73 89 23.54 
Within group 
Block of Games* (B) 371.10 1 371.10 28.51 .001 
Interactions 
B X A 86.04 2 43.02 3.30 .041 
B X G 3.08 1 3.08 .24 .628 
BXAXG 20.15 2 10.07 .77 .464 
B X S Within-group error 1158.54 89 13.02 
Block of Games*; pre- and post-training games 
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In order to test whether there were differences between the treatment groups, a one-way 
between-subjects design (3 treatment groups) Analysis of Covariance was carried out 
with the age (in months, for a more precise control) and the pre-training performance as 
covariates. The participants' age and pre-training performance were calculated in an 
analysis of the training performance as a way to control sampling error. Table 5.4 
shows the results of Analysis of Covariance of the training games. 
The training performance was significantly correlated with age (F = 5.07 with 1 d.f., p 
< .05) and pre-training perfounance (F = 10.13 with 1 d.f., p < .01). The removal of 
the effects of the covariates (the age and the pre-training performance) showed that there 
were significant differences between the treatment groups (F = 3.87 with 2 d.f., p < 
.05). A post-hoc test (A least significant test) shows that the guided-planning group 
was significantly better than the control group (p < 0.05). No difference was found 
between the guided-planning and pausing groups or between the pausing and control 
groups. 
In order to see whether the treatment effects lasted in the post-training games, a one-
way between-subjects design (3 treatment groups) Analysis of Covariance was carried 
with the child's age (in months) and pre-training performance as covariates. Table 5.5 
shows the results of Analysis of Covariance of the post-training games. 
The post-training performance was significantly correlated with the pre-training 
performance (F = 6.55 with 1 d.f., p < .05). Even after controlling the effect of the 
covariates (the child's age and pre-training performance), there was no significant 
difference between the treatment groups. The treatment effects shown during the 
training were washed away in the post-training games. In the next two sections of the 
results, the effects of the treatments will be analysed with inferences from inclusion and 
exclusion information. 
Table 5.4. One-Way Analysis of Covariance of training performance (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Covariate 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age 61.07 1 61.07 5.07 .027 
Pre-training 122.01 1 122.01 10.13 .002 
Main effect 
Treatments 93.15 2 46.58 3.87 .024 
Explained 271.88 4 67.97 5.64 .001 
Residual 1084.20 90 12.05 
Total 1356.20 94 14.43 
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Table 5.5. One-Way Analysis of Covariance of post-training performance (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Covariate 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Pre-training 94.59 1 94.59 6.55 .012 
Age 49.23 1 49.23 3.41 .068 
Main effect 
Treatments 3.32 2 1.66 .12 .892 
Explained 165.91 4 41.48 2.87 .027 
Residual 1300.81 90 14.45 
Total 1466.73 94 15.60 
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5.4.2. 
	 Analyses of inclusion inferences 
In order to find out whether there were treatment effects on inclusion inferences, correct 
inferences from inclusion information were calculated for each of the treatment groups. 
Because the numbers of occurrences of inclusion information varied from child to child, 
the percentage of correct inclusion inferences was calculated for each child, using the 
numbers of occurrences of inclusion information and of correct inferences from the 
information. Table 5.6 shows the mean percentages of correct inclusion inferences 
across the treatment and age groups. 
The mean percentages of correct inclusion inferences were 77.7 (S.D. 20.7) for the pre-
training games, 82.3 (S.D. 16.9) for the training games and 87.2 (S.D. 13.3) for the 
post-training games. Inspection of Table 5.6 shows that the percentage of correct 
inclusion inferences in the pre-training games varied across the treatment and age 
groups. The children were not distributed homogeneously across the groups. Thus, 
the study carried two steps of analysis. The first step was a global pre-post 
performance comparison to see whether there was improvement. Then, the second step 
was a treatment group comparison, controlling the child's pre-training performance and 
age as these suggested that the children were not homogeneously distributed. 
To allow the comparisons, data in percentages were converted to proportions and 
transformed through acsign. In order to test whether there were differences between 
the pre- and post-training games or between the age and gender groups, a three-way 
mixed design ANOVA was conducted, using the block of games (the pre- and post-
training games) as within-subjects factor and age and gender as between-subjects 
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Table 5.7. Three-Way Analysis of Variance on inclusion inferences (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Between group 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age (A) 1.03 2 .51 3.48 .035 
Gender (G) .12 1 .12 .81 .370 
Interactions 
A X G .07 2 .03 .23 .793 
S Within group error 13.15 89 .15 
Within group 
Block of Games* (B) 1.58 1 1.58 13.68 .001 
Interactions 
B X A .40 2 .20 1.74 .181 
B X G .00 1 .00 .03 .854 
B X A X G .07 2 .03 .29 .749 
S X B Within group error 10.26 89 .12 
Block of Games*; pre- and post-training games 
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There were significant differences between the pre-and post-training games (F = 13.68 
with 1 d.f., p < 0.01). The mean percentage of correct inclusion inferences in the post-
training games was significantly higher than that in the pre-training games. Significant 
differences were also found between the age groups (F = 3.37 with 2 d.f., p < 0.05). 
The mean percentages of correct inclusion inferences of the pre- and post-training 
games were 80.9 for the 6-year-olds, 87.1 for the 7-year-olds, and 78.0 for the 8-year-
old children. On inspection of the means, the 7-year-old children were considerably 
higher than the other two age groups. No significant gender difference was found. 
As a way to control sampling error, the child's age (in month for a more precise 
analysis) and pre-training game performance were calculated in the examination of the 
effects of the treatments. A one-way between-subjects design (3 treatment groups) 
Analysis of Covariance was carried with the age and the pre-training performance as 
covariates to test whether there were differences between the treatment groups. Table 
5.8 shows the results of Analysis of Covariance of the training performance. 
The training performance was not correlated either with the child's age or with the pre-
training performance. The removal of the effects of the covariate (the child's age and 
pre-training performance) showed that there was no difference between the treatment 
groups. 
In order to test whether there were treatment effects in the post-training games, a one-
way between-subjects design (3 treatment groups) Analysis of Covariance was carried 
with the age (in month) and the pre-training performance as covariates. Table 5.9 
shows the results of Analysis of Covariance for the post-training games. 
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Table 5.8. One-Way Analysis of Covariance of training performance of inclusion 
inferences (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Covariate 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age .187 1 .187 1.63 .205 
Pre-training .330 1 .330 2.88 .093 
Main effect 
Treatments .072 2 .036 .31 .732 
Explained .574 4 .143 1.25 .296 
Residual 10.34 90 .115 
Total 10.91 94 .116 
Table 5.9. One-Way Analysis of Covariance of post-training performance of 
inclusion inferences (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Covariate 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age .018 1 .018 .163 .687 
Pre-training .206 1 .206 1.183 .179 
Main effect 
Treatments .141 2 .071 .627 .536 
Explained .375 4 .094 .834 .507 
Residual 10.130 90 .113 
Total 10.505 94 .112 
The post-training performance was not correlated either with the child's age or with the 
pre-training performance. The removal of the effects of the covariates (the child's age 
and pre-training performances) showed that there was no difference between the 
treatment groups. The differences between the pre- and post-training performance 
shown in the results of Analysis of Variance (see Table 5.7) did not come from the 





	 Analyses of inferences from exclusion information 
In order to find out whether there were treatment effects on exclusion inferences, 
correct inferences from exclusion information in the pre- and post-training games were 
calculated for each of the treatment groups. Because the numbers of occurrences of 
exclusion information varied from child to child, the percentage of correct exclusion 
inferences were calculated for each child, using the numbers of occurrences of 
exclusion information and of correct inferences from the information. Table 5.10 
shows the mean percentages of correct inferences from exclusion information across 
treatment and age groups. 
The mean percentages of correct exclusion inferences were 46.2 (S.D. 22.5) for the 
pre-training games, 56.3 (S.D. 24.8) for the training games, and 47.7 (S.D. 25.6) for 
the post-training games. Inspection of Table 5.10 shows that the percentages of correct 
exclusion inferences in the pre-training games varied across the treatment and age 
groups. The children were not distributed homogeneously across the groups. Also, 
there was the same pattern of improvement during training and regression in the post-
training performance, in the guided-planing and pausing groups. But this did not 
happen in the control group. Thus, the study carried two steps of analysis. The first 
step was a global pre-post performance comparison, to see whether there was 
improvement. Then, the second step was a treatment group comparison, controlling the 
child's pre-training performance and age, as these suggested the children were not 
homogeneously distributed. 
To allow the comparisons, data in percentages were converted to proportions and 
transformed through acsign. In order to test whether there were differences between 
the pre- and post-training games or between the age and gender groups, a three-way 
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mixed design ANOVA was conducted, using the block of games (the pre- and post-
training games) as within-subjects factor and age and gender as between-subjects 
factors. Table 5.11 shows the results of the Analysis of Variance. 
No difference was found between the pre-and post-training games (F = .38 with 1 d.f., 
p = .54). Differences were found between neither the age groups nor the gender 
groups. 
A one-way between-subjects design (3 treatment groups) Analysis of Covariance was 
carried out, with the age and the pre-training performance as covariates, to test whether 
there were differences between the treatment groups during the training games. Table 
5.12 shows the results of Analysis of Covariance of the training performance. 
The training performance was highly correlated with the pre-training performance (F = 
15.6 with 1 d.f., p < .001). The removal of the effects of the covariates (the child's 
age and pre-training performance) showed that there were significant differences 
between the treatment groups. A subsequent Student-Newman-Keuls test showed that 
the guided-planning group scored significantly higher than the pausing group (p < 
0.05) ; the pausing group scored significantly higher than the control group (p < 0.05). 
Analyses of the post-training performance were not necessary because there was no 
reason to expect treatment effects on the performance. The results of Analyses of 
Variance (Table 5.11) had already informed that there was no improvement between the 
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Table 5.11. Three-Way Analysis of Variance on exclusion inferences (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Between group 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age (A) .40 2 .20 2.22 .115 
Gender (G) .19 1 .19 2.11 .150 
Interactions 
A X G .07 2 .04 .40 .671 
S Within group error 7.99 89 .09 
Within group 
Block of Games* (B) .01 1 .01 .38 .537 
Interactions 
B X A .01 2 .00 .16 .855 
B X G .01 1 .01 .51 .479 
B X A X G .02 2 .01 .48 .621 
S X B Within group error 2.18 89 .02 
Block of Games*; pre- and post-training games 
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Table 5.12. One-Way Analysis of Covariance of training performance of exclusion 
inferences (n = 95) 
Sources of Variance 
Covariate 
SS DF MS F Sig. of F 
Age .090 1 .090 9.43 .313 
Pre-training 1.37 1 1.37 15.6 .001 
Main effect 
Treatments 2.40 2 1.20 13.7 .001 
Explained 3.70 4 .923 10.56 .001 
Residual 7.89 90 .088 
Total 11.59 94 .123 
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5.5. 	 Summary of the results 
Analyses of the numbers of moves show: 
1. There were significant differences between the pre- and post-training games. 
Interactions were found between the blocks of games and the age groups. The 6- and 8 
year-old children learned more than the 7-year-old children through the practice of 
games. 
2. The training performance was significantly correlated with the child's age and pre-
training game performance. After the removal of the effects of the age and pre-training 
performance, there were significant differences between the treatment groups during the 
training games. The guided-planning groups performed significantly better than the 
control group. 
3. The post-training performance was significantly correlated with the pre-training 
performance. After the removal of the effects of the child's pre-training performance 
and age, no significant difference was found between the treatment groups in the post-
training games. The guided-planning group did not perform better in the post-training 
games than in the pre-training games. Nor did the other two groups. 
Analyses of inclusion inferences show: 
4. There were significant differences between the pre- and post-training games and 
between the age groups. The performance of the 7-year-old children was highest 
among the three age groups during the pre-and post-training games. 
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5. There was no difference between the treatment groups in the training games. 
6. No difference was found between the treatment groups in the post-training 
performance. 
Analyses of exclusion inferences show: 
7. There was no difference between the pre- and post-training games. 
8. The training performance was highly correlated with the pre-training performance. 
After the removal of the effects of the covariates (the child's pre-training performance 
and age), there were significant differences between the treatment groups in the 
training. The guided-planning group performed significantly better than the pausing 
group; the pausing group performed significantly better than the control group. 
9. The post-training performance was significantly correlated with the pre-training 
performance. After the removal of the effects of the covariates (the child's pre-training 
performance and age), there was no difference between the treatment groups in the 
post-training performance. Compared with the training performance, the proportions of 
correct exclusion inferences of the guided-planning and pausing groups declined in the 
post-training games. 
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5.6. Discussion and conclusions 
The study investigated the effects of guided-planning and pausing on inferential 
problem solving in a computer game that provided inclusion and exclusion information. 
In an attempt to enhance poor performance, the children had a brief training session 
using questioning or pauses, which were presumed to have a function of encouraging 
the planning of use of inferences from the game rules. In the guided-planning 
condition, the experimenter asked questions about the possibility and impossibility of 
the goal in relation to the clues; in the pause condition, pauses were inserted into the 
game as a deliberate opportunity for children to think how to use inferences. Analyses 
of children's responses were carried out in three ways: analyses of the number of 
moves for a general picture of performance, then more specifically analyses of inclusion 
and exclusion inferences. These inference analyses provided explanations for the 
general picture of performance. 
Interesting response patterns emerged at several points. Firstly, learning occurred over 
the practice of games. There were significant differences between the pre- and post-
training games. The children, on average, made two point six fewer moves in the post-
training games than in the pre-training games. The 6- and 8-year-old groups made a big 
improvement from the pre-training games to the post-training games, whilst the 7-year-
old group did not. Significant differences were found in inclusion inferences between 
the pre- and post-training games. The percentages of correct inclusion inferences 
increased as the game went on. The children made 9.5% more inclusion inferences in 
the post-training games than in the pre-training games. Where did this learning come? 
Did the intervention in planning lead to this change? This will be discussed in 
connection with the next finding. 
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Secondly, the treatment effects in the post-training games contrasted with those during 
the training. The guided-planning group needed significantly fewer moves to complete 
the game than the control group during the training. But there was no difference 
between the treatment groups in the post-training performance. Significant differences 
were found in exclusion inferences during the training. The guided-planning group 
was significantly better at inferring from exclusion information than the pausing group; 
the pausing group was significantly better than the control group. But the difference 
disappeared in the post-training performance. The finding that the treatment effects 
were shown only during the training was harmonious with the results of verbal 
rehearsal training on memory tasks in which children had verbal rehearsal training on 
the test items which then were remembered (Ferguson & Bray, 1976; Keeney, et. al, 
1967; Kingsley & Hagen, 1969). It was reported that children performed better during 
the training, but the effect of the training did not last in the posttest. Children did not 
use the rehearsal strategy that they learned during the training. Why did the children in 
the boat game stop planning to use exclusion inferences that they had learned through 
the guided-planning training, and the usefulness of which they then saw? The 
performance during the training did not really reflect the child's development of 
exclusion inference. The child only appeared to learn concepts of 0 as information that 
the goal was non-adjacent to the present place. Piaget's theory of development might 
explain the underlying reason. It seems that the children at these ages give an 
interpretation to the information of 0 (assimilation), but knowledge is not truly 
appropriated because it has not been internally reconstructed (accommodation). The 
post-training performance clearly showed that the child actually did not acquire the 
concept as her or his own. 
Thirdly, uses of inferences differed greatly between inclusion and exclusion 
information. The mean percentages of inclusion inferences were 77.7 in the pre-
training games, 83.4 during the training, and 87.2 in the post-training games. In 
contrast, the mean percentages of exclusion inferences were 46.2 in the pre-training 
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games, 56.2 during the training, and 47.7 in the post-training games. Even though the 
intervention enhanced exclusion inferences by up to 10 percent during the training 
comparing with the pre-training games, exclusion inferences were still used less often 
than inclusion inferences. The higher use of inference from inclusion than exclusion 
information in this study is further supported by the findings of Studies 1 and 2, in 
which HOT, inferring to horizontally or vertically adjacent places, was used more often 
than COLD, inferring to the non-adjacent places. These results suggest that operations 
dealing 0 in the Boat game or of COLD in the Flamingo was only partially developed. 
Because operations dealing with the concept of 0 or COLD was not fully developed as 
a clue that the goal was non-adjacent to the present place, cognitive demands in holding 
on to the zone of goal-impossible places and choosing one of the goal-possible places 
were too heavy to carry out without an external help. This line of thinking is supported 
by the results of memory tasks, showing that if the child has categories (proper 
concepts) to link test items, performance is enhanced (Bjorklund, 1985; Bjorklund & 
Douglas, 1997). Exclusion and inclusion concept learning and inference of multiple 
possibility and impossibility are not separable but interrelated. The hypothesis that 
operations dealing with the concept of COLD in the Flamingo game were only partially 
developed was tested in the next study that investigated the development of operative 
logic of inclusions and exclusions. 
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Chapter 6. Study 4 
	
6.1. 	 Aims 
This study aimed to investigate children's developmental levels for logical inference and 
to predict their performance on the Flamingo game. An assumption was made about 
possible explanations of the developmental and individual differences found in the 
previous studies 2 and 3. This assumption concerned developmental stages for logical 
inference. If there was an operative logic, this would enable the child to perform across 
the Flamingo game and other inferential tasks. It was intended to test whether there 
were significant correlations between the Flamingo game and two other inferential 
tasks, which were similar in both requiring inclusions and exclusions, but differed in 
the complexity of their requirements. If there were correlations between the game and 
the tasks, these would allow the prediction of the game performance. 
	
6.2. 	 Introduction 
Children's ability to draw a logical conclusion based on indirect evidence or experiences 
has been shown to develop with their ages in various contexts (Bryant & Roazzi, 1992; 
Haake, et al., 1980; Piaget & Garcia, 1991; Pieraut-LeBonniec, 1980; Wellman, 1985). 
Study 2 also showed that inferential problem solving in the Flamingo game develops 
with age. In addition, the patterns of responses found in the final games already existed 
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from the beginning. The poor game players, who performed around the criterion of 
success at chance level in the last games, were those who started the game poorly, 
whereas the good players did better from the start. These findings lead to the 
assumption that the child's developmental level of logical inference plays a role in 
determining whether the child understands the logical structure of the Flamingo game. 
If this is correct, then it should be possible to predict how good a player a child will be 
on the basis of the child's performance in a task that assesses the ability to make the 
same type of inferences. 
In order to play the Flamingo game well, the children need, firstly, to keep critical areas 
in mind, defined by inclusion and exclusion inferences. The game clue of HOT 
identifies the adjacent squares which are above, below, and to the right or left of the 
target. The clue of WARM identifies the squares diagonally adjacent to the target. The 
clue of COLD identifies all the squares non-adjacent to the target. Inferring the goal 
from these clues necessitates inclusions and exclusions of multiple possibilities and 
impossibilities and holding the critical areas of possibilities. Secondly, the children 
need to plan their choices. They need to plan their moves into the critical areas. Would 
they remain in the zone of possibilities, given that the first choice was not right? 
There is a task, discussed in the literature, which investigates this basic level of 
understanding of inclusion and exclusion. In the Number task, used in Bryant and 
Roazzi's investigation on children's concept of equivalence (1992), the inclusion of 
numbers between two boundaries is straight forward. The child is asked to choose a 
number, for example bigger than 3 and smaller than 5. In one instance, there is only 
one possible correct number, and in the other instance there are two possible correct 
numbers. In the case of two possible correct numbers, inferring the "critical areas" of 
two possibilities requires the child to include numbers within the boundaries that the 
experimenter sets, while excluding others. Giving negative feedback to the first 
numbers, the task examines whether the child's later choice(s) would remain in the 
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critical zone. Children's responses to the task reveal whether or not they are able to 
infer the zone of possibilities in numbers and to hold it. No planning of a sequence of 
actions is required for the number choice. The Number task requires inclusion and 
exclusion in a number context (e.g., 1, 2, 3), whereas the Flamingo game does so in a 
spatial context (e.g., above, below, left, right). Despite the difference, I still expect that 
the ability to include is the same in each case. 
In order to play the Flamingo game efficiently, the understanding of inclusion and 
exclusion is not enough. The players need to be able to coordinate several inclusions 
and exclusions in order to plan to use their understanding. They need to anticipate the 
possible and impossible areas for the target and plan the moves into the critical area. 
For the prediction of these action-based inclusions and exclusions, a more sophisticated 
task would be necessary. A Piagetian task, the Tunnel task (Piaget & Garcia, 1991), 
was used to investigate children's anticipatory actions in a structure that necessitates 
coordination of inclusions and exclusions. In this task, the player must choose among 
the paths, which are branches in the form of a tree; the trunk T divides into two primary 
branches, Al and A2. Each of these in turn branches out into two paths, B1 and B2 for 
Al, and B3 and B4 for A2. From each of these four Bs two further paths separate: C1 
and C2 for Bl; C3 and C4 for B2; C5 and C6 for B3; and C7 and C8 for B4. Each of 
the final paths ends up in one of eight terminals (G) (Figure 6.1). A thin ribbon tied to 
the target is contained in hollow tunnels into which the child can peep, and check the 
ribbon through windows. Since she or he is instructed to open as a few windows as 
possible, the child is supposed to use the information gained from opening them to 
include and exclude paths and thus to determine what terminal the target is in. 
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Figure 6.1. Features of the Tunnel 
The dichotomous structure of the task sets the rules of the possible and impossible 
target places implicitly: if the ribbon is (positive incidence) in Al, then it is also in either 
B1 or B2; If the ribbon is not (negative incidence) in Al, then it is in A2 (—A1) and also 
either B3 or B4 (they are branches of A2). In order to represent the logical structure of 
the task, coordination of operations of inclusion and exclusion is necessary. The 
development of inclusions of grouping (classification) enables the children to represent 
the task as a whole: an A consists of (includes) Bs; a B consists of (includes) Cs; a C 
consists of (includes) Gs. Children's choices indicate their understanding of the logical 
structure of the task. 
The most economical way to solve the Tunnel task is to plan moves (start at A first: 
then, B: then, C) because of the hierarchical structure which necessitates coordination 
of inclusions and exclusions. Children need to group places in relation to their level, or 
the possibility and impossibility of locations of the target. The most economical way to 
find the Flamingo also requires them to group places as possible or impossible for the 
target, and to coordinate the places. The previous studies of this thesis showed that the 
children's performances in the game depended on their understanding of the game clues 
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(inclusion of possible goal places and exclusion of impossible goal places), and how 
they planned to use this understanding in their choices. 
Study 4 examines children's inference-making in very different contexts: the Flamingo 
game and the Number and Tunnel tasks. The Flamingo game card arrangement task 
was also used, in order to examine children's understanding of the logical structure of 
the Flamingo game. The children were asked to arrange the game cards as the game 
rules say. The children's performance was of particular interest when they did not 
understand the logical structure of the game. 
Two hypotheses were set: 
Firstly, the operative logic of inclusion and exclusion is the cognitive basis for 
children's understanding of the Flamingo game. It was predicted there would be 
significant correlations between the Flamingo game and the three inferential tasks: the 
Flamingo game card arrangement task, the Number task, and the Tunnel task. 
Secondly, the Number and Tunnel tasks are similar in their requirements of the 
understanding of inclusion and exclusion, but they differ in the complexity of their 
requirements. Different levels of the game play were supposed. Some children might 
rely on the simple strategy of inclusion, as the Number task requires. 
	 More 
sophisticated players might consider the coordination of inclusions and exclusions and 
anticipate the results of moves, as the Tunnel task requires. It was predicted that the 
performances on both the Number and Tunnel tasks would be better predictors on the 




6.3.1. 	 Design 
The study had a within-subjects design. It aimed to examine correlations between the 
Flamingo game and the three inferential tasks: the Flamingo game card arrangement 
task, the Number task and the Tunnel task. 
	
6.3.2. 	 Participants 
The participants were 50 children aged from 6 years 4 months to 7 years 7 months 
(mean age = 82.9 months, S.D. = 3.71 months), who comprised all the year 2 children 
in one primary school in a middle class Inner-London area. 
6.3.3. Procedure 
Each child worked on three different tasks and eight Flamingo games in a quiet corner 
of the school library. The three tasks were randomly allocated in turn, but the Flamingo 
game always followed the Flamingo game card arrangement task. It took 25 to 30 
minutes for each child to complete all the activities. 
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6.3.3.1. The Flamingo game card arrangement task 
The aim of the Flamingo game card arrangement task was to measure the children's 
understanding of the logical structure of the game. Each child was asked to read aloud 
the rules, which appeared on the computer screen, then to tell the experimenter the game 
rules. When the game rules were not properly explained, the child was asked further 
questions: 
"If the Flamingo touches a side of the card that you have, what does the card say?" The 
question was asked to make sure the child could verbalize the answer, "Hot". 
"If the Flamingo touches a corner of the card that you have, what does the card say?" 
The question was asked to make sure the child could verbalize the answer, "Warm". 
"If the Flamingo is not next to the card that you have, what does the card say?" The 
question was asked to make sure the child could verbalize the answer, "Cold". 
The child was given a set of cards: a Flamingo, 6 HOTs, 6 WARMs and 10 COLDs. 
The instruction was: 
"Arrange the cards as the game rules say. If you need more cards, take more." No 
feedback was given. 
6.3.3.2. The Flamingo game 
The aim of the Flamingo game was to measure inferential problem solving. After the 
game card arrangement task, the game started. 
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6.3.3.3. 	 The Number task 
The aim of the Number task was to see whether the children understood inclusion and 
exclusion. The task consists of 2-choice and 3-choice questions. In the 2-choice 
Number question, the child was told: 
"I am thinking of a number. It is bigger than 3, but smaller than 6. Can you tell me 
what it is?" 
In order to see whether she or he still held the zone of multiple possibilities, the child 
was given negative feedback on the first answer. But, the second answer got positive 
or negative feedback, depending on its correctness. 
In the 3-choice Number question, the child was told: 
"Can we do a number game once more? I am thinking of a number. It is bigger than 4, 
but smaller than 8. Can you tell me what it is?" 
In order to see whether she or he still held the zone of multiple possibilities, the child 
was given negative feedback for the first two numbers. The third number got positive 
or negative feedback, depending on its correctness. 
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6.3.3.4. The Tunnel task 
The Tunnel task was used as a measure of coordination of inclusions and exclusions. 
Apparatus of the Tunnel task 
The apparatus of the Tunnel task was a network of branching tunnels leading to caves 
in one of which a toy man was hidden (dimension: 30.5 x 24 inches, or 77.5 x 61 cm; 
height: 2 & 3/4 inches, or 7 cm; see Figure 6.1). The "tunnel" was positioned before 
the child with the big tunnel at the top and the small tunnels expanding towards the 
bottom. The task was to determine which cave the man was in. For this purpose, the 
man was tied to a long thin ribbon, which ran between T and G after the toy man was 
hidden. Each path A, B and C was provided with a small rectangular window that the 
child could open to check to see if the ribbon was in the branch. 
The child was told a story. 
"Do you know the story of 'Snow White and seven dwarfs'. One morning, a small 
man, one of the seven, went down to a mine to find some gold. You can see the 
entrance here. He went down, down, and down. He neither turned around nor went 
backwards. Look carefully how the tunnel divided into two and two again. He left the 
ribbon all the way to the mine he was working. Oh, it's dinner time. It's your job to 
find him and tell him to come back home. Open the windows. You can check the 
ribbon inside the tunnel. Try to find out by opening as few windows as possible. 
Open the lid of the cave where the man is only when you are sure." 
Each child did the task four times. 




6.3.4.1. The Flamingo game 
The mean number of moves over the last 4 games was counted. The first 4 games were 
not analyzed, in order to allow these games for planning children's moves. 
6.3.4.2. The Flamingo game cards arrangement task 
One point was given for each of the errors HOT and WARM. The error COLD was not 
counted, because COLD cards in the wrong places had been put in the places for HOT 
or WARM, which already counted as an error if HOT or WARM cards had not been put 
there. The maximum possible error score was 11 (5 HOTs and 6 WARMs) and the 
minimum error score was 0. 
6.3.4.3. 	 The Number task 
The children were categorized into three groups. The first group was those who did not 
understand the inclusion. They did not infer any correct number between the two 
boundaries. Those who were wrong for the first number(s) but correct for the later 
number(s) were assigned to this group because their responses were treated as correct 
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by chance. The second group was those who inferred the first number(s), but were not 
sure about the next number(s) when the first ones got negative feedback. The third 
group was those who clearly showed the ability to infer the multiple possibilities and 
hold the critical area. Those who inferred two correct numbers in the 2-choice 
question, and three correct numbers in the 3-choice question were assigned to this 
group. 
6.3.4.4. The Tunnel task 
Each child's performance on the last two trials of the task was categorized into one of 
the four developmental stages based on the Piagetian criteria. The first two trials of the 
task were not counted, in order to allow each child to have trials of adjusting to and 
understanding the task demands. 
The characteristics of the four categories are as follows: 
Stage 1A (empirical) 
For the children who randomly tried only levels C or G, their choices of Cs were 
perhaps guided by the short perceptual distance of Cs from Gs. Making links between 
C and G was not treated as an inclusion, because one C corresponds to one G. These 
children did not understand the inclusion. Here is an example from Stage 1A. 
Timothy tried C8, C6, C5, C4, C3, C2, and Cl. He found the ribbon at Cl and 
concluded G7. 
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Stage 1B (partial inclusion) 
Those who started with C, but tried moves up and down across levels, were assigned 
to the partial inclusion group. Those who started with Bs, and those who started with 
As but skipped one level, were also assigned to this group. Their crossing of levels 
was regarded as showing a sign of knowledge of inclusion, even though the inclusions 
were not completed to link the whole system together. Here is an example of Stage 1B. 
Amelia began from BI and went to B3. As they were empty, she opened A2, where 
she saw the ribbon. Skipping the Bs, she deduced C7 and C8 and found the man in 
G8. 
Stage 2 (concept of part-whole) and Stage 3 (concept of negative necessity) 
Those who started with A without skipping levels or turning back, went to B, then to 
C, and concluded at a G were assigned to these groups. These children were regarded 
as being linked subgroups of one group. Stages 2 and 3 differed in responses after 
noticing positions where there was no ribbon. Those who moved to the other side of 
the same level by noticing positions where there was no ribbon were assigned to Stage 
2. Those who proceeded to the lower level on the other side of the branch were 
assigned to Stage 3. Here is an example of Level 2. 
Luca didn't see the ribbon at Al, then tried A2. He proceeded B4, C7 and C8 and 
concluded at G8. 
The second judge categorized each child's response into the classifications 
independently. 
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6.4. 	 Results 
The results comprise five sections. The first four sections describe univariate statistics 
for each of the tasks: the arrangement of the Flamingo game information cards; the 
findings of the Number tasks; and the findings of the Tunnel task. The fifth section 
reports on the associations between the performance in the Flamingo game, the 
arrangement of the Flamingo game information cards, the Number task, and the Tunnel 
task. 
6.4.1. The Flamingo game 
The mean number of moves in the last 4 game was 8.28 (SD 3.71). Of the 50 children, 
24 children (48%) made fewer moves than the criterion of chance level success of 7.07, 
with 95 % credibility. 
6.4.2. The Flamingo game card arrangement 
In order to know how the child understood the game structure, the arrangement of the 
game cards (a Flamingo card, 5 HOTs, 6 WARMs and 10 COLDs) was observed. 
Only 7 participants had no trouble arranging the cards as the game rules say (the 
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arrangement group). The other 43 participants had trouble doing so (the non-
arrangement group). Most of the children were well aware that COLDs were not 
adjacent to the goal. Only two children arranged COLDs next to the Flamingo card. 
Most of the children arranged HOTs next to the Flamingo card. They put HOTs in all 
the places adjacent to the goal, not only at its sides but also at corners. They arranged 
WARMs non-adjacent to the goal. These children were not aware that WARM should 
be diagonally adjacent to the goal. It was clear that most of the children did not 
understand completely how the game was constructed. The arrangement errors were 
scored according to the number of HOT and WARM cards in the wrong places. The 
maximum possible error score was 11 (5 HOTs and 6 WARMs) and the minimum error 
score was 0. The mean error score was 6.06 (SD 3.14) for the whole group. 
6.4.3. The Number task 
In order to see whether children inferred and held the 'critical area' of multiple 
possibilities, they were categorized into three groups. 
(A): those who did not infer any correct numbers, and those were incorrect for the first 
number, but correct for later number(s), were assigned to this group. These children 
did not understand inclusion. 
(B): those who chose the first number within the critical zone but were incorrect for the 
later number(s) in either questions (or both questions) were assigned to this group. 
These children had trouble holding the 'critical area' of multiple possibilities. 
(C): those children who only gave possible numbers in both 2- and 3-choice questions. 
These children, who clearly understood the inclusion of multiple possibilities, were 
assigned to this group. 
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Table 6.1. Number of participants across choice categories 
Category 	 A 	 B 	 C 	 Total 
Number of Participants 	 8 	 12 	 30 	 50 
Of the 50 children, 7 children were incorrect for any numbers. Only one child was 
incorrect for the first numbers but correct for the last number in the 3-choice question. 
This response was treated as correct by chance, because if he had understood the 
inclusion, his first choice could not have been outside the critical zone while his later 
number was within the zone. This child was assigned to group A, that did not infer any 
correct numbers. There were 12 children who were correct for the first number(s), but 
incorrect for the later number(s) in either 2- or 3-choice questions (or in both 
questions). There were 30 participants who were correct for all the numbers in both the 
2- and 3-choice questions. There was a high correlation between the 2- and 3-choice 
questions for those who inferred all the correct numbers (Spearman's rho =.684, p < 
0.01). 
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6.4.4. The Tunnel task 
This section of the results reports the categorization of children's responses to the 
Piagetian stages of the operative logic of inclusions and exclusions, and the agreement 
in the categorization between two raters. 
6.4.4.1. The Piagetian developmental stages 
General observations about performance in this task were collected initially by 
examining the starting points, the order of levels of moves and children's responses 
after discovering the absence of the ribbon were used. Firstly, the frequency of the 
starting points was 16, 16, 14 and 4 children respectively for each of the levels A, B, C 
and G. If the child had the whole-part concept and represented the Tunnel structure as a 
whole, her or his starting point would be on level A. Starting at A was necessary for an 
economic search in a structure that linked three hierarchical levels. If the child did not 
realize the relations between the levels, her or his moves would have been guided by the 
perceptual distances from Gs. The child would start with C or G, because they were 
near to a target place. If the child partially represented the Tunnel structure, her or his 
responses were somewhere between the cases described earlier. Her or his starting 
level might be anywhere and the consequent moves would not be systematic. Thus, the 
later moves were analyzed in relation to the starting levels. 
Secondly, the majority of children starting with level A went down to level B and then 
to level C without turning up and down across levels (12 children). These children 
considered the network in its entirety and constituting an operative grouping. They 
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were at either Stage 2 or 3. If the child understood that if it is not Al, then it is —A1, 
that is the concept of negation, she or he would go one level down on the other side, 
without necessarily checking the windows at the same level. This is the definition of 
Stage 3, characterized as negative necessity. Among those who started with level A and 
went down without turning up and down across levels, none avoided the branches at 
the same level if there was no ribbon. Thus, no participant was identified as at Stage 3 
and the 12 participants were at Stage 2 (concept of whole - part). 
There were 16 children who started at level B. These children showed the ability to 
include, but their inclusions were not coordinated systematically. Two patterns clearly 
emerged in the responses starting at level B. One pattern of responses was made by 
those who moved down without opening the windows at level A (9 children). They 
started with B and then went straight down to C. The other was of those who started 
with B and went up to A, to B, and then to C (7 children). Along with the 5 children 
who started with C but went up and down in their later responses and the 4 children 
who started at level A and skipped one level or turning up and down across levels, 
those who started at level B were assigned to Stage 1B. There were 25 children at 
Stage 1B, which was characterized as partial inclusion. 
The majority of responses starting with C tried neither B nor A (9 children). Along 
with the 4 children who randomly tried Gs, these children were categorized as Stage 
1A, which was characterized as empirical searching without inclusions and exclusions. 
There were 13 participants were at Stage 1A (empirical). 
6.4.4.2. 	 Reliability of the measurement 
To test the reliability of categorization of the Piagetian developmental stages, two raters' 
categorizations were correlated. The agreement between the two raters was 96%. 
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6.4.5. Relations between the game and the tasks 
It was predicted that there were specific and significant correlations between children's 
Flamingo game performances and those on the three tasks. Three sets of analyses were 
carried out. First, correlations across the Flamingo game performances and those on 
the three tasks (the Flamingo game card arrangement task, the Number task, and the 
Tunnel task) were obtained. Because distributions of the mean number of the last 4 
games of the Flamingo game (Appendix 13) and the error scores of the card 
arrangement task (Appendix 14) were non-parametric, Spearman correlation tests were 
carried out. Table 6.2 shows indices of correlation between the game and the tasks. 
Correlation coefficients of .426, -.296, -.299, and .282 were found between the 
Flamingo game and the game card arrangement task, the game and the Number task, the 
game and the Tunnel task, and the Tunnel task and the Number task, respectively. 
These correlations were all significant. Those who had high error scores for the game 
card arrangement had high mean numbers of moves in the game; those who scored low 
in arrangement errors had low mean numbers of moves. Those who inferred and held 
the multiple possibilities in the Number task performed well in the Flamingo game; 
those who did not infer the multiple possibilities performed poorly. Those who 
coordinated the whole structure of the Tunnel had good performances on the game: 
those who did not represent the structure had poor performances on the game. Those 
who inferred the multiple possibilities and held them in the Number task were those 
who coordinated inclusions and exclusions. 
194 
Table 6.2. 
	 Correlation coefficients between the Flamingo game and the tasks 
1 2 3 4 
1 Flamingo game (number of moves) 1 
2 Flamingo card arrangement (error score) .426* 1 
3 Number task (correct number category) 
-.296* -.089 1 
4 Tunnel task (developmental stage) 
-.299* -.222 .282* 1 
*P < 0.05 
The second analysis was a series of fixed order multiple regressions, to see whether the 
children's mean number of moves in the last four Flamingo games was predicted from 
performances of the three tasks after controlling for age. The reason for carrying out 
the regressions was that age might have explained the correlation between the game and 
the tasks. Thus, it was necessary to control for age. The first step variable was the 
child's age. The last (second) step variable was the performances on the Flamingo card 
arrangement, the Number task or the Tunnel task. Table 6.3 shows results for three 
fixed order multiple regressions, with mean numbers of moves in the last 4 Flamingo 
games as the outcome variable. 
Performance on the three tasks significantly related to children's Flamingo game 
performance after controlling for age. Thus it can be said that the correlations between 
the Flamingo game and the tasks were not explained by the child's age. So the answer 
to the question that this section examined was that there was an operative logic of 
inclusions and exclusions which enabled children to perform the inferential game and 
tasks. In summary, the results support the idea that children's operative logic is 
significantly related to children's making inferences and use of them. 
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Table 6.3. Results for three fixed order regressions with mean number of moves o f 
the last 4 Flamingo games as the outcome variable 
Step 
B SE B beta R2 change F change 
1. AGE 
-.075 .138 -.076 
2. CARD ARRANGEMENT .410 .150 .377 .137 7.43** 
** p < .01 
B SE B beta R2 change F change 
Step 
1. AGE .001 .144 .001 
2. NUMBER TASK -1.44 .688 -.295 .085 4.37* 
*p < .05 
B SE B beta R2 change F change 
Step 
1. AGE .001 .144 .001 
2. TUNNEL STAGE -1.59 .722 -.306 .094 4.86* 
p < .05 
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The third set of analyses was to investigate how far the Flamingo game performance 
was predicted by performances on both the Number and Tunnel tasks. It was 
hypothesized that the Flamingo game performance could be predicted better by 
including both performances on the simple Number inclusion task and the more 
complicated Tunnel task in a regression equation than by either alone. The hypothesis 
was tested by stepwise regressions, with mean numbers of moves in the last 4 
Flamingo games as the outcome variable. The first step was the child's age. The 
second step was performance on either the Number task or the Tunnel task. The third 
step was performance on either the Tunnel task or the Number task, depending on what 
was the second step. There was a significant correlation between performances on the 
Flamingo game and on the Number task (R2 change = .094, p < .05) when the Number 
task performance was put in the regression equation before the Tunnel task 
performance. When the Number task factor was removed, the Tunnel task stage did 
not significantly predict the performance on the Flamingo game. There was also a 
significant correlation between performances on the Flamingo game and on the Tunnel 
task (R2 change = .083, p < .05) when the Tunnel task performance was put in the 
equation before the Number task performance. When the Tunnel task factor was 
removed, the Number task performance did not significantly predict the performance in 
the Flamingo game. These results come from the high correlation between the Number 
and Tunnel tasks. 
197 
6.5. 	 Summary of the results 
In the Flamingo game card arrangement, 
1. The majority of children had trouble arranging the game cards as the game rules 
require. However, there were some indications that children understood the game 
structure partially; that is, most of the children did not arrange HOT in the non-adjacent 
places or COLD in the places adjacent to the goal. 
In the Number tasks, 
2. In the 2- and 3-choice Number tasks, the majority of participants inferred all correct 
numbers. They did not have trouble holding a 'critical zone' of possibilities in the 
numeral contexts. 
3. The correct responses were highly correlated (r=.684, p< 0.01) between the 2- and 
3-choice Number tasks. 
In the Tunnel task, 
4. The development of the majority of participants was characterized by partial 
inclusion. The children in this study had trouble linking subclasses to form a higher 
structure. 
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Between the Flamingo game and the tasks, 
5. There was a significant correlation between the understanding of the game structure 
and the game performance. 
6. There was an association between performances on the Flamingo game and the 
Number task, even after control for age. 
7. There was an association between performances on the Flamingo game and the 
Tunnel task, after control for age. 
8. There was an association between performances on the Number task and the Tunnel 
task, after control for age. 
6.6. Discussions and conclusions 
This study examined young children's operative logic across the Flamingo game and 
three tasks: the Flamingo game card arrangement, the Number task and the Tunnel task. 
The Flamingo game card arrangement task was used to investigate the children's 
understanding of the logical structure of the Flamingo game. The majority of 
participants was not able to arrange the game cards exactly as the game rules require. 
There were some indications that children partially understood the game structure. 
Most of the children arranged HOTs next to the goal, but not COLDs. 17 children who 
had trouble arranging the game cards still managed to complete the game with fewer 
moves than the criterion of success by chance. They inferred the goal place from each 
of the word clues one a time, understanding the game structure only partially. The 
word clues worked as a medium to make inferences for those who had not yet 
constructed the whole logical structure of the game. The significant correlation between 
the arrangement of the game cards and the game performance suggests an association 
between understanding the logical structure of the game and the inferential problem-
solving performance. It would have been interesting to see how the practice of the 
game would alter the child's understanding of the logical structure of the games, if data 
had allowed the comparison of performances on the game card arrangement task after as 
well as before the practice of the games. 
The Number task examined the child's understanding of the inclusion and exclusion 
rules: including multiple possibilities, while excluding impossibilities. The majority of 
children did not have any trouble inferring and holding multiple possibilities in 
numerical contexts. Receiving negative feedback for the first choice but remaining 
within the 'critical zone' for the second number(s) cannot be explained by the use of the 
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simple strategies of 'win-stay' and lose-shift'. Thus, the result that the majority of 
children inferred multiple possibility supports the cognitive approach, where children's 
choice behaviour is viewed in relation to the development of logical understanding. 
In the Tunnel task, children's anticipatory actions were examined through their starting 
points and consequent moves across the three levels, and their responses after 
discovering the ribbon. The representation of the whole structure is crucial for the 
Tunnel task, because it consists of a hierarchical order of subclasses. It was found that 
the starting point was associated with subsequent choice actions. The majority of 
responses starting at level A went down to level B and then to level C without moving 
up and down across levels, showing the ability to classify groupings. The majority of 
responses starting at level C did not go to other levels, showing the inability to 
represent the whole connected structure with the subclasses. The finding that there was 
a significant relation between the Tunnel task and the Flamingo game seems to suggest 
that the coordination of inclusions and exclusions enables the child to perform across 
the Flamingo game and the Tunnel task with the same level of efficiency. Even though 
the majority of the children aged 6 years in this study knew how to include and exclude 
with numbers, they could not use the knowledge to synthesize subclasses to a higher 
form in the spatial context of the Tunnel task. It was beyond their ability to relate these 
subclasses to form a whole structure. These results are harmonious with Piaget's claim 
that the initial relations (inclusion and exclusion), first separately and then through 
combinations, serve to constitute fragments of structures that progressively become 
coordinated until "groupings" are formed, beginning at about 7-8 years (Piaget & 
Garcia, 1991). The significance of these findings is that, although the game is not a 
test, children still seem to use logical reasoning as observed in very different tasks (the 
Number and Tunnel tasks) in a social context (a computer game). 
There were significant correlations between the Flamingo game, the game card 
arrangement task, the Number task and the Tunnel task even after controlling for age. 
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Thus, the child's performance of the Flamingo game could be predicted by the 
performance on the Flamingo game card arrangement task, the Tunnel task, or the 
Number task. Those who represented the logical structure of the game, those who 
inferred and held multiple possibilities, and those who coordinated inclusions and 
exclusions managed the game with high efficiency. I am confident in saying that there 
was an operative logic of inclusions and exclusions that enabled children to make 
inferences and use them across the game and the tasks. The findings from the Number 
and Tunnel tasks suggest that the children's performance on the Flamingo game 
developed from use of a clue (mostly HOT) to coordination of clues. At the advanced 
level, children represented more than one possible choice and chose the one that would 
result in the maximum gain. At this level, it could be said that children used gain 
maximizing strategies. They anticipated the results of their choices and planned their 
moves to find the target in the most efficient way. 
Chapter 7. Conclusions and general discussion 
The aim of the thesis was to develop ways to measure and analyze children's thinking 
and learning in computer game activities. An inferential problem-solving game called 
`Find the Flamingo', and a simplified version, 'the Boat game', were used for the 
research, because most computer games have an element of problem solving that is, as 
Piaget and Garcia (1991) have argued, inferential in nature. The games consisted of 
sets of rules, given with affirmative and negative if-then statements. Four experiments 
were carried out, each with a specific design. In this chapter, I will summarize the 
findings of each of the experiments in relation to the research questions. Limitations of 
the study and educational implications for children's computer game play are also 
discussed. 
7.1. The findings in relation to the research questions 
There were four main research questions to be answered, related to children's thinking 
and learning in computer game contexts. They concerned the measurement of learning 
outcomes, decision-making in the context of games, children's construction of the 
meaning of the word clues, and ways of enhancing children's problem solving. 
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How are the learning outcomes measured? 
One of the main research aims was to explore how psychological knowledge would 
help to develop ways to analyze children's thinking and learning in computer game 
contexts. Observation of the game performance and direct questions about how 
children made inferences from the game clues were the methods used for this. Firstly, 
the child's number of moves was observed over the practice of the games. In order to 
test whether the child used the game rules, the criterion of success at chance level was 
set. What number of moves would be needed to find the target by chance? This was 
calculated as approximately the mean number of the places in the game array. If the 
child used the game rules, she or he would not need as many moves as the mean. In 
order to decide what number of moves could be confidently judged as showing success 
beyond the chance level, the criterion of success at chance level was set by using a one-
tail t-test with the mean, 13, (because there were 25 places), and the number of games 
for the degree of freedom. If the mean number of moves was below or the same as the 
criterion of 7.07, it could be confidently said there was a bias — that the game rules were 
being used. 
Secondly, use of each clue given in the course of the game was examined. If the 
players made inferences from the game rules, their choices would be coherent with 
inferences from the information that they had. For example, faced with HOT in the 
Flamingo game, their choice would be one of the adjacent 'up', 'down', 'left' or 'right' 
places. Faced with WARM, they would move to one of the adjacent diagonal places. 
Faced with COLD, the next move would be to one of the non-adjacent places. If the 
players did not have any concept of the game rules, their choices would not correspond 
to how the game rules define the relations between the goal and the information. Thus, 
the focus of analyses of the game behaviour should be on choices (moves) in relation to 
information. Each move can be seen as a result of either a correct or an incorrect 
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inference from the previous information. To assess whether a move follows from a 
correct inference, two methods of analysis were applied. The first method was to 
assess 'single information inference', in which the immediately preceding information 
counts as the base of the inference. The other method was to assess 'double 
information inference', in which the two preceding items of information count as the 
base for inference. However, these methods did not include the cases when the 
children might have gone outside the zone of possible goal places, not because they did 
not infer from the rules, but because they tried to gather more information with more 
advanced strategies. Despite this weakness, the methods showed concerning how far 
the young children made links between the clues and the game rules. 
In addition to observation of the game performance, questions on the game clues were 
also asked in a test context. Given one or two clues at a time, the child was asked to 
make inferences about the possible and impossible locations of the target. Scores for 
the tests would inform us of the children' ability to make inferences from the game 
rules, whereas the number of moves or the percentages of correct inferences would 
inform how the inferences were actually used to guide their choices in the process of the 
game. Would there be an association between what they said and what they did? 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that the mean number of moves in the games 
significantly correlated with the scores for the word clue tests. There was also high 
correlation of the mean numbers of moves between the even and odd sets of games. 
Thus, counting the number of moves until the completion of the game is a reliable 
measurement of the child's inferential problem solving in the game process. While the 
number of moves measured the child's inferential problem solving in the game, studies 
of single and double information inferences identified what concepts and operations 
children had learned, and how they integrated information. The study of single and 
double information inferences is supported by Piaget, who asserts that an action is 
evaluated in terms of effectiveness or usefulness in relation to a goal (Piaget & Garcia, 
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1991, p.4.). For analysis of children's goal-searching actions, their understanding of 
multiple possibilities and impossibilities and use of the understanding were examined 
through the methods of counting the number of moves and of single and double 
information inferences, and the separate tests on inference from clues. 
How do children make decisions in computer game play? 
From the very beginning of the research, two kinds of players were envisaged: those 
who saw the game as a task to tackle with logic, and those who perceived it as a 
random event, not being aware of the problem-solving nature of the game. The 
consequent decision-making processes were that those who saw the game as a task 
would try to use the game rules in their search for the target, whereas those who saw 
the game as a random event would make as many moves as the number of moves 
expected to lead to success from random choices. Each child's mean number of moves 
over the practice of the games was counted and compared to the criterion. Study 1 
showed that the majority of 8-year-old children found the Flamingo with a smaller 
number of moves than the criterion of success at chance level. The correlation between 
the number of moves and the scores for the tests that measured the child's ability to 
make inferences from the game clues was highly significant. It was evident that these 
children did indeed represent the game as problem-solving and infer the goal place from 
the game rules. Thus, the results support the cognitive decision-making theory, 
according to which children represent the problem and calculate the outcomes of moves. 
The cognitive theory explains the children's game behaviour better than the probability 
matching theory, in which children merely reflect the likelihoods of happenings. There 
were too many places that the moves could be made to in the Flamingo game to explain 
the children's choices as a reflection on the likelihood of the target. 
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Developmental changes in inferential problem solving were shown in Study 2. Most of 
the 10-year-old children made fewer moves than the criterion for success at chance 
level, whereas on average the 7-year-old children did not do so. On average, it took as 
many moves as working by chance would need for the younger children to find the 
Flamingo. The results of the word clue tests also showed that the younger children 
usually made poorer judgements about the possibilities and impossibilities of the goal 
place than the older children. Within the same age groups, differences in performance 
were shown as consistent throughout the games. Backward learning curves, rather 
than forward learning curves, were used to trace the performances of the groups in 
order to find out whether those who performed well in the final games differed from the 
beginning of the games from those who performed poorly after the practice of the 
game. The numbers of moves for those whose number of moves of the last four games 
was above the criterion (the 'poor' performance group) and of those whose number of 
moves was below the criterion (the 'good' performance group) were traced from the 
first to the last games. It was found that the 'poor' performance group started the game 
poorly, while the ' good' performance group did better from the start. 
Why was the 'good' performance group able to make and use the inferences whereas 
the 'poor' performance was not able to do so? It was assumed that there was an 
operative logic of inclusions and exclusions that enabled the more successful child to 
represent the game structure and to anticipate the results of the moves. Study 4 
investigated children's inferential problem solving across the Flamingo game and two 
other tasks: the Number task and the Tunnel task. The Number task was used to 
investigate children's understanding of inclusion of multiple possibilities, that is, their 
understanding of exclusion of multiple impossibilities as well. The Tunnel task was 
used to assess the level of the coordination of inclusions and exclusions. The Flamingo 
game and the two tasks were similar in that they all required inclusions and exclusions. 
But they differed in the complexity of their requirements. The majority of 6-year-old 
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children could infer and hold the 'critical zone' of possibilities; their coordination of 
inclusions and exclusions could be judged as being only partially developed. There 
were significant correlations between the results for the Flamingo game, the Number 
task, and the Tunnel task after age had been controlled for. Those who could keep in 
mind multiple possibilities and those who coordinated inclusions and exclusions 
managed the game with high efficiency. The children's performance on the Flamingo 
game could be predicted by their performance of the Number and the Tunnel tasks. The 
results indicate that there are developmental stages of the operative logic of inclusions 
and exclusions. Children develop in their ability to understand logical structure from a 
simple form (i.e., the Number task) to a more complicated form (i.e. the Tunnel task) 
which requires coordination of inclusions and exclusions. 
In conclusion, individual differences in decision-making in computer game contexts are 
clearly related to inferential ability. 8-year-old children, on average, could enact the 
game as a problem-solving task when the game is structured by rules, stated as 
affirmative and negative if-then sentences. The children younger than 8 years made 
random choices and showed poor judgement on the possible or impossible places for 
the target. The ability to understand inferential principles and to use this understanding 
in planning the search actions developed with age. These results are consistent with a 
variety of others that examined the understanding of logical relations in children of 
roughly the same age range (6 to 10 years) that I have examined in the experiments for 
this thesis (Bynes & Overton, 1983; Markovits, et al., 1989; Pieraut-LeBonniec, 1980; 
Scholnick & Wing, 1988). The children's game performance was successfully 
predicted by examining their performances on other inferential tasks that required 
inferring multiple possibilities or coordination of inclusions and exclusions. I can 
confidently say that there is an operative logic of inclusions and exclusions that enables 
these children to make and use inferences in their search. General skills of inclusion 
and exclusion were used to solve specific tasks that differed in their structures. The 
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general skills and their specific uses will be discussed in more detail in the next section 
concerning children's construction of the meanings of game clues. 
How do children construct the new meanings of the words? 
In the Flamingo game process, the children were faced with the clues: HOT, WARM, 
or COLD. The meanings of the clues in the game were no longer related to 
temperature. The efficiency of children's search for the target depended on the 
construction of new meanings for the words as they were defined in the game rules. 
The question of how the children interpreted the clues was tackled by an examination of 
choice making in relation to each of the game clues. Study 2, with 87 children aged 7 
to 10 years, showed that, faced with HOT, about 90 percent of moves were to the 
horizontally or vertically adjacent places. Faced with WARM, there were only one out 
of each two moves to the diagonal places. Faced with COLD, about 65 percent of 
moves were to the non-adjacent places. HOT and WARM had the same meaning — the 
inclusion of possibilities. Why were HOT and WARM used so differently? In the 
Flamingo game, spatial information appears to confuse children about the two kinds of 
inclusion: the inclusion of horizontally or vertically adjacent places (HOT) and that of 
diagonally adjacent places (WARM). A directional difference (side vs. corner) may 
explain the greater successful use of HOT than WARM. Analysis of the moves showed 
that, faced with WARM, moves to the horizontally or vertically adjacent places were 
made nearly as often as to the diagonal places. But moves to the non-adjacent areas 
were quite rare. The children regarded WARM as the signal for moves to adjacent 
places. Were they confused by the directional cue for inclusion and exclusion? Were 
they incapable of keeping in mind simultaneously the two dimensions of the 
information: direction, and inclusion of multiple possibilities? 
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In order to investigate how the directional cues affected the children's inferential 
problem solving, a new game was designed to separate the inclusion information from 
the directional cues. Two rules and two kinds of information (inclusion and exclusion) 
structure the game called the 'Boat' game. The game has only one kind of inclusion 
information, without directional clues; that is, 'touching'. Study 3 showed that the 
children in the control group (without the planning intervention, N=32, mean age = 7.4 
years) had a mean number of 10 moves in the first 8 games in the Boat game. The 
percentages of correct inferences were 81.1 for inclusion information (X) and 44.9 for 
exclusion information (0). Study 2 showed that the same age group (N=32, mean age 
= 7.4 years) had a mean number of 9.9 moves in the 8 games in the Flamingo game. 
The percentages of correct inferences were 88.5 for inclusion information about the 
horizontally or vertically adjacent places (HOT) and 43.8 for exclusion information 
(COLD). The elimination of directional cues did not affect inferential problem solving 
performance. This finding implies that inclusion and exclusion cues are more salient 
for drawing inferences than directional cues. 
In conclusion, there were differences in the use of different kinds of information. The 
children found it easy to use HOT in the Flamingo game and X in the Boat game, taking 
them as signals of inclusion of possible locations of the goal. Exclusion information 
(COLD in the Flamingo game and 0 in the Boat game) was used much less correctly 
than inclusion information. Thus, the construction of the new meanings of the word 
clues in a goal search frame varies according to the demand for operations of inclusion 
and exclusion, and the complexity of the cues in the words. The directional cue 
disturbed the child's inference making when they were using inclusion and exclusion. 
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Can children's inferential problem solving be enhanced in computer 
games? 
In order to see whether the children's inferential problem solving improved over the 
practice of games, the mean numbers of moves were compared between the blocks of 
games. Studies 2 and 3 found significant differences, in favour of the later games. Did 
children's understanding of possibilities and impossibilities and use of their 
understanding change? Or did the accumulated reinforcement lead the children to make 
choices in the way defined by the game rules? It was assumed that if children's 
understanding of possibilities and impossibilities and use of their understanding 
changed over the practice of games, intervention could be given to enhance inference-
making from the game rules and its use in the game process. Study 3 investigated the 
effects of 'guided-planning' and 'pausing' in the Boat game, using a brief training 
session. In the guided-planning condition, the experimenter asked questions about the 
possibility and impossibility of the goal in relation to the clues; in the pause condition, 
'pauses' were inserted into the game as a deliberate opportunity for children to think 
how to use inferences. During the training, the guided-planning group performed 
significantly better than the control group. The planning of use of inferences did make 
differences in inferential problem solving. Analyses of inferences from each type of 
information provided a precise picture of the effect of intervention in planning. In the 
case of inclusion inferences, there was no difference between the treatment groups. 
The percentages of inclusion inferences for all the participants increased from the pre- to 
the post-training games. In the case of exclusion inferences, the guided-planning group 
was significantly better at exclusion inference than the pausing group during the 
training; the pausing group was significantly better than the control group. But the 
difference disappeared in the post-training performance. The children aged 6 to 8 years 
gave interpretations to the information of 0 and COLD (assimilation), but the 
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knowledge was not truly appropriated because it had not been internally reconstructed 
(accommodation). 
If the games provide children with plenty of opportunities to assimilate, children will 
learn through doing them. The selection of games, then, is better when the game 
exceeds a little the child's level of understanding of the concepts and logical structure of 
the game. The construction of the meaning of the game clues and the planning of the 
use of inferences will gradually improve over the practice of the game. 
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7.2. Limitations and suggestions for further studies 
The 'Find the Flamingo' game (1985) used in the thesis is by now a rather simple and 
old-fashioned game. However, it requires the understanding of game rules stated as 
positive and negative, the two basic forms of statements. The inferential nature of the 
rules provided a research opportunity to investigate children's reasoning and problem 
solving in the context of games. The fact that the Flamingo game has an element of 
problem solving, like most computer games, including games in specific subject areas, 
suggests that findings from studies using this game can be extended to other games and 
children's thinking in general. 
The finding that children learned concepts of inclusion and exclusion within the simple 
structure of the game gives an encouraging implication, that individual teachers might 
create simple games for teaching aids, for example, using hyper-text. Kelly and 
O'Kelly (1994) also suggested the use of teacher-designed instructional games in the 
classroom, emphasizing the need for simplicity in the games. Further studies should 
investigate how teachers might create their own games (involving children), what can 
be gained from these activities, and what training is needed to enable teachers to create 
their own games. In particular, research interest lies in the implicit and explicit 
knowledge gained in computer contexts. The comparative effects of implicit guidance 
(the pausing group) and explicit guidance (the guided planning group) in children's 
planning were shown in Study 3. Children's performance benefited from planning the 
use of inference from the game rules in relation to the current position in the game, by 
the experimenter's explicit questioning about the possible or impossible target places. 
How would children make explicit their implicit knowledge when designing new 
games? How would a teacher encourage them to do so? 
7.3. Educational implications 
Children's planning was shown as "planning in action" instead of "planning the action" 
in Studies 3 and 4. The intervention of an adult's questioning before action enhanced 
the use of inferences. This finding has implications for the design and use of 
educational game software. The first point to be made concerns its design. Deliberate 
questions should be posed in the course of games in order to encourage children to 
think and to plan. The approach which provides instructional control by CAI - 
Computer Assisted Instruction — favours provision of explanations or a guideline, for 
example, a help facility, in contrast to the approach which provides learner-controlled 
support, where more choices are left to the learner. The finding of the positive effect of 
guided planning supports the case for direct instructional control. In order to enable 
pupils to take greater responsibility for their own learning in computer activities (DES, 
1990), software should provide and promote more opportunities to think and plan. The 
second point concerns the roles of the teachers in the use of educational software. 
Should teachers intervene in the course of children's computer activity, or is it sufficient 
for them to evaluate and choose a piece of software and leave the resources in the 
children's hands? Squires and McDougall (1994) pointed out that the vast majority of 
educational software packages is used in organized contexts in which a teacher has a 
formal responsibility to participate. Supporting Squires and his coworkers' claim that 
software evaluation should be made, using the paradigm of teacher-children interaction 
(McDougall & Squires, 1995; McDougall, Squires & Guss, 1996), this thesis draws 
the attention to the value of interaction between the pupil and the teacher in the context 
of computer games. 
Individual differences and learning through problem solving in computer game contexts 
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were demonstrated in the thesis. Two levels of analysis were involved. One concerned 
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the general problem-solving process for different age groups. The other level was the 
study of intrinsic individual differences, reflecting a fine-grained analysis of the 
psychological processes in sub-groups of children. Using the backward learning 
curves of two performance groups in each age group, Study 2 showed that some 7-
year-old children played the game with higher efficiency than some 10-year-old 
children. Many younger children used the game rules only after the first four games, 
whereas most older children performed the game with high efficiency from the 
beginning of the games. The grouping offered a means of exploring the diversity of the 
problem-solving processes of children in a way that would not have been feasible with 
a reliance on a single mean for the whole group. 
An impressive observation for the experimenter was that all the children were very 
eager to play the game on the computer. Regardless of whether or not a child managed 
to play the game properly, she or he reported high satisfaction and joy. Nonetheless, 
Study 1 showed that the apparatus used when the children played the game did not have 
a significant effect on the children's problem solving efficiency. There was no 
difference in this between the computer and the traditional game tools (the board and 
cards). Stronger motivation, or eagerness to play the game, did not lead to improved 
problem solving. This finding does not support some claims for the use of technology 
in education, that is, the positive effects of the strong motivation that computers offer 
(Cox, 1997; Silvern, 1986). 
There have been studies showing the negative effects of computer use on children's 
learning. For example, Oyen and Bebko (1996) compared memory-enhancing 
strategies in computer games and lesson contexts. Children aged from 4 to 7 years took 
part in one of two computer games ("GrowWorm" and "ShipWrecks") and were taught 
in corresponding more formal lesson conditions (where they were simply given 
instructions to remember). During the stimulus presentation and delay periods, children 
were observed for strategy use. The observed rehearsal was much greater in game 
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contexts. At each age level the number of rehearsers nearly doubled. However, when 
covert use of rehearsal was also considered through the inclusion of children's reports 
of strategy use, there was no such effect. The game condition, while more enjoyable 
and interesting for the children, was more difficult for them to recall than the lesson. 
Oyen and Bebko speculated that the game contexts required the processing of multiple 
means and goals, whereas lesson tasks were less complex. Some of the elements of the 
games that were reported as interesting and fun by the children, such as the capability of 
dragging images across the screen or the movement of the stimulus items as they fell to 
the bottom of the display, may have distracted some of the children or become subgoals 
in themselves, supplementing the goal of the computer game. The results point to the 
need for careful consideration of specific aspects of the design of the software with 
reference to the purpose of its use. Along with the result reported here, the finding that 
the effects of computer activities did not come from the computer itself, but from the 
activity, Oyen and Bebko's work draws attention to the importance of care in the design 
and use of educational game software. 
Another merit of the 'Find the Flamingo' game for children's learning was its gender-
neutral nature (Littleton, et al., 1992; Littleton, Light, et al., 1998; Littleton, Ashman, et 
al., 1999). Girls and boys did not show any differences in their inferential game 
performance. This finding is harmonious with studies showing that training on spatial 
skills benefits both males and females (meta-analysis of Baeninger & Newcombe, 
1989; a video action game study by Subrahmanyam & Greefield, 1994). 
Overall, the thesis developed a frame for analyzing children's thinking and learning in 
computer game contexts. 	 Four experiments investigated and discussed the 
measurement of learning, individual differences in inferential game performance, the 
construction of the meaning of the clues in the games, and the effects of intervention on 
planning. The approach is supported by the view that researchers must measure the 
promises of providers of high technology systems against our general knowledge of 
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how children think and learn (Littleton & Light, 1999; Squires & McDougall, 1994; 
Underwood & Brown, 1997; Wood, 1998). Educators should look carefully at games 
if they intend to make them a central part of the learning environment. More attention 
should be given to each piece of educational software, with careful consideration of 
why a specific package would be useful, what activities the child does with it and how, 
and what concepts are learned through it. 
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Appendix 14. Distribution of the error scores of the Flamingo game card 
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